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ABSTRACT
The FRANTIC II computer code has been modified and used to
demonstrate that time dependent unavailability analysis is
a practical tool for assessing the periodic testing programs
of operational standby safety systems.
FRANTIC II was assessed from an engineering point of view
and modified as necessary to make it more useful for appli-
cation to operational systems. An offset time was. added to
the component failure parameters to provide more flexible
modeling of time dependent standby failures and the effects
of test caused wear-out. A routine to calculate the optimum
test interval of a constant failure rate component subject
imperfect testing was also developed. The code was then
coupled to a cutset generator and evaluator for application
to multiple component systems. The resulting code is named
FRANTIC II-MIT.
FRANTIC II-MIT has been applied to the High Pressure Coolant
Injection System of a Boiling Water Reactor and a
quantitatively based periodic testing program keyed to a
fault tree evaluation of the system' s safety functions has
been formulated. The analysis indicated that system una-
vailability can be reduced while also reducing testing
requirements from approximately 170 to 123 tests per year.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Standby safety systems have the very difficult mission
of remaining idle for long periods of time while being pre-
pared to function under accident conditions at a moment's
notice. The operational status of most of these systems can
not be monitored while they are idle, so the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) requires that systems important to
safety "be designed to permit appropriate periodic
inspection of important areas and features. . . " [ 10CFR50,
App. A] Unfortunately, establishing a quantitative basis
for judging what is appropriate is very difficult for a com-
plex saftey system containing many components. As a result,
periodic test and inspection policies are frequently based
on "engineering judgment" or the anaylsis of equivalent sin-
gle component systems, rather than a quantitative balancing
of the advantages and disadvantages of accomplishing a par-
ticular testing program in the context of the entire
system's safety function.
To aid in establishing a more quantitative basis for
periodic testing, the NRC has developed and distributed the
FRANTIC (Formal Reliability Analysis including Normal Test-
ing, Inspection and Checking) computer codes. [Ve77,
Ve81] The codes use time dependent unavailability analy-
1
sis to accomplish this task. Given a comprehensive set of
input parameters describing component failure rates and
periodic testing policies and a user supplied equation
relating the system's unavailability to that of the compo-
nents, they calculate the system's instantaneous unavail-
ability at all important time points and the average system
unavailability over a user specified calculation period.
Two versions are currently available. The original FRANTIC
code assumes constant component failure rates, while FRAN-
TIC II can model wear-out and burn-in as a function of both
calendar time and periodic tests. While the codes have been
applied to illustrative examples (eg. EP1443, Va79b, Ka80],
to the best of this author's knowledge, they have not yet
been used for a detailed examination of the periodic testing
program for an operating reactor system.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the utility of
time dependent unavailability analysis for improving the
availability of standby safety systems using the FRANTIC II
computer code as a tool. To accomplish this, FRANTIC II is
assessed from an engineering point of view and modified as
necessary to make it more useful for applications to opera-
tional systems. It is then interfaced with a cutset
generator and evaluator so that is can be applied to complex
system models. The modified verison of the code is named
FRANTIC II-MIT. The code is then applied to the High Pres-
sure Coolant Injection System of a Boiling Water Reactor,
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and a quantitatively based periodic testing policy keyed to
a fault tree evaluation of the system's safety functions is
established. As a result, this thesis provides an improved
framework within which a systems engineer can establish a
quantitative basis for a periodic testing program.
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
To illustrate the primary motivation for accomplishing
periodic testing, consider the following simple example.
Figure 1.1 represents the time dependent unavailability of a
standby safety system whose failure rate can be modeled by a
single constant standby failure rate, Xs per hour, and which
can be tested in its entirety at one time. This parameter
models the system's suseptibility to random shocks that
transfer it into a state which can not respond to a demand to
operate. [Ba75, Ap76, EP14431 However, because the system
is idle, the shocks do not produce observable effects until
the demand is actually made. As the system sits idle, the
time during which the shocks can occur lengthens and the
probability that a failure has occurred gradually
increases. When a test is accomplished, the demand to oper-
ate is made and the failures are revealed and immediately
repaired. After the test the system' s unavailability is
zero because random shocks have not yet had an opportunity
to occur.
3
Periodic Test
r-
Standby Time
Figure 1.1. Simplified Example of a Periodically
Tested System
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In practice, standby failures are not the only factor
to consider in establishing a periodic test policy. For
example:
* Shocks may occur during the demand as well as during the
standby period. They produce failures whose probability
is independent of the standby period. If demand related
failures are possible, the unavailability of a component
is not reduced to zero by an operational test.
e Frequently a system must be reconfigured to test an acci-
dent mitigation function without interfering with normal
operations, and it may be unavailable to perform that
function in the event that a true demand occurs during the
test.
* Operational tests which cycle the system to an active mode
may cause wear-out that makes the system more suseptable
to failures later in its life.
* Since test conditions are not always similar to accident
conditions, a periodic test may not be able to detect all
the failure mechanisms which could prevent the system
from performing its intended function.
* The act of accomplishing the test can cause failures which
require repair and thus produce additonal unavailability.
* Human error during the test may leave the system in a
failed state at its conclusion.
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Clearly, there are positive and negative aspects of periodic
testing which must be balanced when formulating a periodic
testing program.
Even if one accounts for all the factors mentioned in
the previous paragraph, a simple one component system fre-
quently can not be used to model operational systems. Engi-
neered safeguards systems in a nuclear reactor are a prime
example. They contain many components which exhibit a vari-
ety of failure mechanisms. Within the context of these
complex systems, all the considerations listed for the sim-
ple system of the previous paragraph now apply to each
component. It is difficult to establish an optimal testing
policy for these systems for several reasons:
* Direct testing of the entire safety function usually can
not be performed without interfering with the operation
of the reactor, so portions of the system must be recon-
figured, disabled or bypassed, while other parts come
into closer alignment with their operational configura-
tion
* The system is frequently designed to respond to diverse
indications of an accident, each of which must be tested
separately.
* The act of testing some components can affect the status
of both the component being tested and other groups of
components.
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* Testing of individual components can cause failures which
must be repaired. Frequently the entire system is disa-
bled during the repair.
Until recently, a reasonable tool for establishing a
quantitative basis for a periodic testing program which con-
siders all of the above factors did not exist. It is very
difficult to evaluate the effect of individual component
failure mechanisms on the functioning of a larger system
having many different types of components without a tool
such as a computer code to reduce the computational diffi-
culties. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently
developed the FRANTIC II computer code to alleviate this
problem. The code calculates component unavailability at
specific points in time taking into account both demand and
time dependent failure rates and modeling both the positive
and negative effects of periodic testing. A user provided
equation is then called to calculate the system unavailabil-
ity in terms of individual component unavailibilities.
Because it has not yet been applied to actual system prob-
lems, FRANTIC II's capabilites and limitations have not yet
been explored.
1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the usefulness
of time dependent unavailability analysis for improving the
availability of standby safety systems using the FRANTIC II
7
computer code as a tool. To accomplish this goal, the fol-
lowing tasks are performed:
1) Modification of FRANTIC II as necessary to provide
modeling capability of physically reasonable failure mech-
anisms. The resulting code is named FRANTIC II-MIT. The
task includes:
* An engineering interpretation of failure mechanisms of
standby components subject to periodic testing and
repair.
* Correlation of FRANTIC II input parameters with these
mechanisms
* Incorporation of an additional model which accounts for
test caused changes in the demand failure rate.
* Incorporation of an offset time into the Weibull hazard
rate to make possible the modeling of a family of time
varying failure rates having any initial or final value.
* Provision for human error during periodic testing which
results in the nondetection of a fraction of the failures
which the test is capable of detecting.
2) Modifications to improve the code's capability to
examine the sensitivity of component and system unavail-
ability to input parameter changes. This includes:
* Interface of the code with a cutset generator with pro-
visions to save the cutsets for reuse as required.
* Addition of subroutine OPTEST, which can calculate the
optimum test interval of a component for a given set of
8
input parameters, assuming all parameters have constant
failure rates.
3) Investigation of the importance of some of the
code's modeling capabilites relative to assumptions common-
ly used in practical unavailability analysis. This
includes:
* Demand failures verses standby failures.
* Effects of the various types of imperfect testing.
* Effects of calendar time dependent failure rates (common-
ly called wear-out and burn-in).
* Effects of test dependent failure rates (test caused
wear-out or the effects of product improvement due to
elimination of failure causes).
4) Application of FRANTIC II-MIT to the High Pressure
Coolant Injection System of a Boiling Water Reactor to
obtain an understanding of the factors which can influence
the selection of periodic testing intervals. The analysis
includes:
* Description of the system with particular attention to
the interaction of component testing policies within the
system and types of component failures mechanisms.
* Construction of fault trees down to the smallest testable
component level.
e Quantification of the fault tree using generic data and,
to the extent that it is available, plant specific data.
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e Analysis of periodic test procedures to estimate quanti-
tative test input parameters.
* Sensitivity studies of a number of testing options to
determine the most important contributors to safety func-
tion unavailability and the effect that the testing poli-
cy can have on these contributors.
* Discussion of the practical problems involved in address-
ing real systems problems using time dependent unavail-
ability analysis with recommendations for solutions
and/or further research.
This thesis provides an improved framework within
which a systems engineer can establish a quantitative basis
for a periodic testing program. The observations and recom-
mendations resulting from the application of time dependent
unavailability analysis should lead to a more rational test-
ing program and an improvement in the performance of those
systems.
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THESIS
Chapter 2 reviews the basic concepts of unavailability
analysis and summarizes regulations and research which
address periodic testing of standby components.
Chapter 3 presents an engineering interpretation of
the FRANTIC II code and the version of it developed by this
work, FRANTIC II-MIT. It provides explanations and examples
to assist the systems engineer in identifying what each
10
input parameter can model. It outlines the modifications
incorporated in FRANTIC II-MIT and provides the guidance
necessary for its use. An appendix outlines the code's
input format.
Chapter 4 uses FRANTIC II-MIT to investigate the una-
vailability of single component systems. The practical
implications of various assumptions about the failure mech-
anisms of components are illustrated through examples.
Where possible the code' s calculations are compared with
analytical expressions derived in the literature. The sub-
routine OPTEST is presented in this chapter. It was
designed to quickly calculate the optimum test interval of
single components having a constant failure rate.
Chapter 5 describes the use of FRANTIC II-MIT in con-
junction with the cut set generation and evaluation subrou-
tines of UNRAC [Ka80] and examines its applications to a few
simple component configurations. It then describes tech-
niques for applying the package to more complex systems,
using the calculations presented in Chapter 6 as the primary
example. An appendix summarizes the input format necessary
to use the cut set generation and evaluation subroutines,
which have been assembled into a code called CUTSETS.
Another appendix presents IBM CMS/VS system specific pro-
grams which can tailor the code's input and output files to
suit the needs of the user.
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Chapter 6 uses the FRANTIC II-MIT/CUTSETS package to
examine the periodic testing policy of a Boiling Water Reac-
tor' s High Pressure Coolant Injection System in detail.
This chapter demonstrates that the package can be a powerful
and versitile tool for examining the consistency of periodic
testing policies.
Chapter 7 summarizes the results of this study and
makes recommendations for future research.
12
CHAPTER 2
UNAVAILABILITY AND PERIODIC TESTING
This chapter presents a basic description of the una-
vailability analysis of standby safety systems. First una-
vailability is defined in relation to the operational
requirements of a standby safety system. Then basic con-
cepts of unavailability analysis are described as they apply
to monitored and periodically tested components. Since an
engineering interpretation of each failure and test parame-
ter is presented in Chapter 3, this section focuses on those
points necessary to explain what the status of a failed com-
ponent can be and how long that status can last. Finally, a
review of regulations and research addressing periodic
testing of standby systems using unavailability analysis is
presented.
2.1 STANDBY SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY DEFINITIONS
In reactor safety applications, fault tree analysis is
commonly used to account for the ways that the failure modes
of components composing the system contriubute to system
failure. A number of excellent references [He8l, NUREG-
0492, McC81] discuss the construction and use of fault
trees. In this thesis it is assumed that the reader is
familiar with these techniques.
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Fault trees are generally used to calculate system
unavailability and cumulative failure probability. These
two quantities are used to describe the likelihood that the
system will not complete its required mission. This study
addresses the calculation of unavailability. However, so
that system unavailability can be put into proper context,
it is useful to define these terms in the context of the
mission of a standby safety system before proceeding
further.
Unavailability, Q(t 1 )
The ability of a standby system to start when required
depends on its being in state which is capable of making the
transition from the idle mode to the active mode at the time
of the demand. The probability of not being in such a state
at a point in time, t, is referred to as the system's
unavailability, Q (t 1 ), to allow the transition.
The unavailability of a complex system will depend on
individual component unavailibilities, q (t ), and the com-
bination of component faults required to produce system
failure, as represented by a fault tree. The top event of
the fault tree is the failure of the system to startup to the
fully operational properly aligned active mode, given a
demand of a specified type. The unavailability of a compo-
nent is the probability that it can not perform at time t
the specific functions required of it by the system to
startup.
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The symbol Q (tj) is defined to be the unavailability
of minimal cut set i at time t . In fault tree analysis a cut
set defines a combination of component failures whose simul-
taneous existence is both necessary and sufficient to
produce system failure. A minimal cut set is one which is
not a subset of another cut set, and its unavailability is
the product of the unavailabilities of all the components in
it. A large number of minimal cut sets are obtained from
most system fault trees, and the upper bound of the system
unavailability is Q ZQ.. Knowledge of the individual val-
s J.
ues of is useful for determining which combinations of
component failures are most likely to cause system failure.
The unavailability to make a transition to the active
mode can be a result of failures that occur either during the
standby period prior to the demand or during the actual
transition. Failures which occur before the demand may be
detected and repaired. If the repair is completed before
the demand is made, the system will be available. It is not
necessary that the system remain in an operable state for
the entire standby interval so long as it is operable when
the demand to transfer to the active mode is made.
Cumulative Failure Probability, P(t1t2)
Given that a system has sucessfully started to perform
its function during an accident, the probability that it
will not continue to perform its function successfully for
the entire mission interval time (t1 ,t2 ) is called the cumu-
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lative failure probability, P(t 1 ,t2)' of the system. The
cumulative failure probability is calculated using a fault
tree having a top event which is the failure to remain prop-
erly aligned and successfully performing its function under
specified performance criteria.
A typical mission requirement is that the system per-
form its function for the entire period from t1 to t2 . This
requirement is specified when adverse effects will result
immediately from a stoppage of the safety function.
However, some systems may be allowed to be down for repair
for short periods without resulting in adverse
consequences. An example would be those systems which pro-
vide long term removal of decay heat from a reactor. After
the first few days mission failure could be defined as the
system being down for more than a specified interval. The
allowed downtime could be extended as the time since shut-
down increases.
Like the startup unavailabilty, the cumulative failure
probability depends on the structure of the system and the
failure characteristics of its components. However, the
fault tree whose top event defines a failure to make a tran-
sition upon demand may be quite different from one which
describes the failure to continue running once the transi-
tion has been successfully accomplished. For example, the
transition might require that valves change position. Once
they have done so, they must remain passive for the duration
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of the mission. Therefore, a failure mode of the valve for
transition unavailability would be failure to make the
required position change, whereas a failure mode for the
cumulative failure probability during the active phase
would be a change from the proper alignment to a position
which would prevent the proper functioning of the system.
Although the fault trees quantifying unavailability
and cumulative failure probability are different, some com-
ponent failure modes may be the same in both. For example,
emergency core cooling systems are designed so that an iso-
lation signal is generated if sensors indicate that the
source of a loss of coolant accident comes from within that
system. The isolation signal will either prevent the system
from starting or will shut it down if it is already running.
Therefore, the production of an erroneous isolation signal
would appear as a failure mode in both fault trees.
Unreliability, F(t ,t 2 )
The probability that a standby system will either not
start or not run for the required mission time is called in
this thesis the unreliability , F(t1 ,t 2 )' of the system.
Other terms are system undependability and system failure
probability. System unreliability may be expressed as the
sum of the unavailability and cumulative failure probabili-
ty as follows:
F(t 1,t2 )=Q (t )+{1-Q(t 1 ))P(t ,t2 ) (2.1)
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This thesis concentrates on the modeling of a system's
unavailability to initiate a safety function and not on the
cumulative failure probability. More specifically, it
focuses on its time dependence and the effects that periodic
testing might have on both the instantaneous and the time
averaged unavailability of a safety system.
2.2 BASIC UNAVAILABILITY CONCEPTS
Probabilistic unavailability analysis requires deter-
mining when component failures occur and for how long they
last. For this purpose components can be divided into two
generic groups, periodically tested and "other."
2.2.1 "OTHER" COMPONENTS
Figure 2.1 is a graphical representation of the
asymptotic unavailability of all types of components other
than periodically tested. There are three contributors to
the component' s unavailability:
1) Standby failures which occur at a constant rate of X per
hour and are detected and repaired with an average downtime
of TR. (More commonly known as monitored failures.) These
failure occur to components which perform some type of func-
tion during standby, so that failures can be identified when
they happen. For illustrative purposes,' the steady state
For a more complete treatment of the probabilistic
parameters of components with binary states see, for
example, Henley and Kumamoto. [He8l]
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Figure 2.1. Time Dependent Unavailability of Components
Other Than Those Which Must Be Periodically Tested to Re-
veal Standby Failures.
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unavailability due to the downtime, TR, during which the
failures are detected and repaired can be heuristically
derived by recogonizing that, in some increment of time, dt,
the unavailability of a component is increased by the proba-
bility that it fails in dt and decreased by the probability
that it is repaired in dt. At steady state qm(t) is a con-
stant, qm' and d[q m(t) ] = 0. Therefore:
[1-qm]Xdt - qm(1/TR)dt = 0 (2.2)
Where:
X - Conditional failure rate (assumed constant)
1/TR - Rate at which repairs are completed (assumed to
behave as an exponential process)
Rearranging,
XTR
S 1+XTR ~ XTR when XTR<O'l (2.3)
1+TR
2) Transition failures, modeled by a constant time inde-
pendent unavailability per demand, qd. These failures occur
because of a change in the component's operating conditons
at the time of the accident, including the possibility of
operator error.
3) Failures which occur at a rate of per hour during the
standby period, but for some reason are not detected until
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the component fails to operate under the conditions of the
true demand. The rate at which the component's unavailabil-
ity due to these failures increases can be expressed as fol-
lows:
d[q(t)} = [1-q(t)]X Pdt (2.4)
Where:
X dt = Conditonal probability that the component fails
between t and t+dt, given that it is working at t.
[1-q(t)] Probability that the component is working at
time t.
In its most general form X can be a function of time. (Chap-
ter 3 shows how to model time dependent failure rates with a
generalized Weibull hazard rate.) For convenience it is
assumed here that X has a constant value.
The equation can be rearranged to:
d[q(t)] = Adt (2.5)
[l-q(t)]
and integrated from time 0 to t, yielding
-ln[l-q (t)] + ln[l-q (o)] = X t (2.6)
Since it is assumed that the component was working at t = 0,
q (0) = 0, giving ln(l) = 0. This leads to:
q (t) = 1 - e p't - X t for X t < 0.1. (2.7)y 91'
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The three failure modes are accounted for together
because they all behave as a function of just the standby
time. This is not true with periodically tested components,
which will be discussed in the next section.
2.2.2 PERIODICALLY TESTED COMPONENTS
There are three major differences between periodically
tested components and other types of components:
1) Although X failures occur randomly in time, they are
not detected or repaired randomly in periodically tested
components. Repair can not be started until the failure is
detected, and failures can not be detected until the compo-
nent is tested. Thus detection and repair occur at definite
points in time which are controlled by the periodic testing
policy.
2) Because periodic testing generally requires that
the component be cycled to its active mode to detect fail-
ures, the act of testing can caused additonal failures which
contribute the component's unavailability.
3) Whereas TR' the average downtime before a monitored
component can be restored to an operational condition, was a
major contributor to the unavailability of monitored compo-
nents, the repair time of periodically tested components is
a relatively minor contributor compared to the time during
which the failure can have occured but be undetected because
a test has not yet revealed it.
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Figure 2.2. Time Dependent Unavailability of Components
Which Must Be Tested to Reveal Standby Failures.
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Figure 2.2 shows the time dependence of a periodically
tested component. Instead of only one, there are now three
distinct time frames for which component unavailability
must be determined:
T 3Test period. During this time the component is cycled to
its active configuration to verify its operability. If
it is found failed during this time it is assumed to
remain failed for the entire test period.
T Repair Period. Failed components are assumed to remainR
failed until repair is completed, which takes an average
of TR time. If components are verified operational by
the test, they go back on standby during this time.
T s Standby period. For most practical applications, T s
(t+Tr ), so T ~ T, the interval between the begining of
consecutive periodic tests. 2
During standby a periodically tested component can be
made unavailable for the same reasons as the other types of
components. However, since it is usually idle during stand-
by, failures will not be revealed until the component is
required to perform its function. Assuming that standby
failures occur with a constant conditional failure rate of X
per hour, the probability that they have occurred increases
in exactly the same manner as that of undetectable failures
modeled by X in Equations (2.4) to (2.7). However, now the
2 In FRANTIC II, the test interval is given the symbol T2 '
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effective time period starts at t , the last time the compo-
nent was known to be working. The resulting unavailability
is:
= - -(t-t)q (t ,t) = 1 - e w ) X(t-t ) (2.8)X w w
When the component is tested, detectable standby fail-
ures are revealed, but other factors also influence the com-
ponents unavailability.. The various contributions to a
periodically tested component' s unavailability during the
test and repair periods are:
q - Demand failures
q (t) - Probability of undetectable standby failures.
This continues to rise throughout the component's
life independent of standby, test, and repair (un-
less renewal occurs).
qX(t ,tw+T) - Probability that a detectable standby fail-
ure exists at the begining of a periodic test fol-
lowing a standby interval of T. (= XT if <0.1)
P - Probability that the test causes failures which
require repairs.
q - Probability that a component can not respond to a
true demand while it is being tested.
C - Probability that detectable standby failures are
not detected at a periodic test due to human error.
2.3 CURRENT STATUS OF ANALYSIS OF PERIODIC TESTING
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2.3.1 REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS
Requirements for periodic testing of standby safety
systems are currently set forth in 10 Code of Federal Regu-
lations, Part 50, and ANSI/IEEE Std 338-1977, Criteria for
the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Safety
Systems.
Periodic testing is specifically required in a number
of the design criteria set forth in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
However, the extent of testing necessary to satisfy the cri-
teria is not specified. Instead, general phrases are used.
For example, Criterion 18 - "Inspection and testing of elec-
tric power systems, " states:
Electric power systems important to
safety shall be designed to permit appro-
priate periodic inspection of important
areas and features ... to assess the conti- k
nuity of the systems and the conditions of
their components.
More specific requirements and criteria for periodic
testing are set forth in ANSI/IEEE Std 338-1977. It provides
guidance for the development of procedures and documentation,
and the design of equipment necessary for the periodic testing
of a nuclear power generating station's protection and power
systems. This standard provides an outline of good engineering
practice and records requirements to be used in accomplishing
and documenting the tests. The question of test interval is
addressed in Appendix Al, which states:
Determination of test intervals based on
mathematical relations involving logic,
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failure rate data, test duration, and permis-
sible system unavailability is covered by
IEEE Std 352-1975, Guide for General Princi-
ples of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power
Generating Station Protection Systems.
Section 7 of ANSI/IEEE Std 352-1975 provides the guidance
for the establishment of test intervals. For a single compo-
nent system the test interval is expressed as:
0 = 2G/X (2.9)
where:
G Unavailability design goal
X Standby failure rate
9 Periodic test interval
The test intervals for systems of components arranged in common
logic configurations are given in Table 4 of the standard,
which is reproduced as Table 2.1.
Equation (2.9) is essentially a rearrangement of the
expression for the approximate average unavailability due to
detectable standby failures which have occured, but have not
yet been revealed by a periodic test. The average unavailabil-
ity can be easily found from Figure 2.2. The triangular area
represents the increasing probability of unrevealed failures.
The average value is half of the maximum, or OX/2 by the current
notation.
The standard does not quantitatively account for downtime
unavailability during the test period or the effects of
imperfect testing, although it does mention some of the prob-
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Test Interval as a Function of Logic Configuration
and Unavailability Design Goal G
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Table 2.1. Table 4 of ANSI/IEEE Standard 352-1975
Test Interval as a Function of Logic Configuration
and Unavailability Design Goal G
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lems and tradeoffs the analyst should address. Therefore it
should not be applied without supplemental quantitative analy-
sis.
2.3.2 PUBLISHED RESEARCH
Many of the tradeoffs to be considered when establishing a
periodic test and maintenance policy for a standby safety sys-
tem have been addressed in the literature. However, only spe-
cific parts of the problem have been addressed in any one paper
and appliciation has been restricted primarily to simple one
component systems whose failure rate can be represented by a
single distribution, or combinations of components in standard
logic configurations, such as 2-out-of-3: Good. 3
Simple Systems With Test Downtime
Jacobs [Ja68] and Epstein and Shiff [Ep68] were the first
to consider the periodic testing of components which are made
unavailable to accomplish their safety function while being
tested. They suggested that an optimum test interval could be
derived for this type of system. Figure 2.3 illustrates this
concept. It shows the unavailability of a single component
system for three different periodic test intervals. At the end
of each test the system is known to be working, so the unavail-
ability is zero. The failure rate of the component is assumed
constant during standby, and the unavailability rises exponen-
3 The term 2-out-of-3:Good means the system works if 2 of its
3 components are working.
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Figure 2.3. Example of the Effect of Test Interval
on Unavailability.
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Figure 2.4. Unavailability of a Component Subject to
Standby Failures and Test Downtime. [Ja68]
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tially until the next test is accomplished. Since the safety
function of the component is assumed to be bypassed to accom-
plish this test, its unavailability rises to one. If the test
interval is very short, the component would be bypassed most of
time for testing and would have high unavailability. Converse-
ly, if the component is tested with an extrememly long
interval, its unavailability approaches one and remains there
for a very long time. This suggests that there might be a test
interval for a given system failure rate and test down time
that minimizes the unavailability.
Using this concept, both authors derive an equation which
expresses the average unavailability of of a one component sys-
tem as:
1-x(1tQ(S) = 1 [l-e ] (2.10)
Where,
X Conditional failure rate of the system (per hour)
, Periodic test interval (hours). [Equivalent to T2
(which has units of days) in FRANTIC]
t Total time that the system is down per cycle due to
testing (hours). [Equivalent to (q t ) in FRANTIC]
A plot of this equation taken from Jacobs' paper is shown in
Figure 2.4. (Note: Jacobs originally wrote an equation for
availability, which he called P(S), but he plotted curves for
unavailability, which show the results better. The unavail-
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ability equation is written here for consistency with the
remainder of the thesis. ) The curves in Figure 2.4 are plotted
for a test downtime of 1 hour and two different failure rates.
The curves dip through a minimum, indicating that there is an
optimum test interval for a system to be taken out of service
for testing. As the failure rate increases, the optimum test
interval decreases.
By differentiating equation (2.10), both authors obtain a
simple experession for the optimum test interval in cases which
1/X<<t and X'<0.1:
2t
t= X (2.11)
Note that this equation can be rearranged so that
t(l) = XT (2.lla)
At the optimum test interval the area under the triangle in
Figure 2.3 (representing the contribution of standby failures
which have occurred but have not been detected) equals the area
of the rectangle (downtime contribution of the test which
detects them).
A recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission document,
NUREG/CR-2158, duplicates and expands upon the early work
described above. The report states explicitly the following
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assumptions in deriving the optimal test intervals: (These
same assumptions were implicit in earlier papers. )
1. The component has a constant standby fail-
ure rate of X per hour.
2. Testing is done periodically and is done on
line, i.e., during the test the component
could be called upon to operate.
3. During the time of the test, the component
is unavailable and unable to respond if
called upon to operate.
4. The testing requires an average time peri-
od t to complete.
5. Other than the test time r during which the
component is unavailable there are no
test-caused failures or degradations such
as those due to human errors.
The equations derived in NUREG/CR-2158 are the same as
those derived by Jacobs, with the exception that the approxi-
mations for XT and T used to derive Equation (2.11) are also
applied to the unavailability equation and a slightly differ-
ent notation is used. The resulting equations are:
q = IXT + 0  (2.12)c 2 T
and
T = 2 (2.13)
0 X
where:
T 0 Optimum test interval
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qc E Average component unavailability
X B Component failure rate
T Constant standby time between tests
, sConstant test downtime during which the component is
unavailable
(With this notation, a test interval has a duration of T+t
hours. The test interval was t in Jacobs' paper and is given
the symbol T2 in FRANTIC.)
Using these equations the report presents a compilation
of figures and tables which present optimum test intervals for
a variety of component failure rates and test down times
selected to cover the range of values normally encountered in
nuclear plant operations. For comparison with Jacob's paper,
Figure 4 of NUREG/CR-2158 is reproduced here as Figure 2.5.
Note that the curves for X=1.E-4 and 1.E-5 are the same as those
found in Figure 2.4. The document's tables and graphs consti-
tute a comprehensive application of Jacobs' work and provide a
convenient reference for an engineer making a first estimate of
test intervals.
Caldarola [Ca77] has derived a set of time dependent una-
vailability and failure intensity equations for components
having constant failure and repair rates. He consideres four
classes of components, each having a well defined repair
policy:
Class 1 Unrepairable components. No repair action is foreseen.
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AVERAGE COMPONENT UNAVAILABILITY VERSUS TIME BETWEEN TESTS
PARAMETRIC WITH COMPONENT FAILURE RATE, X (FAILURES/HR)
OUTAGE DURRTION(TRU)=1. HOURS
TIME BETWEEN TESTS (HOURS)
Figure 2.5. Average Component Unavailability Verses Time
Between Tests, Parametric With Component Failure Rate, A
(failures/hr), Outage Duration (T) = 1 hour. (Figure 4
of NUREG/CR-2158).
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Class 2 Repairable components with failures which are imme-
diately detected (revealed faults).
Class 3 Repairable components with failures which are detected
upon demand (faults remain unrevealed until the next
demand occurs).
Class 4 Repairable components with failures which are detected
upon inspection.
His results are given in Table 2.1, where:
V U Component unavailability with initial state intact
Vd Component unavailability with initial state failed
X Component failure rate (constant)
y E Component repair rate (constant)
u = Average demand frequency (constant)
6 B Time needed to inspect an unfailed component
,r Time needed to repair a failed component during
inspection
1 aTime interval between two successive inspections
The author states that the motivation for his work was to
derive a set of comprehensive and consistant set of equations
that address repair and inspection which are usually met in
practice for application fault tree analysis. Although the
resulting equations are time dependent, they do not appear to
have the capability of modeling contributions of imperfect
testing to unavailability.
Redundant Standby Components
Hirsch [Hi7l] presents nomographs for determining period-
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ic test intervals and allowable test bypass times to meet una-
vailability goals for systems containing identical components
arranged in one of the following logic configurations:
1-out-of-2; 1-out-of-2, twice; 2-out-of-3; or 2-out-of-4
logic. His assumptions are the same as Jacobs [Ja68] and
Lofgren [Lo8l].
To derive his nomographs, Hirsch apportions the unavail-
ability goal equally between testing downtime and undetected
standby failures. This procedure follows Section 4.11..of
ANSI/IEEE Std 279-1971, which requires that the unavailability
of the system due to test bypass must be commensurate with the
unavailability of the system for the entire interval if no
bypass were applied. He then uses the equations for unavail-
ability due to undetected standby failures presented in what is
now ANSI/IEEE Std 352-1975, Table 2, and the equations for una-
vailability during testing which he derives in his paper to
develop nomograhs for selection of the test interval and down-
time which will meet a given unavailability goal for a given
component standby failure rate. Figure 2.6 illustrates the use
of his nomographs for a system configured with 2-out-of-3
logic.
It should be pointed out that unavailability will not be
reduced by decreasing the test interval below the calculated
value associated with the optimal unavailability without also
decreasing the test bypass time. A shorter test interval means
that the system will be bypassed more often, with a
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Figure 2.6. Nomograph for Calculating a Test Interval and
Duration to Meet an Unavailability Goal. Example for
2-out-of-3:Good Logic. [Hi7]
commensurate increase in unavailability to override the peri-
odic test. Also, the nomographs do not apply to groups of
components for which the unavailability goal can be met before
the testing contribution becomes equal to the failure contrib-
ution. For this situation, Hirsch' s equations would have to be
used directly.
Chay and Mazumdar [Ch75] consider periodic testing strat-
egies to meet unavailability goals when the policy includes
provisions to alter test intervals when one component of a
redundant system is failed. Their assumptions for unavail-
ability during testing are the same as in NUREG/CR-2158. How-
ever, they define separate test intervals for use when 1) no
components are down and 2) one or more components are down.
Also, both downtime for component testing and repair are
explicitly modeled. Using these assumptions they derive sets
of linear equations to calculate the average cycle unavail-
ability of 1-out-of-2:Good and 2-out-of-3:Good logic
configurations containing identical components. They then
apply the equations to a typical reactor trip system. Their
equations are too complex to be presented outside the context
of their paper. However, it is worth noting that for their
examples a wide range of testing options will satisfy the safe-
ty goal.
Effects of Human Error on Simple Systems
McWilliams and Martz [McWSO] have investigated the
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effects of two types of human error on the optimum test inter-
val of simple one component systems. They define the errors
as:
* Type A Human Error - An initially operational standby
safety system is inadvertently left in an undetected
failed state at the conclusion of the test.
e Type B Human Error - A system failure is not detected by
an inspection which should have revealed it.
The authors develop a Markov model for the steady-state
availability of a simple system subject to these errors using
the same assumptions as NUREG/CR-2158, with the exception that
a time dependent failure rate is allowed. The authors use a
Weibull hazard function for their example.
With their model the authors calculate the sensitivity of
the optimum test interval, r*, and the resultant availability,
A*, at that interval to the probability of Type A and B human
error, pA and pB' respectively. Their results are shown in
Figures 2.7. and 2.8 for a component having a Mean Time To Fail-
ure of 100 time units, a shape factor of 2.0, and test downtime
of 1 hour. The results have two limitations. First, failures
or human errors that generate a requirement for repairs that
extend the downtime, are not considered. (All repairs are
assumed to be accomplished instantaneously.) Second, although
sensitivity of the optimal test interval to changes in human
error probabilities are presented, the sensitivity of avail-
ability to deviations from the optimum was not shown, as was
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Figure 2.7. Optimal (Maximum Availability) Test Interval
and Associated Availability as a Function of PA. [McW80]
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Figure 2.8. Optimal (Maximum Availability) Test Interval
and Associated Availability as a Function of PB. [McW80]
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done in NUREG/CR-2158. It is also interesting to note that the
optimum test interval changes by less than one time unit as
either human error probability increases from zero to 10%.
From a practical point of view, if an analyst were to determine
that the error probability is 10%, he should find a better way
to accomplish the test rather than to recommend that the test
interval be lowered slightly to maintain an optimum test inter-
val.
In a subsequent work, [McW81] McWilliams expands the work
described above to account for two additional types of human
error:
Type C - Improper repair of a failed component, and
Type D - Failure to locate the reason for an
annunicator-activated inspection.
McWilliams accomplishes a sensitivity study with all four
types of human error and concludes that Type A human errors,
which leave the component in an undetected failed state,
produce significantly increased unavailability as it
increases. This is not unexpected, since the probability that
the error is committed becomes the minimum probability that the
component will fail upon demand during the entire standby peri-
od. The other types of errors have little effect on
unavailability. McWilliams also comments on the benefits of
annunciating failures. Unfortunately many important compo-
nents, by the fact they they are idle, are incapable of
annunciating their failures.
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Apostolakis and Bansal [Ap77I consider human error during
testing which leaves a component in an undetected failed state
(defined as a Type A error by McWilliams and Martz [McW80]).
Specifically, they investigate the importance of dependencies
among human errors committed in sequential inspections of
identical components. Their unavailability formula account
for:
X Failure modes with a constant standby failure rate
qD S Demand failure modes
, E Standby interval (~ the test interval when T >> nr r'
where nt r is the total time required to test n compo-
nents sequentially. )
Tr Component downtime for test, maintenance and repair.
I = Probability that operator error leaves a component in
an undetected failed state for the first time during a
series of sequential inspections.
T - =Conditional probability of the human error being
J
repeated for the (j+1) time given that it has occurred
for j consecutive times in the current inspection
period
The authors derive equations for gr, average unavailability
due to hardware failures only, and qh average unavailability
when at least one component has been failed by human error.
Equations are presented for a number of common logic configura-
tions. Those for a 1-out-of-2:Good system are given here as an
illustration:
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(WT)2  Tr
q + QD(XT) + Q + XT+ 2 QD] (2.14)
r 3 + +D -
h To 1 + 210[ (XT)/2 + QD + 21(Tr/t] (2.15)
These equations may be interpreted as follows: For a
1-out-of-2:Good system to be unavailable, both components must
be failed simultaneously. Unavailability due to hardware
failures can occur because of 1) two standby failures, 2) one
standby and one demand failure, 3) two demand failures, or 4)
one component is being tested when the other has failed. Human
error unavailability can occur because of 1) two sequential
human errors, 2) human error combined with either a standby or
demand failure, or 3) human error has failed one component and
the second is being tested.
The Apostalokis and Bansal paper also discusses the con-
cept of conditional human error probabilities. Complete inde-
pendence of sequential errors implies that:
o = 1 = T = (2.16)
Complete dependence implies:
1 = = 2 ... . (2.17)
Under the assumption of complete dependence, an operator who
errs during first of a number of sequential inspections (1 )
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will repeat the error during each subsequent inspection with a
probability of one.
The degree of dependence will actually be somewhere
between the two extremes, in which case the human error proba-
bilities will have the bounds 5 T. 1, for all j. For exam-
o 3
ple, one might judge that the probability of making an error
during the test of a component might be 1 = 0.001, but, given
there are circumstances under which an operator would make that
error, the probability of him making it again while testing a
second component might be T = 0.25. The combined probability
of leaving both components of a 1-out-2:Good system failed due
to human error would then be 2.5E-4.
The effect of human error is to reduce the sensitivity of
system unavailability to test interval. The failures remain
undetected until the next periodic test, when they are assumed
to be detected. That second test can fail to detect the failure
or produce its own. Consequently, the human error probabili-
ties remain the same from test to test and are independent of
test interval. They are not independent of testing strategy,
however. For example, staggered testing has the potential of
greatly reducing the probability of dependent human errors.
Provided the test procedure is correct, the chance of making
the same mistake over again when the tests are two weeks apart
should be smaller than when the tests immediately follow each
other. Apostalokis and Bansal in essence make a strong argu-
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ment for accomplishing staggered testing rather than
sequential testing.
In a subsequent work, [EP1443 ] Apostolakis, Chu and
Whitley expand on the above work and present much of the back-
ground and reasoning behind their models. The work contains an
excellent literature review, a discussion of failure mech-
anisms, and common cause failure modeling, both from a hardware
and maintenance point of view. They develop unavailability
equations for a number of common component configurations and
compare their results with FRANTIC calulations, obtaining good
agreement.
Components With Many Failure Mechanisms
Research which accounts for failure mechanisms that
affect the time dependent unavailability of components in a
variety of ways will now be reviewed. These models are improv-
ing knowledge of the relative importance of various types of
failures to the overall unavailability of standby systems. The
FRANTIC models of component failures mechanisms fall into this
category. The FRANTIC code is introduced in the next section
and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Demand related failures, which are independent of the
test interval of a standby component, can dilute the effects of
periodic testing. In two recent papers Mankamo [Ma81I and
Mankamo and Pulkkinen [Ma82] have addressed the division of
observed failure between standby and demand related
mechanisms. In this work they were looking at U.S. Licensee
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Event Reports (LER) to gain information about dependencies in
the failure of diesel generators. The classification between
standby and test observed demand failures was accomplished by
fitting the observed failure frequency of generators verses
test interval to the relation:
q(T) = qd + XT (2.18)
Where: (Notation changed)
q(T) - Observed failures per test demand
q - Transition failure rate
X - Standby failure rate
T - Periodic test interval
Their results are given in Figure 2.9. It can be seen from this
graph that for test intervals greater than about one week ran-
dom standby failures tend to dominate observed demand
failures, the two values being X = 8.7E-5/hr and qd = 6.6E-3.
Using this graph Mankamo suggests that test intervals from 1 to
4 weeks appear to be reasonable. It should be noted that the
demand failure rate can model conditions of a true demand which
cause failure as well as those which occur at tests. Conse-
quently, the shorter test intervals may not produce the
unavailability suggested by Figure 2.9.
Finally, as part of the dependency investigation, Mankamo
obtained time dependent hazard rates for diesel generator
failures. He found that a fast aging contribution attributible
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Figure 2.9. Test Interval of Diesel Generator Failures.
("All" refers to dependent and random failures.) Con-
fidence bounds represent 90% intervals (statistical var-
iation only). [Ma82]
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to design errors could be modeled adequately by a Weibull haz-
ard rate.
Signoret [Si79] has developed a model for time dependent
and average unavailability of standby safety systems which
accounts for:
* Periodic test duration of i hours in which the system
may be either unavailable or available.
* Standby failures which occur with a rate of X per hour.
* Standby period of I hours duration.
* Transition failures which occur with a rate of T per
demand.
* Active mode failures which can occur during testing with
a rate of ' per hour.
* Downtime for repair which has a completion rate of i per
hour.
* Test interval of t hours between the beginning of suc-
cessive periodic tests.
Signoret derives both instantaneous unavailability and time
averaged steady-state unavailability expressions for a one
component system. He defines two cases:
1) Component is not available for its safety function dur-
ing the test.
2) Component is available for its safety function during
the test.
His expressions for the average unavailability are:
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X§ I t xf 2
Q1 = + - + - + (2.19)
xf It >f2 , 2
Q2 =T- + -- + - + -- + (1-1) -2 + (2.20)T pt y1 2t 2 T
Where:
2t= + (1-7)X's total probability that the component
fails because of the test.
The above equations can be interpreted in terms of proba-
bilities of specific failures lasting for specific periods of
time. The r in the denominator of each term appears because the
equation is averaged over a test interval. The terms may be
interpreted as follows:
*i - Time integrated unavailability of a component which not
able to perform its function during the test period (Case
1).
*YT - Time integrated unavailability due to demand failures
occurring at the test (Case 2). It is assumed that the
demand failure will last for the duration of the test
period.
* (Xf)/yp - Time integrated unavailability due to the repair of
standby failures detected during the test. The quantity
(1/yg) is the average duration of the test.
e vt/yV - Time integrated unavailability due to the repair of
failures caused by the test.
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* (XI 2 )/2 - Average time integrated unavailability due to
undetected standby failures times the standby period.
* (l-1_)(X'1 2 )/2 - Average time integrated unavailability due
to active mode failures during the test (Case 2).
e XT - Time integrated unavailability of standby failures
which existed at the beginning of a test and continue to
exist throughout the test period.
An additional term, (Yf)/t, should be added to both
equations to account for the fact that demand failures can
occur when the system responds to an accident during the stand-
by period as well as when it is being started for testing.
Signoret did not account for this possibility in his
derivation. Also, since the above equations are averaged over
the entire test cycle, the unavailability obtained by using
them in conjunction with fault trees may be unrealistic. To be
flexible, equations for the unavailability of periodically
tested components should be broken into the specific time frame
when they are under test, repair, or standby.
Vaurio [Va79a, Va80, Va82] and Vaurio and Sciaudone
[Va79b] have developed models of component failure mechanisms
which contain the most comprehensive set of failure mechanisms
which this author has encountered. The models include (taken
from [Va82]):
s - Failure rate during standby periods
- Test interval, time between inspections (T2 in FRANTIC
II-MIT)
52
iu - Test duration (, in FRANTIC II-MIT)
t - Repair duration for a failed component (TR in FRANTIC
II-MIT)
g - Fraction of u that component is down during a test, or
test override unavailability
p - Probability of failure due to test, failure repaired
after the test (Pf in FRANTIC II-MIT)
T- Probability of failure due to a test, failure not
repaired (detected) before the next test (part of qd
in FRANTIC II-MIT)
p - Probability of failure due to a true demand (e.g., an
event exceeding the design basis criteria of a compo-
nent) (part of qd in FRANTIC II-MIT)'
w- Probability that a failed component is not detected by
a test or not repaired (q , Cf, or qd in FRANTIC II-MIT
depending on failure)
pB - Probability that a periodic test or inspection fails
to detect a failed component (q or C f in FRANTIC
II-MIT)
PI - Fraction of random failures detectectable by a con-
tinuously monitoring annuciator system (modeled as
separate components in FRANTIC II-MIT)
The demand failure rate in FRANTIC II-MIT generates a
repair unavailability implying failures during periodic
tests, so it is not an exact model of event generated fail-
ures. See Section 3.3.
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- Probability that a monitored failure will not be
detected until next test (converts monitored X into
periodically tested X)
In [Va79b] Vaurio and Sciaudone apply components with
these failure mechanisms to redundant m-out-of-n:Good systems
up to m=n=4 to determine average system unavailability verses
periodic testing policies which include sequential, staggered,
and random testing. They have compared their results with the
original FRANTIC code and found agreement for most systems.
However, they found large discrepencies between FRANTIC and
ICARUS, a computer code they developed to calculate the una-
vailability equations they developed for the system in
question, for systems with high redundancy which are tested
sequentially. It is believed that the discrepency occurred
because FRANTIC rounds off t to the nearest hour. This vari-
able establishes the staggering times of the various periodic
tests, and the round off causes inadvertant test overlap. This
problem has been corrected in FRANTIC II-MIT and is discussed
in more detail in Chapter 5.
In [Va82I Vaurio derives an equation very similar to those
used to calculate the optimum test interval, -n*, of single
components in subroutine OPTEST, which is presented in Chapter
4. His equation is:
1 12[qov+(p+y)] (2.21)
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In this equation (1-PI + 5PI ) is simply the fraction of standby
failures which are detected by periodic tests. In FRANTIC
II-MIT this same effect is obtained by defining a periodically
tested component so that standby failures can be detected only
at the test. This equation also assumes that test caused fail-
ures, modeled here by p, are accounted for as part of g0 during
the test. It neglects the possibility that random failure
which should be detected by a periodic test is left undetected
through the next standby interval. This is the Type A human
error modeled by McWilliams and Martz [McW80] and accounted for
by Cf in FRANTIC II-MIT.
Vaurio's work covers a wide range of topics important to
time dependent unavailability analysis, including the effects
of common-mode and undetected failures in redundant systems.
Although much of his work parallels the models contained in
FRANTIC II-MIT, it is still limited by system specific unavail-
ability equations which leave little flexibility to
investigate the effects of changes in design, especially where
diverse safety functions are possible. For this type of work a
computer code which can be easily used with a cut set generator
is required.
2.3.3 APPLICATION TO FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
It is very difficult to evaluate the effect of a testing
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policy for a specific component or group of components within
the context of a larger system having many different types of
components. Often, because of the diversity of their
functions, all the parts of a system can not be tested at once.
The degree by which the conditions of the accident can be simu-
lated will vary according to component location, function, and
expected environmental conditions during an accident. Each
component can have both standby and demand failure mechanisms
contributing to a particular failure mode. The relative impor-
tance of individual components will vary depending on their
function within the system and the system's safety function for
a given accident sequence. Because of these difficulties, the
effects of periodic testing and maintenance are frequently
analyzed manually using models such as those discussed above
for the particular appliciation of interest. The results are
then time averaged and applied in the fault tree as constant
per demand failure modes.
A typical set of time averaged unavailabilities might be:
av hardware + qtest + qmaint + ghep (2.22)
Where:
qhardware = (XT)/2 + qd (2.23)
T Periodic test interval
qd 3Demand failure rate
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(2.24)
':Test downtime
qmaint f(tD) (2.25)
f Frequency of unscheduled maintenance and
repair.
td Average time to complete the unscheduled
maintenance.
qhep = Unavailability due to human error.
The unavailability ghep is usually estimated from human error
models, such as those presented by Swain and Guttmann [Sw8O).
The time averaging method has the disadvantage of masking
combinations of high instantaneous unavailabilties which can
combine to produce a large system unavailability for some peri-
od of time. For example, a component whose instantaeous una-
vailability is 0.001 will have very little effect on system
unavailability when it is parallel with a component which has
just been tested and is known to be working. However, if the
second component is completely unavailable due to testing, the
instantaneous system unavailability will be 0.001. Because of
the complexity of most practical systems, a computer code is
required for a time dependent analysis of their
unavailability.
2.3.4 THE FRANTIC /I COMPUTER CODE
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently released a
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computer code which can alleviate the problems involved with
analyzing the unavailability of complex systems. The most
recently released version is FRANTIC II. [Ve77, Ve8l] A major
feature of the code is its ability to account for the effects of
imperfect testing through the use of a variety of component
input parameters. It can also model time dependent failure
rates, both as a function of calendar time and and test fre-
quency. The code calculates the instantaneous unavailability
of every component in the system before and after each time
point at which any component might have a discontinuous jump in
its unavailability. (These times correspond to passage from
standby to active testing to repair of failures found during
testing in periodically tested components.) It then calcu-
lates the system unavailability at each time point with a user
supplied unavailability equation and time averages the
instantanteous system unavailabilities over the calculation
period. It outputs the average system unavailability over the
calculation period and (optionally) the instantaneous unavail-
abilities at each time point. Through this process FRANTIC II
avoids the need for deriving cumbersome formulas for average
system unavailability. Any system whose failure can be
described by a coherent fault tree can be quantitatively ana-
lyzed using FRANTIC II. When interfaced with a cutset
generation and evaluation routine the FRANTIC II code becomes a
versitile tool for investigating the unavailability of a com-
plex system as a function of its periodic testing policy. An
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engineering interpretation of this code and the modifications
accomplished on it as part of this work is presented in Chapter
3.
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CHAPTER 3
ENGINEERING INTERPRETATION OF FRANTIC Il-MIT
This chapter presents an engineering interpretation of
the FRANTIC II-MIT code. First, the overall structure of
the code is introduced. Simplified equations show how the
various possible component and test failure mechanisms con-
tribute to a component's unavailability. This is followed
by a brief description of how the code uses input to accom-
plish its calculations. Next, the input parameters to the
code are interpreted in terms of the physical failure mech-
anisms they can represent. Limitations imposed by the way
the code calculates with a particular parameter are dis-
cussed and suggestions are made for ways to represent common
modeling problems that the systems engineer might
encounter. The estimation of input parameters that repre-
sent time dependent failure rates is presented in Section
3.6.
FRANTIC II-MIT follows the basic structure of FRANTIC
II, but with the following additions and corrections:
* The code has been interfaced with a code that generates
and evaluates cut sets from fault tree logic. This pack-
age functions as the user supplied SYSCOM Subroutine.
* The Weibull hazard rate has been generalized by the addi-
tion of an offset time (defined in Section 3.6.2).
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* The demand failure rate can now be changed by periodic
testing to reflect potential wear-out or burn-in mech-
ani sms.
* A factor has been added to account for human error which
fails to detect standby failures.
* Undetectable failures are allowed to accumulate and are
unaffected by tests under the code's New-New component
renewal type (See Section 3.2.4 for a description of the
New-New option.).
* The first test interval, T1 , is no longer rounded off to
the nearest hour. This prevents potentially large errors
in sequentially tested redundant components.
* A subroutine has been added to calculate the optimum test
interval of a single component.
* Provision to write directly to user formated files while
suppressing the standard output has been added.
Although this list may seem long, none of them change
the overall structure of the code, which is presented in the
next section. They either make the code's modeling capabil-
ity slightly more flexible or make it more convenient to
use. Of all these changes, the offset time probably adds the
most flexibility to the code, since it allows the user to
project the effects of component wearout years into the
future without the requirement of running the code through
all the intermediate years. This overcomes the time point
limitations imposed by storage dimensioning requirements.
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3.1 OVERALL STRUCTURE
3.1.1 UNAVAILABILITY EQUATIONS
FRANTIC II-MIT uses two sets of equations to calculate
component unavailability. The equations are essentially
the same as those used in FRANTIC II with the additional
options mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.
For periodically tested components,'
During Test Period n,
q, =-- qd +(1-q d)gn+( 1-q d (-n oq
+(1-q d) (~n o0)P f (3.1)
+(1-q d)(l~9n o- (- f )q
During the repair period following Test n,
2 d +(1-q d)gn+(1I-q d -n )Pf
+(l-qd)(~-Qn)(-Pf)q (3.2)
During standby following Test n,
These equations are approximate. The precise equations
depend on renewal type. See the FRANTIC II Manual and
the listing of FRANTIC II-MIT, which is well documented
with comments.
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q(t) = qd+(1-q )qX+(1-qd X)qy
(3.3)
+(1-q d) 1qX)- y)CfqX(T 2)
For all other types of components,
q av = q d+(1-q dm+( 1-q d)(1-qm)q y (3.4)
Where:
gd - Unavailability due to demand, human error, and
transition failures
q - Unavailability due to detectable standby failures
Q- Probability of a detectable failure at Test n
q- Unavailability due to undetectable/unrepairable
standby failures
P - Probability of the test causing a failure that
requires repair
q - Unavailability of a good component due to test and
maintenance
C - Probability of not detecting a detectable standby
failure (represented by q (T2 )) at the last test
q - Average unavailability of monitored components due
to standby failures
Factors, such as (1-q ) are included to account for the
fact that the failure modes are mutually exclusive. They
may be interpreted as, "If the component has not already
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become unavailable because it has been taken off line for
testing, then. . . ."
Three equations are used for periodically tested com-
ponents because of the known cycle of standby, test and
repair. The term q, represents transitions to a failed
stated which have occurred, but because of the idleness of
the component have not yet been detected. When a test is
accomplished those failures are revealed, with the proba-
bility Qn of the component being in a failed state at the
test.
Although not shown explicitly in the above equations,
q may be reset to zero at two times, the end of test and the
end of repair. The split between the two depends on the
probability that the component required repair at the last
test. See the FRANTIC II Manual for a detailed description
of these equations.
Monitored components are the most common type of compo-
nent which are not periodically tested. Their transitions
into failed states are detected when they occur, or at some
random time after they occur. The term qm accounts for both
the rate at which the failures occur and the average time
between failure and return to a working state.
The terms q and q are common to all types of compo-
nents. Their physical interpretation is presented below.
However, they can also be used to conveniently represent any
unavailability that is not reset by a periodic test. A more
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complete explanation of the input parameters which will cal-
culate the above unavailabilities is given in Sections 3.3
through 3. 6.
3.1.2 CALCULATION PROCEDURE
FRANTIC II-MIT follows the FRANTIC II calculation
precedure exactly. It is a series of subroutines driven by a
main program which is controlled by keywords and formatted
input. (Because additional failure parameters have been
added, the format for the COMPONENT data group is entirely
different from that of FRANTIC II. See Appendix I. ) The
user may input data for any number of calculations that he
desires. After the code has completed the calculations gen-
erated by one set of keyword input, it will automatically
shift to the next. Figure 3.1 briefly describes the compu-
tational flow of the code.
A major feature of FRANTIC II-MIT is its ability to
account for discontinuities in the time dependent system
unavailability. SUBROUTINE TIMES determines all the time
points at which periodic tests or repair are started or com-
pleted. SUBROUTINE QCOMP then calculates the unavailabili-
ty of each component just before and just after the time
point and calls the user supplied SUBROUTINE SYSCOM to cal-
culate the system unavailability. This subroutine contains
the equation resulting from the quantitative evaluation of
the system fault tree, which is not accomplished by FRANTIC
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TI S Time point at which
system unavailability
is calculated
e 10-4 hour offset to TI
to allow discontinuities
in QC anc QS
NEWTIM B Flag to calculate
time point array
QC E Component unavailability
QS Z System unavailability
Read optional
PRIN? Yes Print Interval
Data
No
Read Optional
Yes Plot Interval
PLO)T? Da ta
No Yes,
If NEWTIM-1 Call Call QCOMP to
RUN? Yes TIMES to Compute Read RUN Data -Last Run? No Calculate 
QC at
TI Array Each TI-e and
TI+E
No
Stop Call QPRINT and/ Print Average QS Call AVERAG to Call SYSCOM to
or QPID0T for Call QPRINT to Compute Average Calcuate QS at
Optional Output Print Peak QS QS for Entire Each TI-E and
Data Period TI+e
Figure 3.1. Computational Flow of the FRANTIC Computer
Programs.
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Figure 3.2. Example of FRANTIC's Use of Time Points to Cal-
culate the Instantaneous Unavailability of a Two Component
Parallel System. 67
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II-MIT. Figure 3.2 illustrates the way FRANTIC II computes
the unavailability of a simple 2 component parallel system.
When system unavailabilities before and after each
time point have been calculated, SUBROUTINE AVERAGE time
integrates the unavailability by assuming unavailability
varies linearly between the time points. The subroutine
then divides by the time interval of the calculation to
obtain the average system unavailability.
FRANTIC II-MIT contains the print and plot subroutines
of FRANTIC II. With these one obtains formatted output of
the average system unavailability over the calculated time
period, unavailabilities, instantaneous system unavail-
abilities, including an ordering of the largest, average
system unavailability during intermediate time intervals,
and plots of the time dependent system unavailability. (The
plot routine must be updated to interface with local plot-
ting software.) SUBROUTINE FILES with an option to bypass
the standard formatted output and write selected output in a
more compact form to user designated files is an additonal
modification in FRANTIC II-MIT.
The portion of FRANTIC II' s output which breaks the
average system unavailability into contributions arising
from testing, repairs and failures should be treated with
caution. The FRANTIC II Manual calls them contributions
"due to" testing repair and failures. However, this use of
words is very misleading. The rules for apportioning
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instantaneous system unavailability to one of the three cat-
egories is as follows:- [VE81]
1) If at least one component is under test
then the instantaneous system unavailabil-
ity is counted toward the test contrib-
ution.
2) If no components are under test and at
least one component is down for repair,
then the instantaneous system unavailabil-
ity is counted towards the repair contrib-
ution.
3) If no components are under test or
repair, the instantaneous system unavail-
ability is counted towards the failure
contribution (i.e., between test contrib-
ution)
What is actually listed under the three categories is the sys-
tem unavailability due to various causes during specifically
defined time periods. And it is not an average system unavail-
ability over just those specific time periods, but more pre-
cisely the time integrated unavailability over the specific
periods divided by the total calculation time. The unavail-
ability given under each category therefore has no physical
meaning. The only numbers that can be interpreted are the per-
centage figures. For example, the test percentage can be
interpreted as the percentage of the average total system una-
vailability over the total calculation time which accumulates
while at least one component is under repair. To avoid this
misinterpretation, the output of FRANTIC II-MIT has been modi-
fied as shown in Figure 3.3.
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***** SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY DATA *****
RUN OPTIONS:
SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
STAGGERED AT TEST INTERVAL, DEL TIME = 0.5 DAY
EQUATION UNAVAIL. PLOT OPTIONS
NUMBER OPTION X Y
TOTL NONE NONE
CUTOFF
OPTION
0
% OF
TOTAL
2.10
-4 KV'K( 2~.
1
SYSTEM MEAN UNAVAILABILITIES BETWEEN ZERO AND 363.00 DAYS:
-- -- -- - - - -- -- -- -- - ---OF- -- - -- -- -OF - -
TOTAL
MEAN
UNAVA IL
3. 165E-09
UNAVAIL
DURING
STANDBY
% OF
TOTAL
0.61
UNAVAIL
DURING
TESTING
--------------------------- P-
PEAK SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITIES:
POINT
NUMBER
77
148
219
290
361
432
503
574
645
716
787
858
TIME
(DAYS)
3.0375E+01
6.0375E+01
9.0375E+01
1 .2037E+02
1 . 5037E+02
1.8037E+02
2. 1037E+02
2.4037E+02
2.7037E+02
3.0037E+02
3.3037E+02
3.6037E+02
TIME
(HOURS)
7.2900E+02
1.4490E+03
2. 1690E+03
2. 8890E+03
3. 6090E+03
4.3290E+03
5.0490E+03
5.7690E+03
6.4890E+03
7.2090E+03
7.9290E+03
8.6490E+03
SYSTEM
UNAVAIL
% OF
TOTAL
97.29
UNAVAIL
DURING
REPAIRS
4' t
6.0603E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6 .0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
6.0592E-07
C
3.2 STANDBY FAILURE RATE
Both the detectable and undetectable standby failure
rates are represented by a generalized Weibull hazard rate;
given the component is not failed at time t, the probability
that it will fail between t and t+dt is,
P(Fail) = X(t)dt = 5X (t+t -t r) dt (3.5)
Where:
X(t) - Conditional Failure Rate or Hazard Rate (sometimes
designated by z(t) or h(t)).
X - Scale Factor. 2 The probability of failure is propor-
tional to the scale factor, as it establishes the
length (or scale) of time the component is expected
to function before it fails. The subscript n speci-
fies that n periodic tests have been accomplished
prior to the current standby period. I
- Shape Factor. The shape factor is used to specify how
the failure rate varies with time (thereby determin-
ing its shape). It can be any value greater than
zero which, in combination with t0, produces the
time dependence in X(t) which best matches that
2 The scale factor after n tests is automatically calculated
by the code based on a test caused change factor and compo-
nent renewal type. See Sections 3.2.5 and 3.5.3.
3 The symbol for the scale factor has been changed to make it
more distinguishable from the Conditional Standby Failure
Rate.
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obtained from failure data and/or engineering judge-
ment.
t - Renewal Time.* The renewal time represents the time
at which the component is either reconditioned or
replaced. When renewal occurs, the hazard rate time
is reset to t
0
t - Offset Time. This parameter has been added to the
failure rate in FRANTIC II-MIT to give the analyst
more flexibility in modeling time dependent failure
rates. It establishes the time point on the hazard
function curve at which the failure rate of the com-
ponent immediately after renewal will be calculated.
When it is negative, the hazard rate corresponds to
the standard Weibull three parameter hazard rate,
and the failure rate is zero until (t+t 0 ) becomes
positive. It will be discussed in detail in Section
3.6.
The remainder of this section discusses the physical interpre-
tation of standby failure input parameters. Section 3.6 pre-
sents a more detailed development of the generalized Weibull
hazard rate, including methods for estimating t, , and X
when the time dependence of the conditional failure rate is
known.
* This parameter is automatically calculated by the code
based on component renewal type. See Section 3.2.4.
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3.2.1 SCALE FACTOR FOR DETECTABLE STANDBY FAILURES
The Scale Factor for Detectable Standby Failures, X ,
models detectable failure mechanisms that occur during a com-
ponent' s standby period. The scale factor establishes the mag-
nitude (in conjunction with 0 and to) of the probability that a
detectable fault will occur per unit time at any given time.
The scale parameter is used with both monitored and period-
ically tested components. For periodically inspected
components the user inputs the scale factor for the initial
standby interval, X0 . When tests cause wear-out, the code
automatically calculates X using X and f . See Section 3.5.3
for a discussion of test caused changes in the scale factor.
Monitored components normally perform some kind of func-
tion while the safety system is on standby. Failures are
either immediately announced in the control room or detected a
short time later during normal operator rounds. The failure
rate can therefore represent both internal hardware failure
mechanisms and the effects of external shocks. Examples of
monitored components are power supplies and sensors. The out-
put voltage of a power supply can be constantly monitored, and
shorts will be detected immediately. The outputs of many sen-
sors are checked on a routine basis during the standby period.
At this time malfunctions or suspcious output can be checked
and repair affected if necessary.
Periodically tested components are normally idle during
standby and must transfer to an active state when a demand
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occurs. For these types of components, the scale factor models
failure mechanisms which occur during the standby period, but
which are not revealed until the component is required to oper-
ate. Since the component is idle, these failures occur prima-
rily due to external random "shocks" resulting from the standby
environment. Examples would be exposure to vibrations, proc-
ess fluid flow, moisture, and human errors of commission during
the standby period. A more specific example might be a leak
which soaks the windings of an electric motor so that it will
short out when called upon to start and run.
3.2.2 SCALE FACTOR FOR UNDETECTABLE STANDBY FAILURES
The Scale Factor for Undetectable Standby Failures, X
models failure mechanisms which occur during the standby peri-
od that will cause the component to fail to perform its safety
function when called upon during a true demand, but which are
not revealed by monitoring or periodic tests. It establishes
the magnitude (in conjunction with 0 and to) of the probability
that an undetectable fault will occur per unit time.
The general causes of this type of failure mechanism are
the same as for X0 . However, periodic testing does not reveal
these failures. Although the component apparently performs
its safety function during a test, it fails during a true
demand due to a failure mechanism not addressed by the test.
Undetectable faults can occur when periodic tests require
reconfiguration of the safety system from its operational
alignment. For example, during an operational test, the High
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Pressure Coolant Injection System's discharge is routed to the
condensate storage tank. An obstruction beyond the test bypass
line would not be detected by the test. A second example is the
inability to simulate the environmental conditions of the
accident during an operational test.
Monitored components can also suffer undetectable fail-
ures. An example would be a breakdown of insulation in a sensor
which does not short under normal operating conditions, but
causes failure of the sensor in the steam environment of a true
demand. The shock which causes the transition to the failed
state occurs during the standby period, but it is a failed
state only under the highly stressed conditions of a true
demand.
3.2.3 FAILURE RATE SHAPE FACTOR
The Failure Rate Shape Factor, S, specifies how the
instantaneous conditional failure rate (hazard rate) changes
with time. When 5 is equal to one the failure rate is constant
and independent of time. For values of less than one, the
failure rate decreases with time. For values greater than one
it increases.
The shape factor models the fact that a component's sus-
ceptibility to standby failure mechanisms can change with the
past standby service life of the component. For example, the
specification of 5=2 implies that the failure rate of that com-
ponent is increasing linearly with time. The implication is
that environmental factors acting on the component during
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standby are gradually degrading the component' s resistence to
failure causes which can transfer it into a failed state. For
example, gradual buildup of corrosion products might be con-
sidered as an accumulation of small shocks which can transfer a
valve into a stuck state with increased probability as its
exposure to the process fluid increases. This in turn results
in a higher probability that the valve will stick when demanded
to open. Failures resulting from this mechanism would have a
0>1. Time dependent failure rates will be discussed in more
detail in Section 3.3.2.
Conversely, if =l the conditional probability of the
component failing during its 10,000 th hour of standby (given
it has survived until then) is the same as the conditional
probability of its failure at any other time during the standby
period. By implication, the constant failure rate model
assumes that if the random shocks of the standby period do not
cause a transition to a failed state, they have no impact
what-so-ever on the component. This is called the exponential
failure model because the time dependence of the availability
(cumulative probability of survival to time t) follows an expo-
nential distribution.
3.2.4 COMPONENT RENEWAL TYPE
In FRANTIC II-MIT a component can be renewed by either
s The default value of t =0 corresponds to the renewal model-
ing available in FRAN'I!C II.
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periodic testing (which cycles a component through an active
phase of operation) or repair. Renewal has the mathematical
effect of resetting the generalized Weibull hazard rate back to
the offset time, to .' The following renewal input options are
availabile in FRANTIC II-MIT:
New-New (NN) Renewal = Both test and repair reset the haz-
ard rate. The renewal time, tr' is automatically set equal to
the end of the most recent scheduled test period when the com-
ponent is not failed, and is set equal to the end of the repair
time when it is failed. This type of renewal might model a
failure mechanism in which two metallic surfaces cold weld dur-
ing the standby period (exhibiting a 5>l hazard rate). When
the component is operated the effect of the cold weld is
broken, and the cold welding process must begin again.
Old-Old (00) Renewal. Neither test nor repair reset the
hazard rate. The renewal time is kept at t=0, the beginning of
the FRANTIC II-MIT calculation. The hazard rate follows its
time dependence for the entire period of the calculation. This
renewal type might be used to model the failure rate of a large
component where various parts exhibit wearout due to abrasion
and corrosion. Testing has no effect on these mechanisms, and
repair of breakdowns can correct only local problems, so the
component's overall failure rate gradually increases.
Complete replacement of a large component would probably
justify recalculation of unavailability using the newer compo-
nent' s estimated failure rates. This type of repair is beyond
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that envisioned for the repair time modeled in the code, since
it would require shutdown of the plant.
Old-New (ON) Renewal. Testing has no effect on the hazard
rate, but repair resets it. When the component is found failed
at a periodic test, the renewal time is set as the time of the
end of repair. (For further information, see the FRANTIC II
manual. ) This component type most often models components that
wearout or gradually deteriorate and are replaced when they
fail. For example, a circuit board gradually deteriorates in a
humid environment. Testing can not reverse the deterioration,
but when the circuit board is found to be failed it is replaced
with a new one.
Use of Offset Time With Renewal Types
In FRANTIC II-MIT, the user has the option of specifying
an offset time, to, which is the time used to calculate the haz-
ard rate immediately after renewal. Its use in conjunction
with an O renewal option will permit the user to start a calcu-
lation late in the life of a safety system and initialize the
hazard functions of the components so that wearout effects
would have already accumulated at the beginning of the calcu-
lation. It also gives him the flexibility to initialize
wearout of different components at different times. When used
with the NN and ON options, it gives the user flexibility in
selecting the shape of the time dependence of the failure rate.
3.2.5 TEST CAUSED CHANGES TO SCALE FACTOR
In FRANTIC II-MIT the scale factor for detectable standby
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failures may be changed by a user specified factor to reflect
the possibility of test caused wearout. See Section 3.5.3 for
a discussion of this factor.
The scale factor for undetectable standby failures is not
changed by periodic tests in FRANTIC II-MIT. This change was
made because it was judged that tests which cannot detect fail-
ure mechanisms can not affect them sufficiently in other ways
that can increase the components susceptibility to them. See
Section 3.5.3 for a more complete discussion of test caused
changes in failure rates.
3.2.6 UNAVAILABILITY DUE TO STANDBY FAILURES
Unavailability due to standby failures depends on whether
the component is monitored or periodically tested.
Monitored Components
The equations for monitored components are those of FRAN-
TIC II. It uses the asymptotic equations:
Repair to "Good as New"
1/ 6
XTR
qm(t) = qm =T (3.6)
R
Repair to "Good as Old"
qm(t) = Xta-X(t-TR)0 (3.7)
Where:
TR - Average repair time
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Inspection of these equations shows that the unavailability
contribution depends heavily on TR' the time required to com-
plete repair. If the component can be repaired quickly it will
have an small unavailability despite a high failure rate.
Equation (3.6) indicates that even with time varying hazard
rates the average unavailability of monitored components will
approach a constant value when repair resets the hazard rate.
If the hazard rate continues to change even after repair, the
unavailability equation varies with time, as shown in Equation
(3.7).
Periodically Tested Components
In periodically tested components, standby failures can
produce three different typ.es of unavailability contributions:
1) They can occur but remain undetected during the stand-
by period.
2) They can be revealed during a test period.
3) They can keep the component down until repair is com-
pleted.
During the standby period the unavailability is given by:
q(t)=l-exp{-X[(t+t 0 -t r)-(t +t -t )0]} (3.8)
The instantaneous unavailability increases as the time since
the the component was last known to be operational, t wI
increases, because the time during which the failure can occur
increases. After a periodic test, the current time becomes the
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time the component was last known to be working, so the unde-
tected unavailability returns to zero. Equation (3.8) is
derived and discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.2.
At the begining of a periodic test the total undetected
unavailability is Equation (3.8) applied over the entire prior
standby interval. The test reveals the failure, but the compo-
nent remains down until repairs can be made. Therefore, the
contribution of standby failures to the component' s unavail-
ability remains at pl that level until the end of the repair
period.
The unavailability resulting from the use of X is similar
to equation (5.9), but the component is assumed to be last
known working at the beginning of the calculation for the NN'
and 00 renewal options and at the last renewal time, t , for the
r
ON renewal option. The resulting equation is:
q U(t)=1-exp{-X U[(t+t - t r) a-(to)0] (3.9)
Where:
For 00 and NN component renewal, tr =
For ON component renewal, tr is set with the probability
that a detectable failure occurs.
* The orignal version of FRANTIC II assummed that every
renewal revealed undetectable standby failures. Conse-
quently, for the NN option, where renewal occurs at every
test, there was no difference between detectable and unde-
tectable failures.
81
3.3 DEMAND FAILURE RATE
3.3.1 ENGINEERING INTERPRETATION
The demand failure rate, qd, models failure mechanisms
which are independent of the time of the true demand. It can be
input with either monitored or pericially tested components
and contributes that constant value to the unavailability cal-
culated for that component at every time point. Although the
demand failure rate is a constant, a modification has been made
in FRANTIC II-MIT to multiply it by a factor which can change as
a function of periodic tests to model test caused changes in
the susceptibility of the component to the mechanisms that the
parameter represents.
The demand failure rate is used to model failure mech-
anisms other than those which occur during the standby period.
It can represent the probability of:
* Conditions at the time of the true demand that defeat the
component's ability to perform its function. An example
would be the probability that an electric motor is flooded
by a particular Loss of Coolant Accident, and therefore
shorts and can not function.
e Failure mechanisms caused by transitions between states.
For example, the accelerations of starting and stopping may
be the cause of failures during demand, or too much close
force during the previous closure may jam the valve and con-
sequently prevent its opening.
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* Errors during test and maintenance that leave an originally
operable component in an undetected failed condition. This
is called a Type A human error by McWilliams and Martz.
[Mcw80] An example of this is leaving the Auxillary
Feedwater System valved out of the secondary system follow-
ing a periodic test.
When applying this parameter to periodically tested com-
ponents one should remember that a demand to operate implies
two transitions, both of which can cause failures. A previous
transition to standby could have left the component in an unde-
tected failed state, and the current demand to operate can also
cause the failure. (Operator error and jammed valves due to
closure are examples of failures occurring during transitions
to the standby condition.)
3.3.2 SPECIAL USES
Because the demand failure rate is a convenient way to
input an unavailbility that remains constant throughout the
calculation, it can be used in conjunction with other parame-
ters to produce more flexible modeling of time dependent system
unavailability. The following sections present some applica-
tions, but are in no way a complete listing of the possibil-
ities.
Monitored Failures in Periodically Tested Components
Some periodically tested components may have some portion
of their function monitored while they are standby. For exam-
ple, the voltage across electrically operated machinery may be
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constantly monitored, or idle equipment may be subjected to
visual inspections which can reveal some failure mechanisms.
Other failure mechanisms may be revealed only by operating the
equipment. If the monitored failures are assumed to have a
constant failure rate or the component has NN renewal, the
average monitored unavailability is asymptotically constant.
One could then calculate the average using Equation (3.7) and
input it directly using qd'
If the monitored hazard rate is increasing, one could use
gd in conjunction with the undetectible scale parameter, XU, to
model an average unavailability due to monitored components
which rises gradually throughout the calculation.
Common Cause Failures
When more than one component can be made ineffective
because of the conditions of the true demand, the resultant
common cause failure can be modeled by a separate failure event
in series with whatever failure event those components affect.
Since the true demand is assumed to occur randomly, it can be
modeled by a constant unavailability represented by qd. In
this case qd would equal the fraction of true demands for which
the components fail to perform their function.
3.4 TIMES ASSOCIATED WITH PERIODIC TESTING
3.4.1 PERIODIC INSPECTION INTERVAL
The Periodic Inspection Interval, T sets the time
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between the start of successive periodic tests. It is input in
days , but is automatically rounded off to an integer number of
hours by the code. Most practical applications will involve
using a whole number of days as input for this parameter.
3.4.2 FIRST PERIODIC INSPECTION INTERVAL
The First Periodic Inspection Interval, Ti, allows the
user to stagger the periodic testing of various components to
reflect the sequence and interval spacing in which tests are
actually accomplished. Because the code begins its calcu-
lations assuming all time dependent unavailabilities are zero
at time zero, system unavailability near the beginning of a
calculation may not reflect actual unavailability. First
interval effects can be minimized by averaging over many
inspection intervals and not selecting instantaneous system
unavailabilities from times close to the begining of the calcu-
lation.
3.4.3 SCHEDULED TEST AND MAINTENANCE PERIOD
The Scheduled Test and Maintenance Period, t, represents
the average duration of scheduled periodic testing and mainte-
nance and is input in units of hours. This includes the actual
testing time for which the component is unavailable and the
time for repairs of the component that one would expect to do on
a regular basis to prevent safety related failures later. It
does not include unexpected failures which require additional
time for repair. For example, consider a component that is
inspected every month and found to be able to accomplish its
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safety function. However, minor problems are discovered
which, if not corrected, could result in a failure of the com-
ponent at some time in the future. The plant policy is to make
minor repairs and repeat the operational test as a matter of
course. Since the the component was not in a failed condition
at the beginning of the test and the repair was not unexpected,
this maintenance policy should be accounted for in the specifi-
cation of t
3.4.4 UNSCHEDULED REPAIR TIME
The Unscheduled Repair Time, TR' accounts for repair that
is accomplished when a component is found to be failed , either
by monitoring or by periodic testing. The unscheduled repair
time accounts for the total time from the discovery of the
fault through retesting and qualification of the component for
standby service. It does not include normal maintenance that
is done on a component, which is accounted for in r.
During unscheduled repair a component is assumed to be
totally unavailable. The (unconditional) unavailability cal-
culated by the code during TR is the probability that the com-
ponent requires repair (because it failed) times one.
Therefore, the user should account for partial availability by
shortening his estimate of TR. For example, if on line repair
of a component takes on the average of 10 hours, during which
the component is not available to accomplish its safety func-
tion. Requalification for standby takes an additional 4 hours,
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during which the component is only 25% unavailable. The aver-
age unscheduled repair time should be calculated as:
TR = 10 + .25(4) = 11 hours (3.10)
3.5 EFFECTS OF IMPERFECT TESTING
The parameters discussed below are directly associated
with testing. However, failures during testing which also have
a large impact of systemunavailability are modeled by qd'
These, of course, refer to the probability of leaving a compo-
nent in an undetected failed state following the completion of
the test period. See Section 3.3.1.
3.5.1 PROBABILITY OF TEST CAUSED FAILURE
The Probability of Test Caused Failure, P /, represents
the probability of failures occuring during periodic tests
that would not cause the component to fail to perform its func-
tion in the event of a true demand at any time, but which gener-
ate the requirement for an unscheduled repair following a
normal periodic test. This includes repairs to prevent leakage
and contamination, or repairs to correct precursor faults
which currently do not interfere with the functioning of the
component, but if left uncorrected could lead to a safety
related failure in the future. It also includes failures gen-
erated by the conditions of the test which do not occurr during
an accident.
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Since a test cycles some components to an operating mode,
with its potentially much higher failure rate, a component can
fail due to active mode failures which are not related the
standby period during a test. The parameter P also accounts
for these types of failures.
Test caused failures are assumed to be immediately
detected, but the component becomes unavailable for the addi-
tional unscheduled repair time discussed above. This parame-
ter increases the unavailability of the component by P during
the test and repair periods, t and TR. The component returns to
an available status at the end of the unscheduled repair
period.
An example of test caused failure is a pump which blows a
seal during a flowrate test. The pump could have completed its
mission with the blown seal had this been a true demand. Howev-
er, to prevent excessive contamination and further damage to
the pump, repair must be affected, and the pump is assumed to be
not available to accomplish its safety function for both r and
TR'
3.5.2 UNAVAILABILITY TO OVERRIDE TEST AND MAINTENANCE
Unavailability to Override Test and Maintenance repres-
ents the probability that a good component can not be used for
its intended function should a true demand occur while it is
undergoing periodic test and maintenance. It models the fact
that periodic tests often require some reconfiguration from
the component's standby "ready" mode. It also accounts for the
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fact that maintenance and minor repair might make the component
unavailable for some fraction of the test and maintenance time.
This parameter should be estimated considering all of the
activities that could go on during a scheduled test and mainte-
nance period, t. It is actually the fractional down time of the
component, averaged over T that is not caused by failures which
fall into the category of P or Qn* It is derived from an
assessment of both the test procedure and the maintenance
activities which normally occur during -.
3.5.3 TEST CAUSED FAILURE RATE CHANGE FACTORS
Periodic operational tests require that components cycle
to an operating configuration. As the component starts, oper-
ates, and shuts down, it experiences a series of stresses which
may cause changes in its probability of failure when it is
returned to standby. In FRANTIC II-MIT this effect is modeled
by factors which multiply the current value of the standby
failure rate scale factor, X , and qd every time a periodic
test is accomplished. After n tests the standby failure rate
becomes:
X n n (X) (3.11)
Where:
X - Value of the initial scale factor input by the user.
f - Standby failure rate test factor.
After n tests the demand failure rate becomes:
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d (ft)(f dn( do) + (1-ft) do (3.12)
Where:
qdo - Value of qd input by the user.
ft - Fraction of qd which is affected by the test.
fd - Demand failure rate test factor.
The factor f allows the user to keep selected portions oft
qd constant for the entire period of the calculation. It also
allows him more flexibility in selecting how qd will vary as a
function of periodic tests.
The actual value of n used in the code depends on the
renewal option.
NN Option: n represents the number of tests since the begin-
ning of the calculation. Note that one can accumulate test
caused wearout while also resetting the Weibull hazard rate at
each periodic test.
00 Option: n represents the number of periodic tests since the
begining of the calculation or t=0. However, if the user has
input a positive t0 , the code will calculate n based on a total
accumulated time since renewal of t +t.
ON Option: n represents the number of periodic tests from the
last tr' where tr will have values accounting for repair
renewal during each periodic test period of the calculation.
Each one's contribution to the unavailability will be weighted
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according to the probability that the component was failed at
that particular periodic test.
The default values of f, fd and ft are 1.0, corresponding
to no test caused changes. Values of fX and fd greater than 1.0
represent the wearout effects of on-off cycling and active
functional periods required by operational tests. Values less
than 1.0 represent improvements in equipment and procedures
because of lessons learned during the tests.
It is important to remember that f and fd account for the
effect of periodic testing on the probability that the standby
failure mechanisms modeled by X and demand failure mechanisms
modeled by qd will occur after the test is completed. Conse-
quently, the evaluation of f and fd must consider what X(t) and
qd account for in the first place.
Some examples of test caused changes in failure rates
might be:
1) An operational test produces highly stressed cyclic loading
on a valve stem, creating fatigue cracks. The probability that
the valve will fail while closing during an accident gradually
7 Periodic testing can also change the operating failure
rates of the components. This involves an entirely sepa-
rate set of failure parameters, which would have to be cou-
pled to the unavailability calculation using a phased
mission analysis to obtain the total unreliability of the
system for performing a mission of a given duration. The
treatment of phased missions is not the subject of this the-
sis.
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increases as the periodic tests are repeated. This would be
modeled by using a value greater than one for fd'
2) Cycling to the active phase increases the seepage rate of
water from the High Pressure Coolant Injection System. The
increased flow of water enhances the rate of failure mechanisms
caused by water soakage during standby. This would be modeled
by using a value greater than one for f .
3) Operational tests reveal ways to correct potential failure
mechanisms. This would be modeled by using a value less than
one for f or fd depending on the types of failure mechanisms
being eliminated. (Note, however, that one would not account
for one time corrections using these parameters, since the fac-
tors model gradual changes to failure rates.)
4) Operational tests reveal areas for improvement in operator
training and procedures. They also provide valuable experi-
ence for the crew running the plant. This gradually reduces
the probability of operator error. It would be accounted for
by using a value less than one for fd'
3.5.4 TEST ERROR CARRYOVER FACTOR
The input parameter C accounts for the nondetection of
component failures which should be detected by a periodic
inspection, but are not because of human error. This type of
error is called a Type B error by McWilliams and Martz.
[Mcw80] With humans monitoring or accomplishing the test,
there is a probability, Cf, that a detectable failure that
existed just prior to the test is not found, and the component
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remains in a failed state throughout the next standby period.
Consequently, there is an additonal contributor to unavail-
ability, CfQn' in the next standby period. For example, while
verifying the operation of valves, an operator cycles one valve
twice, leaving a second unchecked. If the second valve is
failed, it will remain so throughout the next standby period.
3.6 GENERALIZED WEIBULL HAZARD RATE
In this section the concepts and procedures necessary to
use the generalized Weibull hazard rate to model changes in
standby failure rates will be develope&more detail. First,
some of the physical processes which can produce changes in a
component's failure rate are described. Physical processes
which occur during testing are more appropriately modeled by
the test change factors discussed in Section 3.5.3. Next, a
generalized formulation of the Weibull hazard rate is intro-
duced to model the standby failure rate of a component. It is
shown that a large variety of smoothly varying time dependen-
cies can be modeled with this mathematical formulation.
Before continuing, it should be emphasized that the gen-
eralized Weibull hazard rate is an extremely convenient way to
represent conditional failure rates which vary with time. All
of FRANTIC II-MIT' s calculations are based on using the condi-
tional failure rate (hazard rate) to obtain instanteous compo-
nent unavailability by direct integration. To use the code,
one must first know the time dependence of the conditional
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failure rates of all the components. It is not the purpose of
this thesis to suggest ways to functionally determine the haz-
ard rates. Techniques are available in the literature. (e.g.
Many methods are based on life testing in which the observed
times to failure may be assumed to follow a Weibull Distrib-
ution Function. [Br73, EP1558, He8l, McC81]) However, these
estimation methods should not be confused with the stocastic
process whose time dependence happens to follow one of the
curves the generalized Weibull hazard rate can generate.
With the exception of the method for accounting for test
caused changes in the standby failure rate, the models in FRAN-
TIC II-MIT are more comprehensive than those of FRANTIC II. As
this section demonstrates, the two parameter Weibull Hazard
Function used in the original code does not give the analyst
much flexibility for representing time dependence. Also, the
original version does not premit any variation in the demand
failure rate as a result of testing. These limitations are
overcome by the models used in FRANTIC II-MIT
Methods for statistically estimating all the parameters
available in FRANTIC II-MIT is beyond the scope of this thesis.
It would seem reasonable to expect that a Bayesian approach for
combining knowledge gained in analyzing the root causes of
failures with the statisitcal data obtained from failure fre-
quencies attributed to known and unknown failure mechanisms
could be useful in the estimation process. This is discussed
in the section on recommendations for further research.
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3.6.1 SUSCEPTIBILITY OF COMPONENT FAILURE MECHANISMS
The instantaneous conditional failure rate can be thought
of as a measure of a component's susceptibility at a specific
time to the physical mechanisms that cause it to fail. The sus-
ceptibility depends upon the accumulated effects of the compo-
nent's prior operational and exposure history. In some cases
it might also model the effects of an environment which is
changing as a predictable function of time.
A constant failure rate model carries the assumption that
the susceptibility of the component to failure is not changed
by its previous standby and operating history. When we use a
constant failure rate model we are saying that a component that
has been in service for a period of time is no more susceptible
to failure than one that has been just put into service. The
environment to which the component has been exposed and its
operational history have produced no degrading effects. For
many types of components this assumption may be reasonable.
Periodic maintenance and replacement of worn parts in complex
components can combine to keep the susceptibility constant. In
fact this assumption has been made in most nuclear safety
applications to date.
In FRANTIC II-MIT the instantaneous failure rate is mod-
eled with a time dependent hazard function, X(t). It repres-
ents a conditional failure probability. Given the component
experienced the physical prosseses modeled by the hazard func-
tion during the interval prior to time t and is not failed at
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time t, the probability that it will fail in the interval
(t,t+dt) is X(t)dt.
In choosing a representation for X(t), the analyst should
have an understanding of the physical processes which can
either improve or degrade the survivability of the component.
If they occur during the standby period, X(t) will gradually
increase or decrease, depending on whether a wearout or burn-in
effect is produced. If they occur during a periodic test, a
discontinuous jump in X(t) will result.
Susceptibility to failure can come from both internal
flaws and environmental stresses. Factors which might cause a
component' s failure rate to increase with time include, for
example:
* Operational wear of surfaces or parts of the component which
affect its tightness of fit, smoothness of operation, etc.
* Wear or corrosion produced by the flow of a process fluid
over, around, or through a component.
e Fatique due to on-off cycling, vibration, temperature
changes, etc.
e Radiation damage or embrittlement.
* Buildup of corrosion products, rust, etc. on components.
e An increasingly stressful environment under which the com-
ponent must operate. This might be caused by the gradual
wearout of other components in a long term situation.
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* Accumulated effects of past environmental stresses on the
component which have caused a random amount of undetectable
or uncorrectible damage to the component.
* Effects of prolonged idleness, including cold welding,
drainage of lubricant, discharge of batteries, etc.
* Human error on the part of operations or maintenance
personnel which allows precursors of failure mechanisms to
go undetected.
Factors which could decrease the failure rate include,
for example,
* Correction of design or manufacturing errors.
* Improvement in operating procedures or operator proficiency
which results in less stress on the component.
* Redesign, reconfiguration or improvement or other system
components which result in a less stressful operating envi-
ronment for the component of interest.
* Replacement of a failed component with a new component.
For components which are normally idle during standby,
the test period usually requires cycling to the active mode, so
there are two distinct phases during which X(t) can change.
During standby, it is reasonable to assume that an idle compo-
nent will transfer into the failed state due to the influences
of inherent mechanisms or external shocks. These effects can
not normally be correlated to any particular event. Although
not strong enough to cause immediate failure, some of these
influences may have a degrading effect on the component. Con-
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sequently, the susceptibility to actual failure upon
reoccurance of a similar stress may be increased. In FRANTIC
II-MIT this gradual buildup of susceptibility is modeled by the
generalized Weibull hazard rate formulation of the standby
failure rate.
During periodic test and maintenance periods, the compo-
nent can be subjected to a variety of influences. As it cycles
through an active phase, it will be subjected to the shock of
starting and stopping as well as the wear induced by active
operation. Maintenance actions can detect and correct prob-
lems, reducing susceptibility to failure. However,
maintenance errors might induce additional stresses in the
component and inadvertently increase its failure probability.
Parts or entire components may be replaced during repair. As a
result, the susceptibility of the component after a periodic
test might be quite different from what it was at the begining
of the test. In FRANTIC II-MIT the discontinuous change in
failure probability produced by a periodic test can be modeled
by:
1) Resetting the Weibull hazard function time to the offset
time.
2) Multiplying the Weibull hazard function scale factor, X, by
a user input factor at each test.
3) Multiplying the Constant Demand Failure Rate by a user
input factor at each test.
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3.6.2 EFFECTS OF OFFSET TIME ON HAZARD RATE
As part of this work, FRANTIC II-MIT has been modified to
represent the conditonal failure rate by a generalized form of
the Weibull hazard rate (orginally presented as Equation (3.5)
in Section 3.2).
X(t) = OXn (t+t -t ) (3.13)
Figure 3.4 shows the the effect of the offset time and its
relationship to the calculation time and the renewal time. At
the begining of a calculation both t and tr = 0, and the time
variable for the hazard function equals to. The combination of
X , 5 and to sets the value of hazard function at this time. As
the calculation time increases, the value'of the hazard rate
changes dependent on to and 5, with t playing an important
part, because it affects the factor by which the time variable
changes as the calculation proceeds. When renewal occurs tw is
updated from zero to the calculation time, then immediately
after renewal the time variable is again at to. So the effect
of renewal in FRANTIC II-MIT is to reset the hazard function
back to the the value it had at the begining of the calculation
and start its time variance over again.
Using the generalized Weibull formulation of the hazard
rate, the differential change in a component' s unavailability
due to undetected failures during standby because of failures
between t and t+dt can be expressed as:
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after a renew-
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t
Figure 3.4. Use of Offset Time and Renewal Options to
Obtain Time Dependent Failure Rates With a Generalized
Weibull Hazard Rate.
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d[q(t , t)]=[1-q(t , t)]SX(t+t 0-t r) idt (3.14)w w o r
Where:
qX(tw't) - Unavailability due to undetected standby fail-
ures which have occurred since the last time the com-
ponent was known to be working.
t - The last time the component was known to be working,
either at the end of the last test period or the end of
the last repair period.
This formulation is the same as for the reliability of an unre-
pairable component, since the transitions to the failed state
during standby can not be repaired until they are detected by
the next periodic test. The term [1-q(t wt) ] represents the
fact that in order to fail between t and t+dt, the component
must first survive to time t. When the component is known to be
operational, say at the end of test or repair, t=t , and
qX (tw'tw )=0.
If this equation is integrated from the time a component
was last known to be working to time t, one obtains:
q(t ,t)=1-exp{-X[(t+t -t ) 0-(t +t -t ) ]) (3.15)
w o r w o r
This is the expression for unavailability due to unrepaired
standby failures in the interval between tw and t which is
implemented in the FRANTIC II-MIT code. Because of its conven-
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ient analytical form, it is quickly evaluated by the computer
and provides an efficient vehicle for modeling a large variety
of time dependent hazard rates.
3.6.3 ADVANTAGES OVER FRANTIC II HAZARD RATE
The use of the offset time in the Weibull hazard rate pro-
vides much flexibility in establishing the shape of the instan-
taneous failure rate, while not increasing the complexity of
the unavailability calculation. With the offset time avail-
able as an input parameter to the FRANTIC I I-MIT code, one has
the option to set the initial time from which the failure rate
will be integrated to any point on the time axis of the Weibull
hazard rate time axis. Since the hazard rate is just a math-
ematical function, there is no physical reason to insist that
renewal begin at time zero. In fact, a renewal process which
resets the Weibull hazard function to only time zero restricts
the time variation of the resultant failure rate function
considerately. This can be made more clear by the following
example.
Figure 3.5 plots five failure rates modeled with the two
parameter Weibull hazard rate available in FRANTIC II. The
five curves all have a value of zero at time zero and rise to
1.OE-5 per hour after 20 years. These curves correspond to the
values of 0 and X given in Table 3. 1.
These curves illustrate the problem which arises from
using only two parameters to establish the hazard rate. Say
the analyst is modeling a component with an Old=Old (00)
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renewal option (t r=0 for the entire calculation). The data
indicate that the failure rate of the component rises by a fac-
tor of ten from 1.OE-6/hr to 1.OE-5/hr over a twenty year peri-
od. To determine the shape factor, 5, he divides the value of
the hazard rate at t=20 years by its initial value, say at 1
hour.
X (ti)go(7,201 = 10 = (174,200) (3.16)
X(to) SAO (l hour)
When this equation is solved, he obtains a value for the shape
factor of = 1. 19. Then knowing 5 and the value of the hazard
rate at one hour, he calculates the scale factor from the
expression for the hazard rate:
X At)_ 10- 6/hr (3.17)
1.19
Time when A(t) =
Curve X 0 .lxA(20 years)
1 1.19 8.4x10~7  1 hour
2 1.26 3.5x10 7  1 day
3 1.42 4.5x10-8 1 month
4 1.77 5.3x10-1 0  1 year
5 2.00 2.9x10 1 1  2 years
6 2.66 7.3x10-15  5 years
Table 3.1. Parameters used for plotting curves in Figure
3.5. Values of S and A0 are chosen so that A(t) reaches
0.1 times the 20 year values at the times shown.
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Figure 3.5. Five Failure Rates Modeled With a Two Parameter
Weibull Hazard Rate Which Rise From 0 at Time Zero to l.QxE-5
per hr at 20 Years.
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The resulting scale factor is X=8.4E-7.* When the hazard rate
is plotted verses time, the top curve in Figure 3.5 results.
Note that this curve rises to 50 percent of its 20 year value by
6 months, and 80 percent after only 6 years. For the remaining
14 years it is a good approximation of a constant failure rate,
since it changes by only 20 percent. (This should not be unex-
pected, since beta is close to 1.0. ) This curve may not be a
good representation of the expected increase of component sus-
ceptibility to failure over the 20 year period. The curve's
shape indicates that the influences which change the compo-
nent's susceptibility to failure have four times more impact
during the first six years than during the last fourteen.
A more gradual rise throughout the entire period may be a
better representation of component degration. For example,
external environmental stresses would be expected to occur
randomly throughout the component' s life and should produce a
relatively constant rate of rise in the component's suscepti-
bility to failure. In fact, a hazard function which curves
upward during the latter part of the component' s life might be
more physically reasonable. For example, it might apply to
components in which some threshold or margin of safety must be
exceeded, after which susceptibility increases at an acceler-
ating rate.
* Note that the scale factor's units depend on the value of
( -l) .
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The remaining curves in Figure 3.5 were derived by making
the time at which the failure rate reaches one tenth of its 20
year value progressively longer. It is evident that the hazard
function rises more gradually as the 'one tenth' time
increases. However, these curves have the disadvantage of
producing very low failure rates during the early part of the
interval. For example, the use of one year as the 'one tenth'
time results in failure probabilities of less than 1.OE-7/hour
during the first six months. The use of 5 years, which provides
an upward curving failure rate as a component's age increases,
produces very small failure rates during the first three years.
Both a gradual rise in the failure rate and physically
reasonable values during the first portion of a time interval
can be obtained by use of the offset time, t . With the offset
.0o
time one can select the portion of the Weibull hazard function
curve that best matches the actual time dependence of the fail-
ure rate. Figure 3.6 illustrates this concept. It again
illustrates a situation in which one desires to model a failure
rate which rises by a factor of ten over a twenty year period.
This time, however, the generalized Weibull hazard rate is
available. The 20 year interval does not have to begin at time
zero. It may now be any 20 year interval on the hazard rate
curve starting at the offset time. The only requirement is
that real time elapse a total of 20 years while the hazard rate
rises from 1.OE-6/hr to 1.OE-5/hr.
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For comparison with Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6 has been con-
structed for offset times of 1 hour, 1 day, 1 month, 1 year, and
5 years. In Figure 3.6 the Weibull hazard function varies from
that calculated at the offset time to that calculated for 20
years plus the offset time as t varies from 0 to 20 years. For
this example the value of to has already been established.
Beta can be found by taking the ratio:
X(20 years)
X (0)
(175,200 + to)
to
The parameter X can then be determined knowing that
X(t+t )=1.0E-5/hr. The values of 5 and X that were used to plot
the curves in Figure 3.6 are given in Table 3.2.
8. 4x10~7
3.5x10~7
4. 5x10
5. 9x10- 1 0
2. 6x10 1
9. 4x10 1
3. 7x10~44
Offset Time
1 hour
1 day
1 month
1 year
2.2 years
5 years
50 years
Table 3.2. Values of B, X0 , and offset time used to obtain
the hazard function curves shown in Figure 3.6.
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A comparison between Figures 3 .5 and 3.6 shows that the
use of an offset time allows one to obtain the gradual rise in
failure rate modeled by a shape factor of 2 to 3 while not hav-
ing to accept very small failure probabilities during the first
few years of the 20 year period. The offset time has "chopped
off" the initial rise from zero and retained the overall shape
characteristic of a particular value of beta.
3.6.4 ESTIMATING INPUT PARAMETERS
Use of the generalized Weibull hazard rate implies that
the analyst believes that the time dependence of the condi-
tional failure rate follows a power law time dependence. This
assumption can be tested using statistical hypothesis testing.
The three parameters needed to define the time dependence are
x0 , , and t . These three parameters can be estimated by know-
ing the value of the hazard rate at any three points in time.
One simply writes down the equation for the hazard rate at each
point of time. With the known values of hazard rate and time
substituted into the equations, he now has three equations with
three unknowns.
It is also possible to estimate the input parameters
graphically. Figure 3.7 is a family of curves derived from the
Weibull hazard rate. They are normallized so that each rises
from zero to 100 unavailability units in 100 time units. Each
curve has a value of beta and lambda associated with it, as
shown in the table below the figure.
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50
100
50 -50
0
4)
50 100
Time
1.2 33.18 2.5 4.000x10-2
1.4 11.32 3.0 3.333x10-3
1.6 3.943 4.0 2.500x10-5
1.8 1.395 6.0 1.667x10~9
2.0 0.500 10.0 1.000x10~1 7
Figure 3.7. Normalized Weibull Hazard Rate. The curves
rise from 0 to 100 unavailability units in 100 time units
(TU).
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Say the analyst believes the curve associated with 5=3 has
the shape that he feels best matches a hazard rate that rises
from lxE-6 to 5xE-6/hr over a 6 week period. (This is a New-New
failure mechanism. ) Figure 3.8 shows how he might use the fami-
ly of curves to obtain his input for the code. A factor of five
increase in the failure rate results when the normalized fail-
ure rate rises from 10 to 50. The O= 3 curve crosses a value of
10 at 31.5 time units. It crosses 50 at 71 time units or 1,008
hours. The actual time interval for the rise is six weeks or
1,008 hours. The offset time corresponds to the time from the
zero point to the time point of the initial value of the hazard
rate. It can be found by taking the ratio,
to _ 1004, hours (3.19)
31.5 TU 40 TU (7- 31)
The arbitrary time unit of 31.5 is the offset time, and it is
equivalent to 80&hours. Having obtained to from the graph,
one can then calculate X from the formula for the hazard func-
0
tion, Equation (3.5). At the beginning of the calculation
interval t=t =0 and:
XAX(t) 10-6 (3.20)
(t )( ) 2
0
When this equation is solved, the result is X =5.16E-13 The
estimates of the input parameters can be checked by calculating
the hazard rate at the end of the interval.
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From the graph
t =
off
100
50
(
TU
31.5 x 1008 hours
39.5
= 804 hours
At t = 0
= 
x(t)
6 (t +t) 3- I
1 x 10 -6/hr
2
3 (804)
X = 5.16 x 10
0
Figure 3.8. Use of the Normalized Weibull Hazard Rate
Curves to Obtain Offset Time.
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X (t) = S AX(tO+t) 6-1 = 3(5.34x10-1 3 ) (1004+790) 2 (3.21)
The result is X(t)=5.08E-6/hr after 6 weeks, which is 2% high,
but well within the accuracy expected from graphical esti-
mation. It should be noted that failure data usually do not
support the requirement for more precise estimation methods.
If the analyst believes that the hazard rate is rising
linearly, corresponding to equal weighting of environmental
degradation over a period of time, the estimation of to is very
easy to accomplish using the straight line on the graph. Say
the anaylst wants to model a hazard rate which has an initial
value of 5.OE-6/hr and rises to 7.0E-6/hr at the end of two
years. This corresponds to a rise from 50 to 70 unavailability
units on the graph over a time interval from 50 to 70 time
units. Applying the ratio method to determine t ,
to 2 years (3.22)
50 TU 20 TU
Statistical procedures such as maximum likelihood esti-
mation offer more efficient estimationof the parameters
provided the third Weibull parameter is permitted to be
both positive and negative. These techniques must be used
with caution, since the failure data may not all reflect a
sampling of the same segment of the hazard rate curve.
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yielding to = 5 years. The scale factor can then be calculated
from the formula for the hazard rate at time zero,
X(to) 
_ 5.0E-6/hr
0o St 0  2(5) (365) (24)
yielding X0 = 5.71E-11.
Figure 3.9 shows how the shape of the failure rate curve
can depend on the offset time as well as the shape factor, a.
The curves start with the failure rate being 1.0E-6/hour at an
offset time of either 1, 5, or 10 years. The curves then vary
with shape factors of either 1.5, 2.0, or 3.0. Note that the
curves appear to become more linear and rise at a slower rate as
the offset time increases. This is because the same amount of
time produces a smaller factor change in (t+t ) as the offset
time increases.
3.6.5 ALTERNATE MODELS OF TIME DEPENDENCY
An alternate way to obtain failure rates which rise gradu-
ally from some initial value is to combine failure mechanisms
having diferent time dependencies with an OR gate. Say, for
example, that either random faults (modeled by a constant haz-
ard rate) or a time dependent failure mechanism can cause a
particular component to fail. The initial failure rate will
depend entirely on the random failure mechanisms. The
"wearout" mechanism gradually becomes more probable until it
dominates the failure probability. This component can be
represented by the Top Event a two "component" system combined
114
0D
C14
LA
'-4
>1
0
E-4
LA
01
0
'-4 q/9-Ox
Figure 3.9. Failure Rates for Selected Values
and to Which Start at the Same Initial Value
of 1, X ,
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by an OR gate. Figure 3.10 summarizes the indiviual component
failure input parameters and the resulting hazard rate and
unavailbility as a function of time.
Use of an OR gate can be extended to include a "burn-in"
mechanism, which initially has a large value but gradually
becomes less probable. The probability of the resultant OR
gate would be the classic "bathtub curve. "
The use of the OR to explicitly model various types of
failure mechanisms has the disadvantage of doubling or tripl-
ing the number of minimal cutsets in which the component
appears. It also requires breaking down component failure data
for input to the computer code only to have it recombined in the
Boolean equation. The curves derived using the offset time can
be considered to be an approximation of the combination of
failure mechanism curves in an efficient form for use in a
fault tree.
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Figure 3.10. Use of an OR Gate to Obtain a Failure Rate
Time Dependence which Does Not Follow a Power Law.
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CHAPTER 4
APPLICATION TO SINGLE COMPONENT SYSTEMS
This Chapter discusses the factors which can influence
the periodic testing policy of systems that can be repres-
ented by a single component failure mechanism. First the
effects of demand and standby failures in determining the
optimum test interval of a single component system are
addressed. Then subroutine OPTEST is introduced. It pro-
vides quick estimates of the optimum test interval of single
component systems and determines the sensitivity of the sys-
tem's unavailability to changes in the test interval. It is
designed to use data input to FRANTIC II-MIT using the COM-
PONENTS dataset. OPTEST is used to illustrate the relative
importance of the various contributors to a component's una-
vailability when failure rates are assumed to be constant in
time. Finally, the effects of time dependent failure rates
and the various renewal options on the selection of test
policies are addressed. These include both variations of
the standby failure rate with calendar time and test caused
changes in the failure rate.
4.1 DEMAND VERSES STANDBY FAILURES
Demand failures (discussed in Section 3.3) and standby
failures (discussed in Section 3.2) are the primary causes
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of component failure during the standby period, the effects
of undetectable and carryover failures being usually a small
fraction of the total unavailability. The division of fail-
ure mechanisms between the two can have a great effect on the
usefulness of periodic testing. If failures are primarily
due to standby failures, periodic tests perform the function
eliminating failures that occur and lie undetected during
the standby period. If the tests are primarily demand
related, the tests are just another demand which can cause
failure, and they accomplsh no purpose from the point of
view of the FRANTIC model. 1
4.1.1 RATIO OF OBSERVED DEMAND AND STANDBY FAILURES
Figure 4.1 shows the effect of a change in the ratio of
demand to standby failure mechanisms in a periodically
tested component. The curves are plotted for the condition
that the failure frequency upon test at a 30 day interval is
0.001. The failures are divided into demand and standby
failures by the relation (rare event approximation):
qX(T 2 ) + qd = 0.001 at T2 = 30 days (4.1)
There are other reasons for accomplishing periodic
tests, one of the primary being the prevention of an
increase in the failure rate through maintenance. FRAN-
TIC II-MIT does not contain provisions for maintenance
strategies other than the New-New renewal option. The
Old-New option implies renewal upon failure, which is
not maintenance.
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Figure 4.1. Sensitivity of Component Unavailability to
Demand Verses Standby Failure Mechanisms, Constant Stand-
by Failure Rate, Downtime per Test = 1 Hour.
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Where: q,(T2 ) = Instantaneous unavailability due to unde-
tected standby failures at the time of the periodic
test.
The contribution of each failure mechanism to the
observed failure frequency is allowed to vary by 25% incre-
ments from all demand failures to all standby failures. The
parameters for the curves are given in Table 4. 1. The curves
are generated by making repeated calculations for a given
set of failure parameters while varying the test interval.
The contribution due to testing alone is also shown. It
increases as the test interval decreases reflecting the fact
that the component is made unavailable for testing more
often.
Figure 4. 1 clearly shows the futility of periodic test-
ing if only demand failure mechanisms are present and no
renewal or maintenance benefit is obtained from the test.
The 100% qd curve is simply the sum of qd=0.001 and the una-
vailability due to testing. For this case the best policy is
to not test at all.
Beta = 1 Standby Failure Rate
Figure 4.1 was calculated assuming that the standby
failure rate is constant in time during each calculation.
When only standby failures are present, X is at its largest
value, and the unavailability curve has its largest depend-
ence on test interval. Of course, as qd increases, X
decreases, so the test interval at which the minimum una-
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T =60 days
2 j----over 60 days
N=2,R
NN Renewal
15 30 45 60
Standby Time (days)
Effect of Renewal on the Failure
Curves 1 in Figures
Curve i I L.
Figure 4.l(S=l)
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 4.2(S=2)
1
2
3
4
5
0
0.00025
0.00050
0.00075
0.00100
0
0.00025
0.00050
0.00075
0.00100
4.1 and 4.2
1q T2)
0.001
0.00075
0.00050
0.00025
0
0.001
0.00075
0.00050
0.00025
0
Rates for
xo
1.39x10-6
1. 04x10-6
6.95x10~7
3. 47x10~7
0
-10
6. 43x10-1 0
4.32x100
3.22x10-1 0
1.61x10-10
0
Table 4.1. Component Failure Paramters for Figures 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3.
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vailability is obtained becomes larger. It is also
interesting to note that when the two types of failure mech-
anisms are evenly divided the curve at the minimum becomes
quite flat while going through the minimum, indicating an
insensitivity of the unavailability to test interval. There
appears to be considerable latitude available to the systems
analyst in choosing a test interval if demand failures form
an appreciable percentage of the average unavailability and
the standby failure rate is constant.
It is important to recognize that with a constant
standby failure rate an increasing test interval does not
produce more failures. The increase in the unavailability
occurs because the failures that do occur remain undetected
for a longer period of time. Provided that the approxi-
mation that q, ~ XT2 is valid, the same number of failures
will be observed if the component is tested at two week as
opposed to four week intervals. The probability of having a
failure at two weeks is half that of four weeks, but there
are twice as many two week tests.
Beta = 2 Standby Failure Rate, NN Renewal
Figure 4.2 shows the results of the same calculation as
Figure 4. 1 when a component has an increasing hazard rate
and is renewed at every test and repair. 2 For comparison
with Figure 4.1, the observed failure frequency for a test
2 See Section 3.2.4 for a discussion of renewal types.
123
e O LO- CD
O OO
-4O
(D Q)L Q)
rLO r C
a) 0
CD)
1241
.O O L \
124J
interval of 30 days is again 0.001, with the division
between observed failure mechanisms varying between all
standby and all demand in 25% increments. The hazard rate
has been modeled to increase linearly, doubling its value in
the first 30 days of standby. Table 4.1 gives the component
failure parameters used for this calculation.
When the hazard rate is increasing, the proper
selection of a test interval becomes more important for at
least two reasons:
1) As the standby period becomes longer the average una-
vailability increases at a faster rate than it did with the
constant failure rate. This reflects the increasing
suseptibility to failure which the increasing hazard rate
models .
2) When the hazard rate increases with time during the
standby period, more actual failures will result than if the
component were tested more often. This can be easily under-
stood by referring to the graphs of the hazard functions in
Table 4.1. In order to obtain a failure probability of 0.001
at the 30 day test interval, the linear hazard rate is ini-
tially smaller than the constant rate. It crosses the
constant rate at about 15 days, so that its average over the
30 day period is equal to the constant hazard rate. As the
standby period becomes longer than 30 days, the linear haz-
ard rate continues to increase. A component following this
rate which has survived for 45 days without having been
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tested at the 30 day point has a much higher probability of
failing than one which was tested at 30 days, found working
and returned to service. Again, the implication is that the
test has not only verified that the component is working,
but it has also reduced its probability of failure relative
to what it would have been had there been no test. The aver-
age value of the hazard rate over a 60 day test period would
be approximately the hazard rate's value at 30 days, whereas
a 30 test interval would produce a hazard rate approximately
equal to its value at 15 days.
4.1.2 EFFECT OF INCREASING DEMAND FAILURE RATE
Figure 4.3 shows the effect of increasing the demand
failure rate in a component which has a specific standby
failure rate. The standby failure rate produces an average
unavailability of 0.001 when the test interval is 30 days.
(The failure rate is double that of Figures 4.1 and 4.2. )
These curves are plotted on semilog scale so that the per-
centage change in the component's unavailability with test
interval can be seen more easily. It can be seen that as
demand failures become more dominant the average unavail-
ability of the component becomes less sensitive to the test
interval. However, because the value of lambda has remained
constant, the optimum test interval for the component
remains approximately the same.
4.1.3 EFFECT OF UNDETECTABLE FAILURES
In terms of their contribution to a component's una-
126
X = 2.78xl0 -6/hr
T = 1 hour
= 1.0
qd = 0.0]1
qd 0.003
40 60 80 100
Test Interval (Days)
Figure 4.3. Effect of Periodic Testing on a Component
With a Constant Standby Failure Rate and Various Magni-
tudes of Demand Failure Rate.
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vailability during a test interval, undetecable failures
are very much like demand failures. Their contribution to
the unavailability is independent of the time since the last
periodic test, since the test is incapable of revealing
their existence. One can also give complementary physical
interpretations to the two. Demand failures could be inter-
preted as the inherent inability of a component to cope with
certain extreme conditions of a true demand. The value of qd
would then contain a contribution equal to the probability
that the extreme conditions will exist at the time of the
demand. (Given the conditions exist, the component's fail-
ure probability is one.) In the same context, one
contributor to undetectable failures could result from a
degradation of the component during its standby period which
decreases its ability to respond to the extreme conditions
of a true demand. In other words, undetectable failures can
represent the time dependence of true demand failures.
For both the New-New and Old-Old renewal options of
FRANTIC II-MIT, the unavailability due to undetectable
failures is intially zero and increases monotonically
throughout the calculation. For most practical applica-
tions the unavailability contribution will remain relative-
ly constant throughout the interval, since undetectable
standby failures should be small compared to those which the
test can address. If, for example, its failure rate is con-
stant the unavailability during any one test interval
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changes by XiT 2 during any one interval. If demand failures
are also possible, this increase will be a very small frac-
tion of the test independent contribution to
unavailability. Because of both its mathematical similari-
ty to demand failures with in a test interval and its phys-
ical interpretation as a time dependent demand failure,
there is no need to discuss the sensitivity of component
unavailability to it any further.
4.1.4 FRANTIC CODE ASSUMPTION REGARDING DEMAND FAILURES
For periodically tested components in both FRANTIC II
and FRANTIC II-MIT, it is assumed that all failure mech-
anisms modeled by qd will produce demand failures at period-
ic tests that require repair. In other words, during the
repair period there are two contributions due to qd: 1) the
component is under repair with a probability qd due to
demand failures at the previous test, and 2) the component
which was good at the last test and is now on standby fails
upon demand with probability qd. Since qd can model fail-
ures caused by conditions of the true demand, this
assumption is not always correct. However, the error is
conservative and small. For example, if qd consists of
entirely accident related failure probabilities, the actual
average unavailability would be qd' while the computed value
would be 1 + (TR/T 2). The additional factor is probabily
less than than 10% for most repair times and test intervals
of interest.
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If the analyst does not want demand failures to make a
repair contribution to the unavailability, he can always
establish a composite component using two failure events
combined using an OR gate. In one event only qd is input,
and there will be no repair period. The second will have
only the periodically tested failure parameters. The
resultant composite component will not have the contrib-
ution.
4.2 SUBROUTINE OPTEST
4.2.1 BACKGROUND
The determination of an optimum component test inter-
val for a component using the original FRANTIC II is very
inefficient. A series of calculations must be made input-
ting different values of the periodic test interval for each
calculation. A curve of average system unavailability
verses periodic test interval can then be plotted from which
the minimum value can be obtained. This procedure is both
time consuming and costly. Subroutine OPTEST provides a
quick way to calculate the optimum test interval, minimum
unavailability, and variation of the average unavailability
with test interval of any system that can be represnted by a
single set of failure parameters.
4.2.2 THEORY
The derivation of the equations used in OPTEST could
procede directly from Equations (3.1) through (3.3). Howev-
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Figure 4.4. Graphical Representation of the Time
Integrated Unavailability of a Periodically Tested
Component.
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er, it can be most easily understood by referring to the
graphical representation of time dependent component una-
vailability presented in Figure 4.4. This figure is the
same as Figure 2.2. However, here the areas under the curve
are emphasized, because they represent the contributions of
the various possible failure modes to the component's time
integrated unavailability,
T
- l.
q T q c (t)dt (4.2)
In terms of Figure 4.4, this equation can be written as
qc 1XT2+CfT 2+qdT+XTT+qoTc T 2 d(4.3)
+ PfT+XTTR+PfTR+qdT R
In writing this equation, three simplifying assumptions are
made:
1. Ts T, so that T, = T2 - T = T2. This assumption
produces a slightly larger unavailability due to undetected
standby failures than would be expected.
2. The probability of undetected/unrepaired standby
failures is assumed to remain less than 0.01, so that g,(T2
XT
2 '
3. The accumulation of the probability of undetected
standby failures is assumed to begin at the end of the test
132
period independent of the probability that the component
will require unscheduled repair. This assumption also
produces a slightly larger unavailability than would actu-
ally be experienced.
3. The carryover factor, Cf, is assumed to model failures
that will go undetected for only one test. That is, compo-
nent failures which go undetected for one periodic test will
be detected at the next test. It is recognized that this is
an unconservative assumption. However, the test should be
separated in time sufficiently for the human error probabil-
ities to be independent, and a review of test procedures
which reveals that there is a potential for Cf to be greater
than about 0.01 should result in a revised procedure rather
than an input to a fault tree. Therefore, the probability of
sucessive nondetection of failures should be very small com-
pared to the probability of just one nondetection. It
should also be noted that input parameters for undetectable
failure modes might be the proper vehicle to model modes
which could suffer repeated nondetection.
As shown in Equations (3.1) through (3.3) of Chapter 3,
the contributions to unavailability during standby,
testing, or unscheduled repair can not be simply added,
since they are mutually exclusive. Applying the proper fac-
tors to the failure modes which could occur together in the
standby, test and repair periods respectively and collect-
ing terms produces the following equation:
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c = AT + B + C/T (4.4)
Where:
A = (1-qd) (0.5+Cf)X (4.4a)
(Note: In this derivation, it is assummed that undetected
and carryover failures will occur with a low enough proba-
bility to use the rare event approximation when writting
(4.4a). A crossterm would add considerable complexity to
the mathematical presentation.)
B = qd+(1-qd) [T(l-%o (l-Pf)X+TR(l-q)(l-Pf)X] (4.4b)
C = (1-qd (q0(+{l-q }P f)+TR d+{l-qd}P f)] (4.4c)
The interaction of the various failure modes with the
periodic test interval may now be easily interpreted.
Coefficient A contains those failure modes whose contrib-
ution to system unavailability can be reduced by reducing
the periodic test interval. These are the contributions
due to undetected standby failures, both those which
occur during the current standby interval and those which
escaped detection during the previous periodic test.
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* Coefficient B contains those failure modes whose contrib-
utions to average system unavailability are independent
of the test interval. These include the demand failure
mode and the downtime produced when standby failures are
detected and repaired during period tests. (If the tests
are further apart in time, each one is more likely to
produce a failure, but since they are further apart, the
more likely event occurs less often. These two factors
cancel. )
* Coefficient C contains those failure modes whose contrib-
utions are decreased by increasing the test interval.
These include the contributions of imperfect testing,
namely unavailabilities due to unscheduled repair of test
caused failures, unability to override the test mode in
the event of a demand to perform the safety function, and
unscheduled repair of demand failures resulting from the
cycling to test mode.
The optimum test interval can be found by taking the
first derivative of equation (4.4) and setting it equal to
zero, which produces:
C o [+ (1-q0 ) P ]+T REE+(1-qd) P f 4.50 =4-5=Top A 0.5(l+Cf);k
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As expected, those contributions resulting from imperfect
testing increase the optimum test interval, while those
which result in undetected standby failures decrease it.
Note that Equation (4.5) reduces directly to Equations
(2.11) and (2.13) if q0 = 1 and all parameters except T and X
are assumed to be zero.
An expression for the minimum unavailability can be
obtained by using Equation (4.5) in Equation (4.4). This
results in:
TOP (4.6)q =AT + B + T---(4.6
c(min) op C
Additional flexibility can be obtained by rearranging
Equation ( 4.3) into quadratic form:
AT 2 + (B-qc )T + C = 0 (4.7)
The average unavailability can now be any value. For con-
venience it is expressed as a factor increase f over the min-
imum average unavailability. Since the minimum
unavailability occurs at the optimum test interval:
q = fq 0 (mif) = f[A/C + B + C F] (4.8)
Where f is defined by:
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qc( 2, failure parameters) (49)
qc(min) (Top,failure parameters)
This equation reduces to:
qc = f[B+2/I (4.10)
Using equation (4.10) as the value of the average unavail-
ability in equation (4.7) and applying the quadratic
formula, one obtains:
2fAC+(f-l)B [ (l-f)B-2fAd }2-4AC' (4.11)
2A
The quantity T 2 is now the periodic test interval at which
the minimum average system unavailability is increased by a
factor of f over what it would be at the optimum periodic
test interval. With this equation one can determine the
range of period test intervals which will produce no more
than a factor of f increase in the component's unavailabili-
ty over that obtained at the optimum test interval. For most
practical applications one would be interested in lengthen-
ing the test interval, as this will decrease the potential
for system wearout and will decrease manpower requirements.
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It may be interest to determine how far one is from the
optimum periodic test policy for a given set of failure
parameters and test interval. This can be done by calculat-
ing f using Equation (4.9). First, the optimum test inter-
val for a set of failure parameters is calculated using
Equation (4.5), and the minimum average unavailability
obtained by testing at that interval is determined using
Equation (4.6). The component's unavailability is then
recalculated using Equation (4.4) for the specific test
interval that was input. This quantity is then divided by
the original minimum unavailability to obtain the factor
increase created by not testing at the optimum interval.
4.2.3 IMPLEMENTATION IN FRANTIC i1-MIT
The theory presented in the section above is imple-
mented in FRANTIC II as subroutine OPTEST. Component fail-
ure parameters can be input using the COMP keyword, and
OPTEST is called using the TEST keyword. The user must pro-
vide the index number of the component he wishes to analyze,
the calculation option for OPTEST, and (optionally) the fac-
tor used to find the range of test intervals producing less
than this factor increase in unavailability. (In the absence
of a factor the default value of 1.1 is used.)
Two calculation options are provided.
1) Option 1 calculates the optimum test interval, the una-
vailability at this interval (qmin ' and the range of test
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interval producing less than a factor f increase in the una-
vailability.
2) Option 2 calculates the optimum test interval, the una-
vailability at this interval, the unavailability at the user
input test interval, T in the component input data, and
the factor increase, f, produced by testing at the user
input interval.
For a detailed description of the calculation
sequence, the reader is referred to a listing of SUBROUTINE
OPTEST, which is fully documented with comments. The format
for the OPTEST keyword input is included in Appendix A.
4.2.4 COMPARISON WITH FRANTIC I-MIT RUN OPTION
Figure 4.5 is a comparison of OPTEST calculations with
those of a standard FRANTIC II-MIT calculation. It can be
seen from Figure 4.5 that excellent agreement is obtained
between the two methods of calculating unavailability for a
single component. These results are also in excellent
agreement with Figures 2.4 [Ja68] and 2.5 [Lo81.
Table 4.2 shows the input and output of the OPTEST cal-
culation. With OPTEST the optimum test interval is given
directly, as well as information about the sensitivity of
the unavailability to changes in the test interval. The
optimum test interval of 18.6 days and minimum unavailabili-
ty of 4.47E-3 are in execellent agreement with the values of
447 hours and 0.004472 from Table 3 of Lofgren's work.
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Figure 4.5. Comparison of OPTEST and RUN Calculations
of the Average Unavailability of a Periodically Tested
Component Verses Test Interval.
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FILE: TABLE42 DAT A
TITLE
FIGURE 4.5
POPT
COMPARISON OF OPTEST AND RUN
COMP
NEW
I ICOMP
I 2COMP
-1
TEST
1 1 1.1
1 1 1.2
1 1 1.3
1 1 1.4
1 1 1.5
1 1 1.6
1 1 1.7
1 1 1.8
1 1 1.9
1 1 2.0
1 1 3.0
1 1 4.0
1 1 5.0
2 1
FILE: TABLE42 OPTEST
10.0
1.0
30.0 29. 1.0
A
OPTION I
J LAMBDA
I 1.OOE-05
I 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.00E-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.OOE-05
1 1.00E-05
I 1.OOE-05
OPTION 2
J LAMBDA
I 1.00E-05
QRESID
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
QRESID
0.0
TAU TREP
(HOURS)
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0
TAU TREP
(HOURS)
1.0 0.0
QOVR PTCF
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
1.000 0.0
QOVR PTCF
1.000 0.0
F QMIN
1.10E+00 4.47E-03
1.20E+00 4.47E-03
1.30E+00 4.47E-03
1.40E+00 4.47E-03
1.50E+00 4.47E-03
1.60E+00 4.47E-03
1.70E+00 4.47E-03
1.80E+00 4.47E-03
1.90E+00 4.47E-03
2.OOE+00 4.47E-03
3.OOE+00 4.47E-03
4.OOE+00 4.47E-03
5.OOE+00 4.47E-03
Q(AT T2) QMIN
4.99E-03 4.47E-03
T20P T2LOW T2HI
(DAYS)
18.6 12.0 29.0
18.6 10.0 34.7
18.6 8.7 39.7
18.6 7.8 44.3
18.6 7.1 48.8
18.6 6.5 53.1
18.6 6.1 57.3
18.6 5.7 61.4
18.6 5.3 65.5
18.6 5.0 69.5
18.6 3.2 108.6
18.6 2.4 146.7
18.6 1.9 184.5
T20P T2
(DAYS)
18.6 30.0
F
1.12
Table 4.2. Input and Output of OPTEST Calculations
for Figure 4.5.
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1.0
1.0
FILE: TABLE43 DAT
TITLE
FIGURE 4.5 COMPARISON
POPT
COMP
NEW
1 ICOMP 10.0
I 2COMP 1.0
-1
TIME
100.
RUN
A
OF OPTEST AND RUN
5.0 4. 1.0
1.0
1.0
2.
i TOTL NONE
-1
COMP
NEW
I ICOMP 10.0
1 2COMP 1.0
-1
TIME
200.0
RUN
FIGURE 4.5 COMPARISON OF OPTEST AND RUN
10.0 9. 1.0
1.0
1.0
3.
I TOTL NONE
-1
COMP
NEW
I ICOMP 10.0
I 2COMP 1.0
-1
TIME
300.
RUN
5.
1 TOTL NONE
-1
15.0 14. 1.0 1.0
1.0
.(Note: Input continues
170 more lines)
FILE: TABLE43 FILE
LAMBDA(1)
I.OOE-05
1.OOE-05
i.OOE-05
1.00E-05
1.OOE-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
I.OOE -05
1.00E-05
1.OOE-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
I.OE-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
OFFSET(1)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
( 1
A
BETA( 1)
I.OOE+00
1.OOE+00
1 .OOE+00
1.00E+00
I .OOE+00
1.00E+00
1.OOE+00
1.00E+00
I.OOE+00
I.OOE+00
1.00E+00
1.OOE+00
i .OOE+00
1.00E+00
I .O0E+00
1.OOE+00
1.00E+00
1 .OOE+00
I .00E+00
1.00E+00
ORESID(1)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TEST2( 1)
5.OOE+00
1.00E+01
1. 50E+01
2.OOE+0 I
2.50E+01
3.OOE+01
3.50E+01
4.OOE+01
4.50E+01
5.OOE+01
5.50E+01
6.OOE+01
6.50E+01
7.OOE+01
7.50E+01
8.OOE+01
8.50E+01
9.OOE+01
9. 50E+01
i.OOE+02
QSAVG
8.91E-03
5.35E-03
4.55E-03
4.46E-03
4.64E-03
4.96E-03
5. 36E-03
5.80E-03
6.28E-03
6.79E-03
7.3iE-03
7.84E-03
8. 38E-03
8. 93E-03
9.48E-03
1.00E-02
1.06E-02
1. 12E-02
1. 17E-02
1. 23E-02
Table 4.3. Input and Output of RUN Calculations for
Figure 4.5.
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Table 4.3 shows the input and output of the RUN option
calculation. Because of its size (205 lines), all the input
for the RUN option is not given. As FRANTIC II-MIT does not
contain a search routine for optimization, a series of cal-
culations must be done to determine where the unavailability
goes through a minimum. The RUN option is designed for use
with complex systems, so its instantaneous unavailability
and numerical integration algorithm is inefficient for sin-
gle components. Its flexibility for addressing
multicomponent system' s far outweigh this minor inconven-
ience for one component systems, as will be demonstrated in
Chapters 5 and 6. OPTEST fills the gap for constant failure
rate single components.
4.3 BEHAVIOR OF CONSTANT FAILURE RATE COMPONENTS
The analytical form of the unavailability equations
used in OPTEST lead to insights which can be quite useful in
establishing a periodic testing program. The following
sections give a few examples.
4.3.1 APPROXIMATE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FAILURE MODES
Examination of Equation (4.4) shows that the relative
importance of the various component failure modes is influ-
enced by their duration. For the purposes of comparison, it
would be useful to express the test and repair times in terms
of the period test interval.
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Say that test time is typically about one thousandth of
the periodic test interval. This corresponds to a test time
time of slightly less than one hour when the period test is
done monthly. Also suppose that the repair time is approxi-
mately one fiftieth of the test interval, corresponding to
repair taking an average of 15 hours. Also assume qd < 0.01,
so that (1-qd) ~ 1. Equation (4.4) then becomes:
~ =(0-3q c = (.5+Cf)AT + qd + 10 T(1-q0 ) (1-Pf )X +
0.0 2 T(1-Pf)X + 10- 3q + 10-3 (1-q0 )Pf + (4.12)
0.0 2 qd + 0.0 2 Pf
Collecting terms obtains:
q = [0.5 2 1+Cf]XT + 10-qO + 0.021P + 1.02qd
With the equation in this form, the following observations
can be made:
1) The coefficient multiplying the standby failure con-
tribution due to undetected failures awaiting testing to be
revealed is 0.5. A contribution of 0.021 in the coefficent
is due to detected standby failures during periodic testing
and unscheduled repair. It can be seen that this contrib-
ution is small compared to the undetected contribution.
2) The coefficient of q0 reflects the relatively short
period of time that the component is undergoing periodic
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testing. Consequently the unavailability to override the
test mode must be quite high for it to become comparable to
the contributions of standby and demand failures.
3) The coefficient of P f is larger than that of g because
test caused failures must be repaired. Consequently, the
component will be unavailable for a longer period of time.
However, the coefficient is still quite small, reflecting
again the relatively short duration of the test and repair
periods compared to the test interval.
4) The demand failure rate is multiplied by one, because a
demand failure can occur whenever a demand is made to accom-
plish a test or safety function. In fact, it is slightly
greater than one because demand failures which occur at the
beginning of a periodic test must be repaired.
5) The crossterms reflect the fact that the different
failure modes combine through an OR gate. The sum of the
first four terms would be maximum unavailability obtained by
a combination of all failure modes.
4.3.2 EFFECTIVE TEST DOWNTIME
The coefficient C of Equation (4.4) can be given a
physical interpretation which will make it easier to use
OPTEST for engineering applications. Recall that this coef-
ficient is given by Equation (4.4c). If the terms which
account for the fact that they are mutually exclusive are
removed, the contributions to this term become more clear:
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C = T (q 0+Pf) + TR qd+Pf) (4.14)
Each term is just a probability that the component is failed
times the length of time it will be down during test or
repair due to this cause. All four causes are created by the
test.' It is interesting to note that the time integral of
all these contributions carry the same weight in determining
the optimum test interval. For the prupose of establishing
a testing policy for a one component system it will be useful
to consider them as one group of contributors to the Effec-
tive Downtime per Test.
The Effective Downtime per Test is very useful for
determining the unavailability caused by testing. equally.4
For example, if testing of a component takes 0.5 hours dur-
ing which it is entirely unavailable and generates test
caused failures at a rate of 0.05 per test which require on
a For periodically tested components, FRANTIC II-MIT
assumes that all demand failures can occur at the test
demand and require repairs whose duration is the same as
for standby failures (see Section 4.1.4). With the
exception of a test caused change in the failure rate
(see Section 3.5.3), no benefit is obtained by testing
for demand failures, because the probability that they
will occur again after the test is not changed.
* For a single component system these contributions are
weighted For multiple component systems the unavailabil-
ity of other components affect the importance of a compo-
nent's unavailability to the system. For example there
is no penalty for taking a component offline if a redun-
dant component is known to be working.
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the average of 20 hours to repair, then, on the average, the
EDT per test is:
EDT = (1.0)0.5 + (0.05)20 = 0.6 hours/test (4.15)
(Note that the maximum unavailability during the test is
1.0.) The EDT can then be used directly in tables and graphs
such as those given by Lofgren [Lo80] and the unavailability
contours which are introduced in the next section.
4.3.3 UNAVAILABILITY CONTOURS
Figure 4.6 is a mapping of unavailability verses test
interval for a range of failure rates. It was derived by
using option 1 of OPTEST. Calculations such as those shown
in Table 6.2 were made for various values of X. All the qmin
data points, 1 data points, etc. , were connected to
form the contour lines shown.
Figure 4.6 can be read much like a contour map, yield-
ing a "valley of unavailability" about the optimum test
interval. Note that the valley can extend in two
directions. For a given value of X, say 1.OE-6/hr, a range
of test intervals come within 10% of the minimum unavail-
ability would lie between 38 to 92 days when the EDT is 1.0
hr/test. Conversely, if one were to to decide to test a com-
ponent at thirty day intervals, he would be within 10% of the
optimum test interval for values of X in the range of 1.6 to 9
E-6/hr.
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Figure 4.6. Average Unavailability Contours for a Period-
ically Tested Component Having an Effective Downtime Per
Test of One Hour.
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It is interesting to note that as the value of the
standby failure rate increases, the width of the "valley"
decreases. This should be expected, since at the higher
failure rates more failures occur per unit time, so the
testing policy ought to become more critical. For failure
rates below say lE-6/hr, the 1. lq . contours embrace a
choice of test intervals ranging from 38 to 92 days, a total
of 54 days, whereas when X = lE-5/hr the range has declined
to from 12 to 29 days, or a 17 day interval.
4.4 BEHAVIOR OF TIME DEPENDENT HAZARD RATE COMPONENTS
With the introduction of the offset time, the flexibil-
ity available in FRANTIC II-MIT to model hazard rates which
vary with time makes the presentation of sensitivity calcu-
lations to illustrate the general characteristics of the
resultant unavailability impractical. Instead, a few com-
ments will be made about how a time dependent failure rate
might effect a calculaton differently than a constant fail-
ure rate.
4.4.1 IMPORTANCE OF HAZARD RATE
Figure 4.7 illustrates how the time dependence of the
hazard rate can influence the rate of change of the instan-
taneous unavailability. The calculation is made for an
increasing, constant, and decreasing hazard rate. The haz-
ard rates are normalized so that they give approximately the
same instantaneous unavailability after a 30 days standby
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Figure 4.7. Instantaneous Unavailability Resulting
From Hazard Rates Having Three Different Time Depen-
dencies.
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period. The calculation is then carried out to 60 days to
see the effect of the individual time dependences. The top
half of the figure shows the hazard rates and the bottom half
shows the resultant instantaeous unavailabilites.
For values of the instantaneous unavailability less
than about 0.01 (so that there is a high probability of sur-
viving to come under hazard over the entire period) there is
a direct correspondence between the area under the hazard
curve and the magnitude of the instantaneous
unavailability. Therefore, an increasing hazard rate will
increase the rate at which the instantaneous unavailability
rises, while the decreasing rate causes it to begin to level
off.
4.4.2 USES OF RENEWAL OPTIONS
New-New Renewal
With New-New renewal both test and repair reset the
hazard rate. For these conditions, Figure 4.7 shows that
the proper selection of a test interval becomes more impor-
tant as the value of increases. A typical example of how
the New-New renewal option is used with an increasing fail-
ure rate was given in Section 4.1.1, so the effect of the use
of this option will not be discussed other than to comment
about a decreasing failure rate. It is hard to visualize a
physical situation in which a component would be modeled
with a decreasing failure rate and a NN renewal option. The
only plausible situation that this author can envision is
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that somehow a test creates a condition from which a compo-
nent must recover during standby. When it initially comes
off test, it is quite suseptible to the random shocks of
standby. But as it sits idle it can some how take the shocks
better, or perhaps the rate of shocks die off following the
test. Data which implies this type of condition exists
should be considered very carefully.
Old-New Renewal
Recall that the Old-New renewal option resets the haz-
ard function back to the offset time if a component is failed
at a given test. In the code this calculation becomes very
involved, because every test has a probability of producing
failure, so the instantaneous unavailability depends on a
composite of hazard rates extending back to the begining of
the calculation. A decreasing hazard rate would model
replacements where there are possibilities of substandard
components. The longer a component survives, the less
chance of it being substandard. The effect will be a gradu-
ally declining unavailability.
If the hazard rate increases, in theory a steady state
will be reached. Those components which have survived for a
long time will have very large hazard rates and will almost
surely fail. They will then be replaced with components
whose hazard rate starts at the offset time. Eventually
there will be a balance. In practice, an increasing failure
rate with replacement upon failure is an excellent candidate
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for the application of renewal theory. When the components
are judged to be very likely to fail, they should be
replaced. FRANTIC II-MIT does not currently have a model to
reflect replacement policies such as this.
Old-Old Renewal
There are two applications for which the Old-Old
renewal option can be used, modeling long term wear-out or
burn-in and investigating maintenance policies.
Long Term Wear-out or Burn-in
Old-Old renewal means that neither test not repair
resets the hazard rate. It implies a hazard function that
gradually changes over the course of many test intervals.
The hazard rate during any one test interval remains rela-
tively constant, and the unavailability during that inter-
val behaves much like it would for a constant failure rate
equal to the value of the hazard rate at the middle of the
interval. Table 4.4 illustrates this. It gives the results
of calculations comparing the average annual unavailability
due to a 5=3 hazard rate with a constant hazard rate. The 5=3
hazard rate is allowed to vary over a 20 year time period,
and calculations are made using the offset time to establish
the year in the which the calculation is being made. For
comparison a constant (0=1) hazard rate is calculated at the
midpoint of each year and run separately. It can be seen
from Table 4.4 that very close agreement is obtained between
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BETA LAMBDA OFFSET TEST INT OSAVG
(YEARS) (DAYS)
3.00E+00 1.00E-15 0.0 3.OOE+01 2.67E-05
3.00E+00 1.OOE-15 1.00E+00 3.OOE+01 1.90E-04
3.00E+00 1.OOE-15 2.00E+00 3.00E+01 5.16E-04
3.OOE+00 1.OOE-15 3.OOE+00 3.OOE+01. 1.01E-03
3.00E+00 1.OOE-15 4.0OE+00 3.OOE+01 1.66E-03
3.OOE+00 1.OOE-15 5.00E+00 3.OOE+01 2.47E-03
3.OOE+00 1.OOE-15 6.00E+00 3.OOE+01 3.45E-03
3.OOE+00 1.OOE-15 7.00E+00 3.OOE+01 4.59E-03
3.OOE+00 1.OOE-15 8.00E+00 3.OOE+01 5.88E-03
3.00E+00 1.OOE-15 9.OOE+00 3.OOE+01 7.34E-03
3.OOE+00 1.OOE-15 1.90E+01 3.OOE+01 3.02E-02
Results with time dependent hazard rate.
Offset establishes the point of the be-
ginning of the annual calculations.
BETA LAMBDA OFFSET TEST INT OSAVG
(YEARS) (DAYS)
1.OOE+00 5.76E-08 0.0 3.OOE+0i 2.05E-05
1.00E+00 5.18E-07 0.0 3.OOE+Oi 1.84E-04
1.OOE+00 1.44E-06 0.0 3.OOE+01 5.12E-04
1.OOE+00 2.82E-06 0.0 3.OOE+01 1.00E-03
1.OOE+00 4.66E-06 0.0 3.OOE+01 1.66E-03
1.00E+00 6.96E-06 0.0 3.OOE+01 2.47E-03
1.00E+00 9.37E-06 0.0 3.OOE+01 3.32E-03
1.00E+00 1.29E-05 0.0 3.OOE+01 4.57E-03
1.00E+00 1.66E-05 0.0 3.OOE+01 5.87E-03
1.OOE+00 2.OE-05 0.0 3.OOE+01 7.35E-03
1.00E+00 8.75E-05 0.0 3.OOE+01 3.02E-02
Results with a cons'tant (S=l) hazard rate.
The value used is determined by evaluating
the time dependent hazard rate at mid year
of the annual calculation.
Table 4.4. Comparison of Calculations Using the Old-Old
Renewal Option and a B=3 Hazard Rate With Those Using an
Equivalent Constant Failure Rate. The agreement is ex-
cellent after the second year.
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I'
the two methods of calculating the annual average unavail-
abilities.
For this type of application the primary advantage of
the Old-Old renewal option is its ability to propogate a
gradual change in the failure rate throughout the entire
lifetime of the component. The offset time automatically
updates the failure rate to the proper value for the year of
the calculation. Because it does not change by much during
an individual test interval, the increasing failure rate can
be approximated by a constant failure rate calculated at the
midpoint of the calculation interval, but this would require
manual updating for each new year.
Maintenance Policies
The Old-Old renewal option can be used to investigate
maintenance policies in which the hazard rate is set back to
its initial value by the maintenance action. This can be
done by limiting the calculation time to the maintenance
interval. With the Old-Old renewal option the effects of
varying the maintenance (or replacemant period) can be
investigated by changing the calculation time. Figure 4.8
is an example of what the hazard rate resulting from the
choice of two different maintenance intervals might look
like.
Because the components of a complex system may be main-
tained at different intervals, with hazard rates being reset
at throughout any particular period, this method of simulat-
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q t)
Maintain every 3 months
Average over maintenance
interval
-....... Calc. Time = 90 days
q(t)
Maintain every 6 months
Average over maintenance
interval
- Calc. Time = 180 days
q(t) Maintain every 9 months
Average over maintenance
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x(t)
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Figure 4.8. Effect of Variations in the Maintenance Interval
on a Time Dependent Hazard Rate. Test monthly, maintain as
indicated.
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ing maintenance activities is not useful in multiple compo-
nent systems. It is recommended that a provision be added to
the code to reset the hazard rate after a user specified num-
ber of tests. This should not be a difficult option to add,
as the computational routines currently count periodic
tests during the calculation.
4.5 TEST CAUSED WEAR-OUT AND BURN-IN
The original FRANTIC II code provided for only the
standby failure rate change. In the FRANTIC II-MIT Code
both the standby and demand failure rates can be changed by
tests. This modification makes the code more consistent,
because tests can change a component's suseptibility to
demand as well as standby failure mechanisms. The equations
for test caused changes were presented in Section 3.5.3 and
the idea of suseptibility was discussed in section 3.6.1.
Here only their effects on the code's calculations will be
addressed.
4.5.1 EFFECT ON STANDBY FAILURE RATE
The effect of test caused wear-out is to slightly
increase the rate at which the component's unavailability
increases during the next standby interval. Since the
effect is cumulative in FRANTIC II-MIT, the more the compo-
nent is tested the higher its failure rate will be at some
later point in time. With the Old-Old renewal option, the
offset time, t0, allows one to project the effect of testing
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into the future to see the effect of test caused wearout over
the design life of the plant. Figure 4.9 is an example of
this projection.
Figure 4.9 is a calculation of the unavailability of a
component which fails during standby due to a constant (5=1)
failure rate, but is subjected to test caused wearout. The
wear-out is modeled by increasing the scale factor by a fac-
tor of f =1.01 at each test. For purposes of illustration it
is assumed that the test does not cause any Effective Down-
time as defined in Section 4.3.2. Five curves are shown in
the figure. The first and lowest corresponds to the compo-
nent' s unavailability during the initial stages of plant
life. Because there is no immediate penalty for tested
(EDT=0 hr/test), the lowest unavailability is obtained when
the component is tested often.
The next four curves are calculated over the first 20
test periods after the plant has been in service for the time
indicated.5 These curves show the long term effects of test
caused wear-out. At the lower test intervals, the component
is gradually worn out by testing, so that it begins failing
very often. It can be seen that an "optimum" test interval
appears to exist at a 30 day test interval for the 10 year
s When the 00 renewal option is used in FRANTIC II-MIT, the
Offset Time automatically accumulates test caused
changes in hazard rate over that period. This option
makes the curves easy to generate. See Section 3.5.3 and
Appendix I.
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Figure 4.9. Long Term Effect of Test Caused Wear-out in
Standby Failure Mechanisms. Example for f = 1.01.
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curve. This optimum goes to longer test intervals and
becomes less sensitive to the test interval later in the
plant life. Because of the storage dimensioning and the
coding of the time point generating routine, a 30 year cal-
culation would require recoding, so a calculation over the
entire 30 years was not accomplished. However, if it were
done it is believed that it would be very close to the 15
year curve.
The so called "optimum" test interval for the 20 test
periods after 10 years appears to be the most reasonable
interval to use if one is planning to overhaul the component
on a ten year cycle. The criteria that would drive the deci-
sion would be whether or not the average unavailability of
3.5E-3 is acceptable just before overhaul. The unavailabil-
ity prior to that time will always be less, because fewer
tests have been accomplished and the standby failure rate
will be smaller. If a higher unavailability is acceptable
before overhaul is necessary, the component should be tested
on a longer interval to reduce the rate at which the failure
rate increases. This will produce a higher initial unavail-
ability, but one that is still lower than the target. A
graph such as that given in Figure 4.6 would be useful to
determine the range of unavailabilities produced by testing
at a specific interval over the given number of years.
4.5.2 EFFECT ON DEMAND FAILURE RATE
Test caused wear-out of demand failure mechanisms
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produces the same effect as it did for standby mechanisms.
Because qd is increased by each test, a short test interval
produces a larger increase in qd over a given life time than
a long test interval. However, since testing is done to
detect standby failures, the importance of these increases
depends on the relative magnitude of the demand failure rate
to the standby failure rate. In practical situations if the
demand failure rate will be affected by a test, the standby
failure rate will probabily also be changed. Space does not
permit a detailed investigation of all the possibilities.
4.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to give the reader a feel
for the manner in which the unavailability of a component
can depend on the various failure parameters that can be
modeled in FRANTIC II-MIT. Because of the flexibility of
the code it is very difficult to address all the possible
applications. For the application to the High Pressure
Coolant Injection System of a Boiling Water Reactor dis-
cussed in Chapter 6 it turns out that the constant standby
failure rate model is adequate to provide most of the infor-
mation required to make recommendations on test intervals.
The generalized Wiebull hazard rate makes the code
capable of modeling a wide variety of time dependent failure
rates. The renewal options available to reset the hazard
functions do not have the same degree of flexibility. A
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maintenance model which could reset the hazard function
every n tests might be useful to account for periodic main-
tenance or scheduled replacement of worn-out parts.
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATION TO MULTIPLE COMPONENT SYSTEMS
This chapter discusses the application of FRANTIC
II-MIT to systems having more than one component. The pri-
mary power of the FRANTIC codes is their ability to calcu-
late the unavailability of a complex system. Section 3.1.2
discussed how the selection of time points for the calcu-
lation of instantaneous unavailability and the numerical
integration of the instantaneous unavailability calculated
at these time points enables one to obtain the average una-
vailability of any multicomponent system without the use of
cumbersome analytical equations. The analysis of multiple
component systems using FRANTIC II-MIT is limited by only
the capability to model the system's failure in terms of the
unavailability of the individual components in the system
and the storage capacity of the code. (Currently it is
dimensioned for up to 100 components.)
In order to more efficiently address multiple compo-
nent systems, a cut set generator and evaluator has been
interfaced with FRANTIC II-MIT to accomplish the functions
of the user supplied SYSCOM subroutine. The package is
named CUTSETS and is taken directly from UNRAC
(UNReliability Analysis Code), developed at MIT by Karimi
[Ka80] and based on BIT, an unpublished work by
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Wolf. [Wo75] The basic features of CUTSETS are discussed
briefly in this chapter.
Following the presentation of CUTSETS, some of the con-
siderations which could influence the choice of the periodic
testing policy for simple systems are discussed. Many of
the characteristics of simple multiple component systems
have been anaylzed analytically in the literature. Some of
these results are presented in the references discussed in
Chapter 2. This chapter is not intended to duplicate that
research. Rather it will show how some special problems
which might not be easily modeled analytically can be
addressed with the CUTSETS - FRANTIC I I-MIT package.
The chapter concludes with a short discussion of an
approach to analyzing the periodic testing programs of
standby safety systems in operating reactors.
5.1 CUTSETS
CUTSETS uses a top down algorithm and the method of bit
manipulation to generate minimal cut sets. To speed the
calculation time the user can specify that only cut sets
with a number of components equal to or less than a specified
size be retained during the evaluation. Cut sets larger
than that value are automatically discarded. A flow chart
of the cut set generator is given in Figure 5.1.
CUTSETS can process both complement and basic events,
giving it the capability to evaluate fault trees containing
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Figure 5.1. Cut Set Generator Flow Chart. [Ka8O]
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Figure 5.1. Cut Set Generator Flow Chart. (continued)
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NAND, NOR, and Exclusive OR gates. However, since the cut
set generator accepts only AND and OR gates, these special
gates must be manually transformed before the logic can be
input. Figure 5.2 illustrates how special logic gates can be
modeled with AND, OR and NOT gates from basic events.
In adapting the cut set generator for use with FRANTIC
II-MIT the following changes were made:
e The input format was modified to make more readable and
easier to use.
e The maximum number of components per cut set was reduced
from 30 to 10 to reduce storage requirements.
* FORTRAN statements were added to write the generated
cutsets to a permanent file for repeated use.
* FRANTIC II-MIT was modified to read the appropriate cut
set file and use the CUTSETS evaluation routine as the
user supplied SYSCOM subroutine.
The unavailability of the Top Event is evaluated in
terms of the individual component unavailibilites through
the minimal cut sets in accordance with the following
equation:
N N
Q =Q.L=L TTq (.1TOP i 1 jTi
Where:
Q - Cut set unavailability
q. - Component unavailability
J
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Figure 5.2. Equivalent Transformation of EOR, NAND, NOR,
and NOT gates [Ka80]
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N - Total number of cut sets
- Union of the minimal cut sets, which is by defi-
nition,
N N
SQi = (1-Qi)
=1i=
Expanding Equation (5.1) obtains the series:
N N N
QTOP i ij + Q Q-Qk
i=1 i=1 i=1
i<j i<j<k (5.2)
N
... + (-1.)NN+ 1)TTQi
i=1
CUTSETS evaluates Equation (5.2) using the inclusion -
exclusion principle. [He8l, Ve70] The user has the option
of evaluating the first term, the first three terms, or the
first five terms of the expansion. Evaluation of only the
first term is called the rare event approximation. It pro-
vides an upper bound estimate of the unavailability and runs
much quicker on a computer than the second two options,
which provide more precision. For most practical applica-
tions the rare event approximation yields sufficient
accuracy if the analyst is careful not to assign high values
of test caused unavailability to more than one series compo-
nent. For further information on the algorithms that
CUTSETS uses, refer to Karimi. [Ka80]
Input format and information on the use of CUTSETS on a
VM/SP CMS computer are given in Appendix J.
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5.2 SOME APPLICATIONS TO SIMPLE SYSTEMS
The discussions presented below are intended primarily
to point out the flexibility available in applying FRANTIC
II-MIT to systems and present some suggestions for using
FRANTIC II-MIT. They are by no means complete, but are
intended simply to illustrate the code's potential.
5.2.1 SERIES SYSTEMS
It is well known that series systems can be represented
by a composite "super component" whose failure rate is equal
to the sum of the individual failure rates. [He8l] This
can be used to combine the contributions of components which
contribute to the Top Event through a common OR gate into one
failure event. The major advantage is a decrease in the num-
ber of cut sets which must be manipulated by the code to
obtain the system unavailability. The advantage can become
large if the OR gate contributes to higher level AND gates.'
If they are to be represented by a single failure event,
the following conditions must be met: [Va79a]
1) All components in the series system are tested either
simultaneously or successively, one after the other,
2) Repair is not started until all components have been
tested, and
The comparison with Vaurio in Section 5.3 is a good exam-
ple. There the consolidation of failure events in three
redundant pump legs reduces the number of cut sets from 8
to 1.
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3) The components that need repair are repaired
sucessively, one after another.
In terms of FRANTIC II-MIT, this last condition means that
TR is representative of the expected repair time of any com-
bination of failures that might be observed during a test. 2
The testing strategy for series components is straight
forward. However, there are two points that should be men-
tioned.
1) The test interval should be determined considering
the composite failure rate of all the components. The test-
ing of the Turbine/Pump train in section 6.3 is done on the
basis of all the components in the train.
2) If testing requires that the components be made
unavailable to accomplish their safety function in the event
of a true demand, testing of all the series components
should be made at one time. If the components are maintained
as separate failure events and the rare event approximation
is used to combine the cut set contributions, care should be
taken to account for the unavailability to override the
test, q , in only one of the series components. If this is
not done, an over estimation of test caused unavailability
2 Recall from Section 4.3.1 that the time required to
repair a periodically test component is relatively minor
compared to the time that the failure of the component
might remain undetected.
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will result, giving the potentially false impression that
longer test intervals are warranted.
5.2.2 DEMAND FAILURES AND REDUNDANT COMPONENTS
When two components are in parallel each component has
another which can accomplish the safety function while it is
being tested. Figure 5.3 shows that for this type of system
the optimum test interval depends on the demand failure rate
as well as the standby failure rate. If there is no demand
failure contribution to component unavailability, the aver-
age unavailability of the two component parallel system
decreases as the test interval decreases, despite the fact
that each component must be made completely unavailable to
accomplish the test. When the interval becomes very small,
one component is out of service for testing almost all of the
time. However, there is a high probability that the second
component will be availabile, since it just came off of test
and has not had time to fail.
Demand failures put a lower limit on the unavailability
of the components. When the possibility of a standby fail-
ure having occurred becomes small compared to the demand
failure rate, the advantages of further decreasing the test
interval becomes small, and lost redundancy due to testing
becomes the dominant consideration. Consequently, the sys-
tem unavailability goes through a minimum and increases for
shorter test intervals.
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Figure 5.3. Effect of Demand Failure Mechanisms on the
Optimum Test Interval of a Parallel Two Component System.
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5.2.3 EFFECT OF UNEQUAL TEST OVERRIDE
Consider two different types of components which per-
form the same safety function. One component must be made
unavailable for testing while the second is available during
its test period. For this combination of components a
sequential test policy provides lower unavailability than
staggered testing. Figure 5.4 illustrates this. If the sec-
ond component is tested just before the first, it will have a
very low unavailability while the first component is being
tested. Consequently, the unavailability created by the
first component's test is minimized by the fact that the
second component is in its most available condition. If the
tests are staggered or accomplished in reverse order, there
is a much higher probability that the second component may
have failed since its last test. The resultant system una-
vailability is increased by a factor of 3 and 10
respectively.
5.3 COMPARISON WITH VAURIO'S 1-OUT-OF-3 SYSTEM CALCU-
LATION
To illustrate the use of FRANTIC II-MIT for addressing
system unavailability, a comparison with a calculation made
by Vaurio and Sciaudone is made. [Va79b] Their work in
modeling failure mechanisms of standby components was dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. They derived a code, ICARUS, to calcu-
late the average unavailability of m-out-of-n redundant
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0
Figure 5.4. Comparison of Test Policies for Parallel
Components with Unequal Unavailabilities During the
Test Period.
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systems for up to m=n=4. Part of their work compared ICARUS
with FRANTIC and found large discrepencies for sequentially
tested components with more than one component per train.
In validating the FRANTIC II-MIT - CUTSETS package, the cal-
culations of Vaurio were repeated to determine the reason
for the discrepency. It was determined that the discrepency
results from rounding off Ti, the parameter which staggers
the tests, to nearest whole hour in subroutine COMPON.
The parameter T1 should not be rounded off, as sequentially
tested components may be tested at very close intervals and
inadvertant overlapping of tests of redundant components
may result in large calculation errors.
This section uses Vaurio and Scaudione's test system to
illustrate the application of the CUTSETS - FRANTIC II-MIT
package to multiple component and shows results of the com~-
parisons between the two codes both before and after the
correction to FRANTIC II-MIT. It is shown below that the
correction produces excellent aggreement where there was
once an order of magnitude discrepency.
System Description and Cut Sets
The system in question is a 1-out-of-3 valve system
3 The error can be eliminated by changing
TESTl(NCOMP)=INT(TESTl(NCOMP)*24.0 + 0.5)
to:
TEST1(NCOMP)=TESTl(NCOMP)*24.0
This change must be accomplished three times.
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Figure 5.5. Single Line Diagram of the l-out-of-3, Two
Valve Per Redundancy, Test System Used in the Compari-
son Between FRANTIC and ICARUS.
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with two valves per leg. Any one leg can accomodate the
required flow, but both valves must open to obtain flow
through any one leg. A line diagram of the system is given
in Figure 5.5.
To use the FRANTIC II-MIT - CUTSETS package, we first
draw the fault tree shown in Figure 5.6. Following the for-
mat given in Appendix J, we then create the logic file for
input to CUTSETS shown in Table 5.1. The top line states that
there are 6 components, a total of 10 components and gates,
no more than 3 inputs to any one gate, sorting is desired
(0), and the maximum allowable components per cut set is not
more than 3. Each successive line gives the gate number,
type gate (0 = OR, 1 = AND), and identity of input gates or
components to that gate. The output from the code is given
below the input.
To calculate the system's unavailability we establish
an input file of component failure parameters from Table
XVII of [Va79b], which is reproduced in Table 5.2. The
resultant file is given in Table 5.3. Since T1 is input in
days, it is necessary to convert the 1.5 hours staggering
interval into multiples of 0.0625 days. The cause of the
discrepency reported by Vaurio was in FRANTIC's conversion
of T1 back to hours.
Vaurio compared exact, ICARUS, and FRANTIC calcu-
lations. These results are given in Table 5. 4 along with the
results of calculations with both the uncorrected and cor-
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FILE: VAUR013 LOGIC Al
6
7
8
9
10
FILE: VAURIO13 CUTOUT
10
0
0
0
0
3
8
1I
3
5
0 3
9 10
2
4
6
AI
FAULT TREE
GATE
TYPE
LOGIC
INPUT COMP. OR GATES
7
8
9
10
O MIND IND LMIN II I
0 0 8 9 8
1 * TOTAL NUMBER
0 TABLE - 2 ;
CUT SET NO. NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 8 9 10
O 1 2 0
O 3 4 0
0 5 6 0
OF CUT SET GENERATED =
t
8 *
OF COMP. IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
13 5
23 5
1 45
1 36
2 45
23 6
1 46
24 6
*** TIME USED TO GENERATE THE MIN. CUT SETS WAS =.7999998E-01 SECONDS
Table 5.1. Input and Output of CUTSETS Application to the
Test System.
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0
TABLE -1
GATE
NO.
Parameter
FRANTI C
Notation
X
Pf
go
T
TR
Exact
Calculation
3. 0x10~ 7 /h
0.001
0.10
1.5 h
10.0 h
720 h
ICARUS
Input*
6. 0x10~ 7/h
0.001
0.10
3.0 h
10.0 h
720 h
FRANTIC
Input
3. 0x10 7/h
0.001
0.10
1.5 h
10.0 h
30.0 d
Table 5.2. Input Parameters for the 1-out-of-3, Two
Valves Per Redundancy, Test System. *ICARUS represents
the two series valves by an effective "single" component.
FILE: VAURIO3 DAT AI
1-OUT-OF-3 SYSTEM, 2 COMP PER LEG, DATA ON PAGE 56 OF VA79B
0.5
30..3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
1.5 10. 0.1 .001
30. .06251.5 10. 0.1 .001
30. .12501.5 10. 0.1 .001
30. .18751.5 10. 0.1 .001
30. .25001.5 10. 0.1 .001
30. .31251.5 10. 0.1 .001
STAGGERED AT TEST INTERVAL, DEL TIME a 0.5 DAY
Table 5.3. Input of FRANTIC II-MIT Application to the
Test System.
181
PRINT
-I
TITLE
VAURIO
TIME
363.
COMP
NEW
I I
1 2
2 1
2 2
3 1
3 2
4 1
4 2
5 1
5 2
6 1
6 2
RUN
1 TOTL NONE NONE
-1
FRANTIC-MIT
Exact
ICARUS
Uncorrected
FRANTIC
Corrected
FRANTIC
3.111x10~9
3.145x10~9
2. 310x10- 8 2. 36x10-8
3. 165x10~9
Table 5.4. Results of Comparison of Uncorrected and
Corrected Versions of FRANTIC with Vaurio's Calcula-
tions.
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Vaurio
rected version of FRANTIC II-MIT. It can be seen from this
table that good agreement is obtained between the corrected
version of FRANTIC II-MIT and the exact and ICARUS calcu-
lations.
It can be seen from the above example that FRANTIC
II-MIT can be used to analyze multiple component systems
quite easily. Because the input for both the system's
structure and the component failure characteristcs are
straight forward, the analyst has the flexibility to inves-
tigate the effects of changing either.
5.4 AN APPROACH FOR ANALYZING SYSTEMS
In this section the general procedure used to apply
FRANTIC II-MIT to an operating standby safety system is out-
lined. It is not intended to be prescriptive. It follows
the philosophy of NUREG-0492, which states:
System analysis is a directed process for
the orderly and timely acquisition and
investigation of specific system informa-
tion pertient to a given decision.
Accordingly, the approach outlined here is system oriented and
directed towards providing information upon which to base
periodic testing program decisions in an operational standby
safety system. To accomplish this task, the following steps
are followed:
1) Define the system's safety functions. Identify the
conditions of the demand and the requirements of the response.
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Determine how the system interacts with other systems which can
also accomplish the safety function.
2) Determine how the system can fail to accomplish its
safety functions. Establish the external boundaries of the
system and interfaces with other systems. Based on the prelim-
inary understanding of the safety functions and the system
define the TOP Events of the safety function fault trees.
There should be a fault tree for each safety function.
3) Identify the components in the system and the func-
tions they perform. The limit of resolution should extend down
to individual components that should be addressed in the test-
ing procedure. Group components by the functions they contrib-
ute to and identify those which affect more than one safety
function.
4) Construct fault trees for each safety function.
5) Correlate the fault tree failure events with the plant
test procedures. Follow the procedures step by step to deter-
mine what component functions are actually tested. Determine
if any components or functions are not tested by the
procudures. Change procedures as necessary to include all com-
ponents and functions in the procedures. Identify those
components which are tested by more than one procedure. Com-
pare conditions of the test with the expected conditions of a
true demand. Identify any test created unavailabilities.
6) Quantitatively evaluate the testing policy. Test
intervals should be varied at either a weekly or semi-monthly
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interval. These intervals are practical because they are easy
to schedule. Run the quantitative calculations over an operat-
ing cycle. Consider test prerequisits and manpower when estab-
lishing test staggering intervals. Subtrees that contribute
directly to the TOP Event may be analyzed individually to
reduce calculation time. Actual calculations should be based
on a qualitative analysis of the fault tree cut sets and the
test procedures.
7) Set up calculations to answer specific questions and
judge the relative effectiveness of the various tests. The
process can be iterative and involve minor modifications to the
system as well as changes in the procedures or the interval at
which they are accomplished.
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CHAPTER 6
APPLICATION TO A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The High Pressure Coolant Injection System will be the
primary vehicle for illustrating the practical application
of FRANTIC II-MIT to standby safety systems. On the surface
the system is quite straightforward. Its major components
are not redundant, so the primary contributors to its una-
vailability are rather obvious, single component cut sets
which account for failures to make transitions during
initation. The system contains, however, many good illus-
trative examples of considerations that one must make in
applying time dependent unavailability analysis to real
systems. Currently, 21 separate procedures test various
components and functions of the system. The resulting test-
ing requirement is over 150 tests per year. Given the effort
required to accomplish these tests, there is good reason to
investigate the testing policy for the system from an una-
vailability point of view.
The approach to the analysis is to let the HPCI system
analysis generate questions and find out if FRANTIC II-MIT
can address them. The next section lists a variety of
questions that have arisen. In every instance FRANTIC
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II-MIT is flexible enough to address the problem and give
valuable quantitative information to assist in making
recommendations. The power of the code is not its ability to
find the optimum test interval. It can not do that automat-
ically. Rather, its primary advantage is the flexibility it
gives the analyst to try a variety of approaches to improv-
ing system availability.
Organization of Analysis
First the safety functions and major components of the
HPCI System are briefly described. The logic and actions
necessary for the successful accomplishment of the safety
functions are then presented. The assumptions used in
deriving the fault trees for each safety function are then
listed, and some of the features of the trees are discussed.
(Fault trees, cut sets, and representative component fail-
ure data are contained in appendices to the chapter. ) The
analysis is broken into three major functional groups:
1) Turbine/pump train operability.
2) Initiation logic
3) Autoisolation logic and function.
The specific procedures which address each group are exam-
ined in detail, both qualitatively and quantitatively to:
1) Insure that they accomplish a complete verification
of the functions they address. As necessary, specific pro-
cedural changes are recommended to address failure mech-
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anisms that could be left undetected by the existing
procedures.
2) Relate the procedures to fault tree failure events
and quantitatively determine the impact changing the test
interval on the unavailability of the system to perform its
safety functions.
3) Investigate to effects of various periodic testing
strategies on safety function unavailability and recommend
changes to improve availability. (In one instance this
includes a design modification on the system.)
The analysis has uncovered many good illustrative
examples of FRANTIC II-MIT applications to the probabilis-
tic risk analysis of real reactor systems. Among them are:
1) Consolidation of series components into super com-
ponents with composite failure parameters (Section 6.4).
2) Importance of non fault tree components as contrib-
utors to test caused failures (Section 6.4).
3) Use of failure events to model the condition of the
entire system being being disabled to allow testing its ini-
tiation logic without interfering with normal reactor oper-
ations. (Section 6.5)
4) Calculations where a specific periodic test can
affect more than one fault tree (Section 6.6).
5) The effect of design modifications to the system
(Section 6.5).
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6) Effect of common cause failures resulting from cal-
ibration of a group of sensors at one time (Section 6.5).
7) Effect of common cause failures due to the limited
ability of specific groups of components to respond to a
true demand (Section 6.6).
8) Effects of staggered testing of a set of parallel
components in series with a second set of components
(Sections 6.5 and 6.6).
It will be shown in this chapter that application of
time dependent unavailability analysis reveals many areas
where the HPCI system periodic testing policy can be
improved.
6.2 DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System is a
single leg, steam turbine powered pump and associated piping
designed to provide up to 4,250 gpm of water to the reactor
vessel via feedwater line "B. " It operates over a pressure
range of approximately 150 to 1,000 psig. Steam produced by
decay heat is used to drive the turbine. The steam is taken
from the main steam supply line upstream of the main iso-
lation valves. The water supply to the pump is provided by
the Condensate Storage Tank or the Suppression Pool. The
1 The numbers 23 and 2301 appear throughout this chapter.
They identify a component as belonging to the HPCI
System.
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system is designed to operate independently of AC power,
with the exception of one (of two) autoisolation valves (MO
2301-4).1 A simplified diagram of the HPCI System is given in
Figure 6.1.
6.2.1 SAFETY FUNCTIONS
In the event of a loss of coolant accident the HPCI sys-
tem must accomplish one of two safety functions:
1) Given the break has occurred elsewhere in the pres-
sure boundary, the HPCI System must automatically deliver
its rated output of water to the core upon demand.
2) Given the break has occurred within the HPCI steam
supply line, the system must automatically isolate the break
from the reactor.
In the manual or test mode the HCPI System is also used
to provide cooling and/or controlled depressurization to
the nuclear vessel in conjunction with the Automatic
Depressurization System (ADS) during transients which iso-
late the primary containment. When decay heat generation
has been reduced to about 2 % of full power (at approximately
20 minutes after shutdown), the HPCI System can provide this
function without the use of the ADS. Water discharged from
the pump can be routed back to the Condensate Storage Tank,
with the HPCI being used primarily as an energy sink for
decay heat steam, or a controlled amount of makeup water can
be provided to the reactor by splitting flow between the
injection line and the test return line using MO 2301-10.
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6.2.2 INJECTION FUNCTION
HPCI System operation is initiated automatically by
either low-low water level in the reactor vessel (approx. 49
inches below a reference water level or 78.5 inches above
the active fuel) or high drywell pressure (approx. 2.5
psig), provided no autoisolation or turbine trip signal
exists in the HPCI logic circuits. Four sensors monitor
each parameter, each closing a switch when the setpoint is
reached. (There is no external readout of the parameter.)
The switches are arranged to complete a circuit when
one-out-of-two, taken twice, logic is satisfied. The initi-
ation signal produced by the sensors energizes a series of
relays, which in turn close circuits that send signals to
eleven different components in the HPCI system. Based on
the analysis of the initiation logic tests, recommendations
for changes in the design of the logic train are presented in
Section 6.5 where a more complete description of the current
design and recommended changes is given.
Actions Required for Injection
Steam required to power the turbine must pass through
five valves before entering the turbine. The two
autoisolation valves, MO 2301-4 and MO 2301-5, are normally
open during reactor operation, and the steam supply line is
at reactor pressure up to the Steam Supply Valve, MO 2301-3,
which is normally closed. The turbine stop valve and con-
trol valve, which are hydraulically operated by the turbine
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lubrication system, are also normally closed. Upon HPCI
initiation, MO 2301-3 must open and the auxillary oil pump
must start and attain sufficient pressure to open the two
hydraulically operated turbine valves.
Steam is exhausted from the turbine to the suppression
pool through a 20 inch pipe containing a check valve and a
normally locked open block valve. No active functions are
required in the exhaust line upon initiation. However, the
the check valve must not stick closed.
The HPCI turbine is mechanically coupled to a two stage
water pump and booster. A flow controller monitors pump
output and provides feedback to the turbine control valve.
Upon initiation the controller set point must be correct and
its instruments and logic circuits must be operating. Its
failure could result in either too little water being
injected into the core or a high speed turbine trip and loss
of HPCI function entirely.
Water for the HPCI pump can come from two sources. The
initial source is the Condensate Storage Tank. Water from
this source passes through one of two normally locked open
butterfly valves into a 16 inch pipe containing the normally
open CST Supply Valve, MO 2301-6, and a check valve. The
initiation signal opens MO 2301-6 in the event it is closed
when the demand is made and the limit switches on the sup-
pression pool isolation valves indicate that at least one
valve is closed.
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The source of water for the pump is automatically
transferred to the suppression pool when:
1) Level switches in the CST open on low level
(two-out-of two logic).
2) Level switches in the suppression pool close on
high level (one-out-of-two logic).
Relays in each of these circuits open MO 2301-35 and MO
2301-36. Limit switches in these two valves (two-out-of-two
logic) then send a close signal to MO 2301-6 and an interlock
prevents it from reopening.
Water supplied from the suppression pool to the pump
goes through a strainer screen, a normally locked open
butterfly valve, a check valve, and MO 2301-35 and MO
2310-36.
The HPCI pump discharges water into feedwater line B
via a 14 inch pipe containing a normally open pump discharge
valve, MO 2301-9, a normally closed pump discharge valve
downstream of the test return line, MO 2301-8, and a
testable check valve, 2301-7. There are two significant
sources of water diversion:
1) A 10 inch test return line to the CST. This is
normally blocked closed by two motor operated valves, unless
a system operational test is underway.
2) A 4 inch minimum bypass line designed to protect the
HPCI pump in the event the discharge line is blocked. Upon
initiation the minimum flow bypass valve, MO 2301-14, opens
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and then closes when sufficient flow is attained to verify
that proper pump discharge is established. For conservatism
it is assumed that MO 2301-14 must cycle properly to prevent
diversion of water to the suppression pool in order for sys-
tem success.
Once in feedwater line B, the water is prevented from
flowing away from the reactor by a check valve and an iso-
lation valve. It must pass through a check valve and a
normally open isolation valve to reach the reactor. HPCI
initiation has no control over any of these valves.
6.2.3 AUTOISOLATION AND TERMINATION
The HPCI injection function will be disabled for any
one of the following reasons: 1) LOCA in the HPCI steam
supply line, 2) Low reactor vessel pressure, 3) Turbine pro-
tection functions, or 4) High reactor vessel water level.
The first three result in isolation of the HPCI System from
the reactor vessel, with the consequent disabling of the
injection function. The forth results from two of the sen-
sors that generate the low-low reactor water level signal
and indicates that the injection function is no longer
required.
LOCA in HPCI Steam Supply Line
The HPCI System is automatically isolated from the
reactor and the turbine is tripped if a break or leak is
detected in the HPCI steam lines. The autoisolation signal
is produced by any one of four different groups of sensors.
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Each has independent sets of sensors powered by both 125 VDC
buses A and B to provide redundancy with respect to power
supply. An autoisolation signal can be produced by one of
the following:
1) Temperature of 170 degrees F in the torus room north
west quadrant mezzanine behind rack 2257 in two-out-of-two
temperature switches (one circuit on each bus).
2) Temperature of 170 degrees F in the Reactor build-
ing, north side above the HPCI valve station in
two-out-of-two temperature switches (one circuit on each
bus) .
3) Temperature of 190-200 degrees F in the
Turbine/Pump Room, west wall, elevation 31' in
two-out-of-two temperature switches (one circuit on each
bus).
4) High differential pressure of at least 180 inches
H 2 0 (corresponding to 300% rated flow) across a 90 degrees
turn in the HPCI steam supply line (one circuit on each bus).
The autoisolation signal produced by any one of the above
eight circuits will close the two steam supply isolation
valves, trip the steam turbine, and inhibit both manual and
automatic HPCI initiation until an operator manually resets
the autoisolation seal-in on Panel 903 in the Control Room.
The eight leak detection circuits are not as redundant
as they appear to be. They are located in different areas
and may not all be able to see a leak that is occurring at one
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specific location. For this reason they complement rather
than duplicate each other. In the fault tree for the
autoisolation function a conditional event is included
which gives the probability that a given set of detectors
can detect the leakage steam.
Low Reactor Vessel Pressure
The system will also autoisolate if reactor vessel
steam pressure falls below the level at which it will no
longer be sufficient to turn the turbine. The logic con-
sists of four pressure switches (set point at 77 psig) con-
nected in a two-out-of-one logic configuration. This
circuit does not seal-in the autoisolation signal. If ves-
sel pressure subsequently rises the HPCI may be reinitiated
without a manual reset.
Turbine Protection Functions
A turbine trip without closure of the steam supply line
isolation valves will occur when the following sensor
switches are closed:
1) Low water pressure at pump suction (set point: 15
in. Hg, one-out-of-one logic).
2) High steam turbine exhaust pressure (set point: 150
psig, one-out-of-two logic).
No manual reset is required to enable the HPCI initiation
circuit after a turbine trip due to turbine protection func-
tions. The HPCI can be started either manually or by the
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reoccurrence of vessel low-low water level or high drywell
pressure provided the trip signal no longer exists.
High Reactor Water Level
HPCI System operation is terminated by a high water
level signal (approx. 48 inches above the referenece level)
in both of the level switches used for this logic. The ter-
mination signal produces a turbine trip and a seal-in which
must be manually reset before reinitiation is possible by
any means other than a low-low reactor water signal.
Actions Required for Autoisolation
If an autoisolation signal is generated, one of two
steam line isolation valves, MO 2301-4 or MO 2301-5, must
close to isolate the steam line. To provide redundancy with
respect to power sources, MO 2301-4 is operated by AC power
while MO 2301-5 has a DC motor. In addition, the logic for
each valve is powered by separate DC buses. Close signals
are also sent to MO 2301-35 and MO 2301-36 in the event they
are open. This isolates the suppression pool from the pump
suction. The pump discharge valves are not closed by the
autoisolation signal, but the testable check valve in the
line can provide the necessary isolation. If the LOCA
occurs in the HPCI system, the autoisolation signal will
disable the HPCI initiation circuit, and all normally closed
valves will remain closed.
6.3 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
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6.3.1 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions used in the fault tree are as follows:
1) The fault trees are developed down to the level at
which individual components are periodically tested.
2) Individual component failure rates include:
* Failures of wires from the respective power bus to the
component.
* Failures in sensor conduits or taps into process
lines which would prevent a sensor from being exposed the
the environment being measured.
3) The following faults are not considered:
e No water in the CST
e No water in the suppression pool
4) Failures of relays include failures of wires from
the activating relay contacts to the control circuits of the
operating equipment.
5) Common cause failures which occur at the time of a
true demand are accounted for using a separate failure event
and are modeled with qd. This assumption makes their proba-
bility of occurrence unaffected by a periodic testing
policy. Common cause failures modeled by qd include:
* Design errors.
* Dependent failures.
* Extreme environments for which the sensors are not
qualified.
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* Human and calibration errors during sequential test-
ing of redundant components. All sensors performing a given
function are normally calibrated on the same month. Human
error can result in a failure to recognize that the sensors
are improperly calibrated when they put back into service.
Common cause failures due to calibration may also be
modeled by a standby failure rate. In fact, calibration
drift is a candidate for a time dependent hazard rate. Since
all sensors of a given type are all calibrated during the
same month, they all drift from their setpoints for the same
period of time. There is normally a range in which the sen-
sor can respond without hindering the effectiveness of the
system, so there is a period during which the sensors have
little chance of being far enough from the setpoint to
degrade system performance. As the time since last cali-
bration increases, the probability that the next small drift
will cross the tolerance limit increases. This failure
behavior can be modeled with a generalized Weibull hazard
rate with a shape factor greater than 2. The conditional
failure rate in this case would be increasing as the time
since the last calibration increased.
6) No credit is taken for a manual initiation of the
injection function during a small LOCA. It is a constant per
demand probability and reduces the probability that the ini-
tiation function will fail. It should be noted that manual
initiation of HPCI requires that the operator activate at
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least four separate components, and in a high stress situ-
ation the probability for error can be quite high. However,
this is offset by the fact that the operators manually ini-
tiate the HPCI System for the monthly Turbine/Pump Operabi-
lity Test. The reliability of manual initiation could be
increased by allowing the operator to energize
autoisolation relays directly with one switch. However,
this can increase the probability of inadvertent HPCI initi-
ation without a LOCA present.
6.3.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Because there are two safety functions which the system
must satisfy, two fault trees are necessary to describe the
system's safety unavailability.
A fault tree describing in detail the failures which
can prevent HPCI injection upon demand as the system is cur-
rently designed is presented in Appendix A. The cut sets
generated in the evaluation of this tree are given in Appen-
dix B. This fault tree is dominated by single component cut
sets, which for convenience are reproduced in Table 6.1.
Revisions to the fault tree resulting from recommended
design changes in the system's initiation logic are con-
tained in Appendix D, and the resulting minimal cut sets
appear in Appendix E. The design changes are discussed in
detail in Section 6.5.2.
The autoisolation function fault tree is presented in
Appendix F, with the resulting minimal cut sets appearing in
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1 System down for repair of support equipment
2 Loss of 125 VDC Power from Bus D5
3 Loss of 125 VDC Power from Bus D8
4 Loss of 250 VDC Power from Bus D9
5 System unavailable due to initiation logic testing
12 23A-K23 or 23A-K24 (Initiation seal-in relays) Normally
open, fails open
30 MOV 2301-3 (Steam to Turbine Valve) Normally closed,
fails closed
31 MOV 2301-4 (Inboard Steam Supply Line Isolation Vavle,
AC operated), Normally open, fails closed
32 MOV 2301-5 (Outboard Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve,
DC operated), Normally open, fails closed
33 Turbine driven pump failure
34 Steam turbine loss of function
35 Turbine lubrication system failure
36 HPCI Room cooler failed and required
37 LOCA in HPCI Steam Supply Line
39 2301-45 (Steam Discharge Check Valve) Stuck closed
40 2301-74 (Steam Discharge Manual Valve) Locked open,
fails closed
41 Coolant discharge line rupture
42 AO 2301-7 (Air Operated Testable Check Valve) Fails
stuck closed
43 MOV 2301-8 (Pump Discharge Valve from MOV 2301-9)
Normally closed, fails closed
44 MOV 2301-9 (Pump Discharge Valve) Normally open, fails
closed
45 MOV 2301-14 (Minimum Flow Bypass to Suppression Chamber)
Normally open, fails open
46 Feedwater 57B line discharge isolation valve Normally
open, fails closed
47 Feedwater 58B line discharge check valve Normally open,
fails closed?
50 Human error probability: Failure to reset HPCI
51 Common cause failures in steam line low pressure sensors
52 Human error, common cause: miscalibration of high tem-
perature sensors in steam line space
53 Human error, common cause: Miscalibration of turbine
trip sensors, a) Pressure, 2) Level
54 23A-28 (Autoisolation initiation relay) Normally open,
fails closed
55 False signal indicates turbine overspeed
56 PSL 2360 (Pump Suction Low Pressure) False signal indi-
cating low pressure caused by contacts failing shorted
Table 6.1. HPCI Injection Function Single Component
Cut Sets.
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57 23A-K17 (Relays pump suction low pressure to turbine
trip relay) False signal caused by contacts failing
shorted
62 dPIS 2352 or 2353 (Steam Line Differiential Pressure
Sensor) False signal indicating
1) Low range contacts failed shorted
2) High range contacts failed shorted
3) Human error: calibration
4) Transient steam flow
63 23A-K9/K36 (Relays from Differential Pressure Sensors
to Autoisolation Circuit), primary, calibration and com-
mon cause failures
70 High turbine steam exhaust pressure false signal, due to
PSh 2368A pressure switch: Contacts fail shorted
PSh 2368B pressure switch: Contacts fail shorted
(Note: These sensors are not tested directly.)
72 23A-K12 (Relay from Steam Line Pressure Sensors to tur-
bine trip circuit) Contacts fail shorted
75 23A-K6/K34 (Relays Turbine/Pump Room temperature sen-
sors to autoisolation) circuit) primary, common cause,
and calibration failures, Normally open, fails closed
76 23A-K8/K35 NOFC (Relays from valve station above 23 feet
and torus compartment temperature sensors to
autoisolation circuit) primary, common cause, and cali-
bration failures
77 23A-K20 (Relay indicating high turbine exhaust) fails
shorted
Table 6.1. HPCI Injection Function Single Component
Cut Sets (continued).
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Appendix G. Because of the apparent redundance of the steam
line break sensors, the tree is layered with failure events
that account for potential common cause failures. Of these,
events 1, 10, 16, and 22 (all of which account for the ina-
bility of the dP sensors or temperature sensors at a specif-
ic location to detect the break) are judged to dominate the
contribution of common cause failures. There are no single
component cut sets for this tree and only two important dou-
ble cut sets:
29, 31 - Both isolation valves fail to close upon
demand.
19, 21 - Both Bus A and Bus B autoisolation relays fail
to energize.
It will be shown in Section 6.6 that these cut sets dominate
the quantitative analysis of the autoisolation function
testing policy.
Because of the dual nature of the system's safety func-
tions, the fault trees interact in two ways:
1) Because the autoisolation signal can override or
terminate HPCI operation, testing to insure that the system
can autoisolate reduces the availability of the system to
perform its injection function.
2) Both of the Steam Line Isolation valves close as a
result of the autoisolation tests. Valve failures during
this test generate a requirement for repairs which make the
valves unavailability to remain open for the injection func-
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tion. This is accounted for by modeling test caused fail-
ures in Failure Events 31 and 32 of the injection function
fault tree which follow the periodic testing interval of the
autoisolation functional tests.
6.3.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Sections 6.4 through 6.6 contain a detailed discussion
of the quantitative analysis of the fault trees. The analy-
sis revolves about those calculations necessary to make
recommendations regarding a periodic testing policy. As
such, the relative change in the unavailability resulting
from variations in the testing policy is more important than
its absolute value, which is subject to the uncertainties of
failure rate data.
Appendices C and H contain assessments of component
failure rates used to determine the recommended periodic
testing intervals discussed in Sections 6.4 through 6.6.
These failure rates were derived from a number of sources.
(WASH1400, N2232, GE80, IEEE-500, Plant data] Where the
uncertainty in failure rates is considered important, the
sensitivity of recommendations to variations in the failure
rates of components is investigated.
6.4 TURBINE/PUMP TRAIN OPERABILITY TESTS
6.4.1 DESCRIPTION OF ONLINE TESTS
Currently, the injection function is tested by monthly
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operational tests of the turbine/pump and cycling of all
valves, with a few surveillance requirements added quarter-
ly. Two monthly procedures are listed for the flow test at
1000 psig. A third requires quarterly surveillance incon-
junction with the flow test. Finally, a forth exercises the
injection valves monthly. The procedures 2 are:
Procedure 8.5.4.1. HPCI Pump Operability and Flow Rate
Test at 1000 psig. - The HPCI System is manually started, but
then allowed to come to operational flow capacity under the
influence of the flow controller. The flow test is accom-
plished using the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as the water
source. The water is pumped back to the CST through a full
flow test bypass line. One of the test return line valves is
preset to a partially open position to create a flow
restriction so that the system's capability to pump its
rated flow of water against the rated pressure head, as
measured at the output of the pump, is verified. In addition
to the flow test, several valves are cycled to verify their
operability.
Procedure 8.1.6. HPCI System Pump and Valve Operabi-
lity Surveillance - This procedure is the same as 8.5.4.1,
with the exception that fewer valves are cycled and none are
timed. It also requires the recording of selected hydraulic
and mechanical data quarterly.
2 Procedure numbers are from the plant's Operating Manual.
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Procedure 8.A.15. HPCI System Integrity Surveillance
- A physical inspection of the HPCI piping is conducted
quarterly in conjunction with the full flow test.
Procedure 8.5.4.4. HPCI Valve Operability Test - This
test cycles the two steam supply line isolation valves (MO
2301-4 and -5) and the two pump discharge injection valves
(MO 2301-8 and -9).
Recommendations for Consolidation
It is recommended that the first three procedures be
combined into one. Procedure 8.1.6 is very nearly redundant
with 8.5.4.1. The quarterly requirements of Procedures
8.1.6 and 8.A.15 are not great and could be easily added to
8.5.4.1 without making it too long. The one test could com-
ply with all testing requirements, reduce paperwork, and
make the actual testing policy clearer.
The requirement to cycle MO 2301-4 and 5 as part of
8.5.4.4 is redundant with the autoisolation functional
tests, which also cycle these valve's. It is recommended
that the requirement to cycle those valves be dropped from
this test. The resultant Procedure 8.5.4.4 involves the
cycling of only one valve, which could be easily incorpo-
rated into 8.5.4.1. They are both accomplished at the same
frequency and are subject to same Limiting Conditions for
Operation test requirements.
6.4.2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATING CYCLE TESTS
Three test procedures are currently done on a once per
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refueling cycle basis. They are accomplished to verify
functions that are not addressed by the monthly operational
tests. Therefore, the failure mechanisms revealed by these
tests are modeled as undetectable failure rates in compo-
nents subject to more frequent testing. The procedures are:
Procedure 8.5.4.3. HPCI Pump Operability and Flow Rate
Test at 150 psig - This procedure tests the operability of
the same components as 8.5.4.1, but at the lowest pressure
that the system is designed to operate. This test is
designed to reveal failure mechanisms that prevent the HPCI
System from performing its function at lower reactor vessel
pressures. For the purposes of defining undetectable fail-
ures in 8.5.4.1 revealed by this test, it is assumed that
only the turbine is subject to low steam pressure failure
mechanisms.
Procedure 8.5.4.6. HPCI Pump and Valve Operability
From Alternate Shutdown Station - This test is similar to
8.5.4.1, with the exception that manual initiation is accom-
plished from the Alternate Shutdown Station. It will not be
addressed in this analysis for the following reasons: 1)
Failure mechanisms which would be detected by this test
which would not be revealed by the normal operational test
are wiring and switch faults, which have a low probability
of occurring, 2) Startup from the alternate shutdown station
is primarily a manual requirement, which is redundant with
the automatic initiation logic, and 3) Preliminary analysis
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indicates that failures on nonredundant active components
dominates the system unavailability.
Procedure 8.E.23. HPCI Instrument Calibration - The
flow controller instrumentation is isolated from the system
and checked with a pneumatic calibrator. Both as found and
as left data are recorded. This test reveals possible degr-
adations in the flow controller not observed in the monthly
operational tests. Since the monthly operational tests will
detect failures of the flow controller it is assumed here
that the primary purpose of this test is to maintain the unit
and prevent an increase in the hazard rate. The test is not
addressed further in this analysis.
6.4.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL TESTS
The HPCI Turbine/Pump test satisfies the necessary
conditions to be analyzed as a single "super component." -It
tests at the same time a total of 15 single component cut
sets: 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51, 55,
62. Repairs are not accomplished until the completion of a
test and the system is declared inoperable until all repairs
are completed.
Super Component Failure Rate
For the purposes of establishing a periodic testing
policy, it is more reasonable to estimate a range of failure
rates for the supercomponent than attempt to make a single
point estimate. First the overall assessment is presented.
This is followed by a discussion of the failure rate of the
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Steam Supply Valve, which has been the major contributor to
the unavailability of the HPCI System.
Table 6.2 lists failure data for the individual events
which are accounted for by the super component. Five dif-
ferent sources are used to make the estimate. Events 50 and
51, corresponding to human error disabling the HPCI or tran-
sient steam causing autoisolation, are purely demand
related. They occur only at the time of the true demand.
Except for a few descriptive failure reports which give
clues to to possible failure mechanisms, there is no avail-
able breakdown of data into standby failure mechanisms
verses demand generated mechanisms. In order to establish
bounds for the standby failure rate, we assume that the
failure data which does not distinquish between demand and
standby contributions will contain some fraction of demand
caused failures. First all data sources (with the exception
of the two known demand failure mechanisms) are converted
into a standby failure rate assuming demand failure rates
correspond to a 30 day demand interval. Then the value of X
is reduced to .75X and a demand failure rate is calculated
using .25\ based on the 30 day demand interval. This proce-
dure is repeated for a 50% division of failure mechanisms.
The range of the composite failure rate data is summarized
in Table 6.3.
The turbine/pump unit deserves special mention. It is
represented by three failure events on the fault tree, but
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the entire assembly functions as a unit. As it is a special-
ized piece of equipment, generic failure rates for the indi-
vidual parts of the unit may overestimate its failure poten-
tial because they may double count certain failure modes.
It can be seen in Table 6.3 that the standby failure
rate of the turbine/pump train super component is probabily
no higher than 67E-6/hr. Considering that failure reports
and occurance rates verse standby time indicate that demand
failure mechanisms do exist, the upper bound is taken to be X
= 50E-6/hr and qd = .0075/d. The lower bound is estimated to
be 10E-6/hr and q, =.005/d.
Steam Supply Valve Failure Rate
The Steam Supply Valve, MO 2301-3, is unique in that it
is part of the reactor pressure boundary during the normal
operation of the plant. It is subjected to much more severe
environmental stresses than any other valve in the HPCI sys-
Low Geometric Mean High
q d xd d
Increasing 18 .0012 34 .0012 67 .0012
Demand 13 .0028 24 .0044 50 .0072
Failure
Mechanisms 9 .0043 18 .0075 34 .013
Table 6.3. Range of Super Component Failure Rates for
Turbine/Pump Test (A in units of E-6/hr, qd in units of
per demand)
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tem. Actual failure data taken from the operational history
of the plant indicate that it has failed seven times during
the life of the plant. As six of the failures resulted from
binding of the valve seat, it is estimated that perhaps one
half of the failures could have been caused by closure of the
valve with too much force after a previous demand. This is
supported by the fact that the valve failed to open after
only a short standby period on Nov 11, 1974. If it assumed
that the probability of failure is divided equally between
standby and demand related failure mechanisms, a point esti-
mate of the valve's failure rate yields:
q = 7 (6.1)
2(130)
and,
q= 1 - e- 720, - 7 (6.2)
2(130)
Confidence X(x10~fhr)
Level
95% 57.0
90% 43.8
80% 30.6
75% 26.4
50% 13.2
Table 6.4. Upper bound estimates of MO 2301-3 Standby
Failure Rate Since 1975.
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The solution of the above equations then yield failure rates
for MO 2301-3 of X = 3.8E-5/hr and qd = 0.027/d.
Further inspection of the data indicate, however, that
an engineering assessment of the cause of the failures was
accomplished, and the last time the binding failure was
observed was June 8, 1975). With this information, it may be
valid to assume that the six binding failures were burn-in
failures which should not be given full weight in estimating
the failure rate of the valve. Given that no failures of MO
2301-3 have occurred during periodic tests since June 1975,
one can calculate a one sided confidence interval for the
valve failure rate using standard chi square approaches.
Table 6.3 gives the failure rates at various confidence lev-
els.
Finally, generic data is available from the Nuclear
Plant Reliability Data System [NUREG-2232] for motor oper-
ated gates valves of size similar to MO 2301-3. Unfortu-
nately the data is not grouped by standby environmental
conditions, so the applicability of it is subject to ques-
tion. Also, criticisms regarding the variances among the
utilities in reporting failures have been raised.
[EPRIl064I. Even though NPEDS may have large uncertainties,
Never-the-less it is reasonable to at least consider those
failure rates when making a judgement about the current
failure rate of MO 2301-3. Generic failure rates for motor
operated valves are given in Table 6.2.
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Considering all the information available, the standby
failure rate of MO 2301-3 is estimated to be between 5 and 25
E-6 per hour. The information on demand failure mechanisms
is used the divide the overall super component failure rate.
The lower limit takes into account the generic data on
valves, but lies in the upper part of the range. The upper
limit corresponds to the 75% confidence limit of no observed
failures since 1975. That value is considered reasonable
since the engineering problems with the valve appear to have
been solved.
It should be noted that the valve has a monitored fail-
ure rate. The one additional failure of the valve (under-
voltage coil, March 23, 1977) which occurred since 1975 was
detected during the standby period by normal operator sur-
veillance. (A periodic test was not necessary to detect
it.) Since monitored failures occur randomly and are
repaired when they occur, their contribution can be modeled
on a per demand basis.
Unavailability During Testing
The second area of uncertainty in analyzing the
turbine/pump operational tests is the effective downtime
created by the test. It was shown in Chapter 2 that test
caused downtime can come from three primary causes: 1) q0t,
unavailability to override the test mode, 2) Pf(,r+TR) '
Probability of Test Caused Failures , and 3) qdTR' Repair of
Demand Failures.
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In the case of the HPCI System, only the second and
third terms contribute to the effective downtime per test
(EDT). The reasoning is as follows. Although an opera-
tional test requires that the pump discharge be routed
through a full flow test return line, during the flow test
the system is in closer alignment with its operating condi-
tion than when it is on standby. At the start of the test all
but one of the active components transfer into their operat-
ing configuration. (MO 2301-8, the Injection Valve, remains
closed.) The only misaligned components are the test return
valves, and if either one closes and MO 2301-8 opens, the
injection function is successfully initiated. During
standby, at least eight different components must startup or
change position. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that the HPCI System is in its most available state when it
is undergoing a turbine/pump operability test.
The major disadvantage of performing a turbine/pump
operability test is the potential for generating failures
which would not inhibit the functioning of the system during
an emergency, but during normal operations require the sys-
tem to be made inoperable for repairs. This includes not
only leaks and burst seals in critical components, but also
failure of equipment whose purpose it is to keep the working
environment in the vicinity of the system free of contam-
ination. Eleven failure reports have been identified as
resulting from this type of failure during approximately 120
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tests. If the probability of test caused failures is
assumed to follow a binomial distribution, where P is a
constant failure probability per test, the 90% confidence
interval is 0.05<P <0.13.
Actual downtime to the completion of repairs is not
recorded on all failure reports. Based on partial informa-
tion it is estimated that the system is inoperable for an
average of about 20 hours following a test caused failure.
The product of repair time and Pf then yields an EDT in the
range of 1 to 4 hours per test.
The third term, qdTR' contributes only a small portion
of the effective downtime per test. The maximum estimated
value of test observable qd is 0.0075/d, which is a small
percentage of the contribution of P .
Results
Figure 6.2 is a mapping of the optimum test interval of
the super component which represents the single component
cut sets that are tested by the turbine/pump operational
test. This figure was generated by repeated calculation of
the OPTEST subroutine option which is included in FRANTIC
II-MIT. The figure gives the optimum test interval for the
system given any assumed standby failure rate between 1 and
50 E-6 per hour and an estimated downtime per test of one to
six hours. The range of failure rates estimated for the HPCI
turbine/pump single component cut sets is given by the hori-
zontal bar. It is placed on the current test interval of 30
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Figure 6.2. Optimum Test Interval of HPCI Turbine/Pump
as a Function of Composite Failure Rate and Effective
Downtime Per Test.
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days. Note that for the lower half of the range of standby
failure rates the 30 day test interval is very close to the
optimum.
Figures 6.3 to 6.6 give an expanded version of the cal-
culation for effective downtimes of one to four hours.
These figures not only plot the optimum test interval, but
also the contours for various factors of increase in una-
vailability due to standby failures. It can be seen from
these figures that near the qlmin contour line the average
unavailability relative to its minimum value becomes insen-
sitive to changes in both the failure rate and the test
interval. Except for the case where the Estimated Downtime
is one hour and the standby failure is above about 28E-6/hr,
the 30 day test is within 50% of the minimum attainable una-
vailability.
If demand failures form an appreciable percentage of
the observed failures, the factor increase in the total una-
vailability of the system will be less than that shown in the
figures, since
qav = qd + (1-qd )av (6.3)
Variations in the test interval do not actually produce the
percentage change shown in Figures 6.3 to 6.6 in the overall
unavailability of the system. Figure 6.7 is illustrates
this. It shows the results of OPTEST calculations using the
various ratios of demand and standby failure rates given in
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Figure 6.6. Average Unavailability Contours for HPCI Turbine/
Pump Testing When Effective Downtime per Test is Four Hours
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Table 6.3. Note that with the demand failure rates included
in the failure data, the unavailability becomes less sensi-
tive to the test interval.
Figure 6.8 shows the effect of test caused wearout on
the on the average unavailability of the HPCI turbine/pump
train at various times in the system's operational life as a
function of test interval throughout the previous opera-
tional life. For these curves only standby failures are
considered. The base curve is that obtained with no test
caused wearout. For the other curves, it is assumed that
each test causes an increase of 1% in the suseptibility of
the components in the train. This is modeled by making the
super component failure parameter f = 1.01. The successive
five year time frames are obtained by incrementing the Off-
set Time parameter for the super component by five year
increments. This parameter is available only in FRANTIC
II-MIT. The calculation shows that the existence of test
caused wearout in a system favors accomplishing testing at
longer intervals. Initially the shorter intervals reveal
undetected failures sooner and thus produce lower unavail-
ability. However, each test also increases the rate at
which failures occur in the future. Consequently, the
shorter test intervals produce more failures and a resultant
higher average unavailability as the plant becomes older.
The failure data for the HPCI system does not appear to
indicate that wearout is occurring in the turbine/pump com-
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Figure 6.8. Effect of Test-Caused Wearout on Optimum
Test Interval.
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ponents. However, if inspection of the equipment reveals
possible wearout, Figure 6.8 supports a lengthening of the
operational test interval by up to several weeks. This will
increase the average unavailability by only a few percent,
but would increase the useful life of the component subject
to test caused wearout.
Recommendations
The current test interval of 30 days appears to be well
within the range that provides close to the minimum unavail-
ability attainable for the system. No significant improve-
ment in availability can be achieved by shortening the
interval. The potential for additional test caused failures
and increased test caused wear-out argues against shorten-
ing the test interval to obtain a marginal reduction in the
time over which standby failures can remain undetected.
Aside from the recommended consolidations, no change in the
turbine/pump operability tests appears to be warranted.
6.5 AUTOMATIC INITIATION FUNCTION TESTS
Simplified diagrams of the HPCI automatic initiation
function are given in Figures 6.9 and 6.10. The automatic
initiation function requires that 1) either the low-low
reactor water switches or the high dry well pressure
switches activate their associated logic relays, and 2) the
logic relays activate the appropriate circuits in the HPCI's
active components. Failure to accomplish automatic initi-
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125 VDC
Bus 'B'
Initiation Seal-in
Figure 6.9. Simplified Diagram of HPCI Initiation Function
Components. (Relay Signal Flow is given in Figure 6.10.)
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ation is assumed to produce system failure. Currently, five
tests are accomplished on the initiation logic. Two tests
verify the functioning of the two types of initiation sen-
sors monthly and require a quarterly calibration. Three
tests check the initiation logic relays semi-annually.
To assess the periodic testing policy for the initi-
ation function, the intermediate event, "Failure to Gener-
ate Automatic Initiation Signal at Active Components" of the
Injection Function Fault Tree is made into the Top Event of
an intermediate level fault tree. (See Sheets 3-8, Appendix
A.) Cut sets which contribute to this Top Event will also
contribute to the more general failure definition of the
HPCI System.
The evaluation presented in this section indicates
that the initiation function is a relatively minor contribu-
tor to the overall system unavailability. This is expected,
since the dominant contributors to overall system unavail-
ability involve active components with relatively high
failure rates. However, the analysis does reveal two areas
where major improvements in the design and testing of the
initiation function can be made:
1) The transmission of an initiation signal to 7 of the
11 components which receive it is currently not verified.
Changes to the initiation logic tests can make this verifi-
cation without necessarily requiring that each component
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activate. Suggestions on how to do this are given in the
section on the logic tests.
2) The analysis reveals three minor changes to the
initiation circuit that eliminate the single failure con-
tribution of Basic Failure Event 12 from the initiation
function fault tree. These changes result in a decrease of
over an order of magnitude in the unavailability of the
function and simultaneously reduce the requirement for
periodic testing of all the automatic initiation circuit
components. Due to the lower unavailability created by the
design changes, testing requirements on the initiation log-
ic relays can be reduced to once per cycle.
6.5.1 INITIATION SENSOR TESTS
The following tests are currently accomplished to ver-
ify the operability of the initiation sensors:
Procedure 8.M.2-2.1.1. Reactor Water Level Safeguards
System - Frequency: functional monthly, functional and cal-
ibration quarterly. This procedure tests the four reactor
low-low level switches, which are wired in an
one-out-of-two, taken twice configuration, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.9. During the test the logic remains active. A
prerequisite for the test is that all four sensor switches
are open. This verifies that none have shorted and reduces
the chance of spurious initiation of the HPCI injection
function during the test. In turn, each one of the switches
is isolated and attached to a pneumatic calibrator. Pres-
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sure to the inlet of the pressure sensor simulates
differences between reactor water level and a reference
water level and closure of the sensor's relay contact is
verified. During calibration each switch is attached to a
cold water head simulating the difference between reactor
water level and reference level, and the actual difference
in water head is measured.
The test isolates each one of the four switches for
about 15 minutes. During most of that time, the switch is
not activated. Because of the nature of the test, it is
estimated that switch function can not be restored during
the test time if a LOCA were to occur, yielding a g of 1.0.
The effect is to reduce the redundancy during the test to
one-out-of-one for the switch wired in parallel to the one
undergoing testing.
Procedure 8.M.2-2.1.4. Reactor Drywell High Pressure
- Frequency: functional monthly, functional and cali-
bration quarterly. This procedure tests the four drywell
pressure sensors, which are connected with the same logic as
the low-low reactor water level pressure sensors. It fol-
lows the same procedure as 8.M.2-2.1.1 using a test signal
appropriate for these sensors. Observations and comments
for that procedure also apply to this test.
Quantitative Analysis
The sensitivity of initiation function average una-
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Figure 6.11. Average Unavailability of Initiation Sensors
Without Common Cause Failures.
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vailability to variations in the test interval of the tem-
perature and pressure sensors, is shown in Figure 6.11. For
this analysis it is assumed that either the low-low water
reactor water level or high dry well pressure sensors are
capable of detecting a small LOCA. Therefore, the sensors
are both diverse and redundant and would be expected to
produce a relatively low unavailability. Figure 6.11 shows
that the probability of having neither sensor group avail-
able to detect a LOCA is extremely small, given 1) there are
no common cause failures within a given group and 2) logic
relays are operational.
When common cause failures are considered, the una-
vailability of a particular group of sensors is given a sin-
gle failure event which relates the probability that all the
sensors of that group fail simultaneously. Figure 6.12
illustrates the potential effect of these common cause fail-
ures, which are accounted for by Events 6 and 7 in the HPCI
fault tree. For this analysis it is assumed that the two
diverse means of detecting a small LOCA makes the possibil-
ity of a common cause failure taking both types of sensors
off line remote.
For the purpose of estimating the possible effects of
common cause failures, standby failure rates corresponding
to 10% and 100% dependent failures and demand failure rates
of 0.0 and 0.001 are considered. The demand failure rates
account for the possibility that the conditions of the true
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Figure 6.12. Average Unavailability of Initiation Sensors
With Common Cause Failures Within Individual Groups of Sensors.
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demand prevent the sensors from responding in accordance
with design. For the purposes of this sensitivity study, it
is estimated that this probability is not more than 0.001.
The "worst case" standby failure rate assumes that sensors
failures are completely dependent, so common cause failures
occur at a rate equal to the failure rate of an individual
component. Somewhat arbitrarily, a second common cause
failure rate equal to 0.1 of the component failure rate is
also used for the estimate. (The very low average unavail-
abilities obtained for the the sensors, even assuming
completely dependent failures, indicate that more detailed
analysis is not warranted. ) It can be seen in Figure 6.12
that it requires a large contribution of common cause fail-
ures to make the average unavailability of the sensors go
above 1.OE-5. That does not occur until the standby failure
rate is equal to the individual component failure rate and
the demand failure rate is close to 0.001.
Despite the very low unavailability obtained for this
function, we do not recommend increasing the test interval.
These two groups of sensors activate more than just the HPCI
System. The level sensors also contribute to the activation
of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Automatic
Depressurization System, Standby Diesels, Low Pressure
Coolant Injection System, and the Core Spray System. The
pressure sensors also contribute to the activation of the
Low Pressure Coolant Injection System and the Core Spray
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System. For this reason it is reasonable to continue test-
ing them at the current 30 day interval to insure that their
unavailability remains very low.
6.5.2 DESCRIPTION OF INITIATION LOGIC TESTS
The initiation logic consists of relays associated
with either the low-low reactor water level switches or the
high drywell pressure switches, an initiation signal
seal-in relay, and a relay to activate the controller. Fig-
ures 6.9 and 6.10 show the signal flow of these relays. When
the low-low reactor level sensor contacts close in a
1-out-of-2, taken twice, logic relays 23A-Kl and K2 (desig-
nation abbreviated on Figure 6.16) are activated. Relay K2
closes a contact in a circuit which activates K23 AND K24,
and the four relays energize the specific components shown
in Figure 6.10. The high dry well pressure sensors accom-
plish the same function, but energize K3 and K4 instead of K1
and K2.
As the relay logic is currently designed, at least four
relays must function for successful activation of the
system. Relays 23A-K1 and 2 are redundant with 23A-K3 and 4,
provided that both the low-low reactor level and the high
drywell pressure sensors are capable of detecting the LOCA.
However, essential functions are also initiated by two non-
redundant relays, 23A-K23 and K24.
Current Test Policy
There are currently three procedures for testing the
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initiation logic:
Procedure 8.M.2-2.l0.4.2. HPCI Initiation Logic Test.
Procedure 8.M.2-2.1O.4.3. HPCI Steam Supply Isolation
Valve Logic.
Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.4.4. HPCI Injection Valve Logic.
Each one is accomplished in approximately the same manner.
First circuit breakers to most active components are opened.
Then the low-low reactor water and high drywell pressure
switches are closed in a sequence which tests their wiring
logic and the activation of the required logic relays is
verified. The procedures differ primarily in the components
which are kept active during the test. Figure 6.10 shows
that 11 different components receive signals from the initi-
ation logic. The tests verify that only four of these
components receive and function in response to the signal,
specifically:
1) 8.M.2-2.l0.4.2 - Auxillary Oil Pump.
2) 8.M.2-2.l0.4.3 - MO2301-4 and MO2301-5. (These
valves are verified to open on an initiation signal, giv-
en they are closed. The only time when they will be
closed during normal operation is during testing of the
autoisolation signal function.)
3) 8.M.2-2.10.4.4 - MO2301-8.
Comments on Current Test Procedures
Before proceeding with a quantitative determination of
recommended test intervals, two comments are in order:
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1) The three initiation logic tests should be consol-
idated into one procedure which verifies that all 11 compo-
nents receive the necessary initiation signal. In most
cases the signal path can be checked without requiring that
the component itself activate. For example, in the circuit
which opens MO 2301-3, the manual switch is parallel to the
automatic initiation circuit contacts. Therefore, closure
of the initiation contact should produce a short circuit
across the manual switch. Then activation of the valve by
the manual switch would by inference verify activation by
the automatic initiation circuit.
2) Accomplishing the logic tests in conjunction with
the initiation sensor tests will provide an integrated test
of the entire logic train. If the logic tests are done dur-
ing annual refueling, as recommended in the following
sections, the longer time required for the integrated test
will not contribute to the system's unavailability.
6.5.3 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF INITIATION LOGIC TESTS
Failure Event 5 models system unavailability resulting
from the initiation logic tests. It has been given a standby
failure rate of 1.0E-26/hr to "switch on" the periodic test
logic of the code. System downtime for injection logic
testing is then modeled using q0 , t, and T2 derived from
analysis of the logic tests. Figure 6.13 shows the contrib-
ution of Failure Event 5 to average system unavailability.
(Although the data points were generated by the FRANTIC
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Figure 6.13. Average Unavailability Due to Online
Testing of the Initiation Logic Relays.
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II-MIT code, they could easily be calculated using the idea
of effective downtime. The resulting average unavailabili-
ty would be gav (q r) ) An important consideration in
the quantitative analysis is the fact that if the logic
tests are done when the reactor is down for refueling and
maintenance they do not contribute to the system's unavail-
ability.
Unavailability Using Current Logic Design
To obtain a comparison with the current design and test
policy, the first series of calculations assumes that three
different tests of the HPCI initiation logic will continue
to be made, but with procedures modified so that proper
transmission of the initiation signal to one third of the
active components will be verified by each test. (If the
procedures are not changed, a failure in the circuit from
the initiation relays to one of the seven unverified compo-
nents will remain undetected until a true demand, and the
probability that such a failure has occurred will increase
monotonically throughout the life of the plant. Since the
procedural change is reasonable to implement, the magnitude
of the undetectable is not estimated.) With this policy,
the automatic initiation of each active component will be
tested every six months, which is the intent of the current
policy.
The current logic tests result in the HPCI System being
disabled for approximately one hour per test. During the
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test circuit breakers to most of the active components are
opened to prevent inadvertent injection into the reactor due
to the test initiation signal, and it is conservatively
estimated that there is a 0.5 probability that the system
can not be activated in the event of an actual demand. This
yields an Effective Downtime (EDT) of 0.5 hours per test.
For the initial calculation it is assumed that an additional
two or three components can be verified to activate without
adding significantly to the EDT of an individual test.
Under the existing schedule the three logic tests are
all accomplished during the same month. With this schedule,
the second and third tests have little opportunity to detect
standby failures in the relays, since there is little time
for them to occur. Consequently, a policy similar to that
currently being used would result in the relays being tested
once every six months with a test time of 3.0 hours and an
unavailability to override the test, q0 = 0.5, yielding an
EDT of 1.5 hours per logic relay test.
Figure 6.14 shows the effect of staggering the three
logic tests. When the three tests are staggered, the number
of tests accomplished in a six month period remains the
same. However, since every test requires tripping the ini-
tiation relays, a staggering policy whould result in their
being tested at the staggered interval instead of once every
six months. Also, since tests are no longer being made
sequentially, the test duration for any given month
242
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Figure 6.14. Unavailability of Initiation Logic Relays With
Current Design and Current Test Procedures and Staggering.
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decreases. The calculations are made for a variety of
assumed failure rates which cover those expected for control
relays. A 365 day calculation is also made. At this inter-
val testing is done when the reactor is down, and EDT = 0. It
can be seen in Figure 6.14 that with the current design the
staggered testing policy yields the lowest unavailability.
Note also that testing more often (each test every 3 months,
with a resultant staggering interval of 30 days) increases
the average unavailability, because of the unavailability
to override the test.
Initiation Logic Relay Modifications
A series of three design improvements will now be pre-
sented, and their effect on the most reasonable testing pol-
icy of the initiation logic will now be discussed. For
calculations showing the effects of the modifications, the
following two assumptions are made:
1) The logic relay tests are consolidated into one
procedure which verifies that each active component
receives an initiation signal. It is estimated that the
consolidated test will take longer than the current partial
tests. For purposes of estimation the calculations are per-
formed using an Effective Downtime (EDT) per test ranging
from one to four hours.
2) The failure parameters X = 3.OE-7/hr and qd=
3.6E-6/d are reasonable representations of the relay fail-
ure rates. These data are derived from WASH 1400 assuming
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25% demand failures and converting the reported demand fail-
ure rate to a standby failure rate using a 30 day periodic
test interval.
The first recommended design change is to consolidate
the functions of the two relays in the seal-in circuit. Cur-
rently, both relays 23A-K23 and 23A-K24 must function for
initiation to succeed. However, Relay 23A-k23 has suffi-
cient spare contacts to take up the functions of 23A-K24.
The modification will remove relay 23A-K24 from Failure
Event 12, a single component cut set in the injection func-
tion fault tree.
The second puts Relay 23A-K24 in parallel with Relay
23A-K23 across five existing sets of contacts in Panel 934.
This modification is represented in the fault tree by making
23A-K24 Failure Event 96. Event 96 is then connected
through an AND gate to Failure Event 12, making Event 12 part
of a two component cut set. Figures 6.15 and 6.16 illustrate
the changes to the logic circuits.
Modification 3 permits either the high dry well pres-
sure sensors or the low-low reactor water sensors to acti-
vate both sets of initiation logic relays. The modification
can be done by making the shunt from C to F on Test Connector
23A-JlA permanent. It reduces the number of cut sets in the
initiation function fault tree from 79 to 49. As this mod-
ification reduces the separation of the two sensor groups,
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Initiation Function Logic
Low-low Reactor Level
~1~ I-
125 VD,
Bus 'B
High Dry Well Pressure
I~
Initiation Seal-in
Figure 6.15. Wiring Diagram of HPCI Initiation Logic with
Modifications Two and Three. (Additions to Relay Signal
Flow are given in Figure 6.17.)
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by Modification Two.
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it should not be accomplished if sensor shorts to ground are
a concern.
The modifications should not increase the potential
for inadvertent initiation as three relays must still ener-
gize to activate all necessary components. It provides a
more consistent design in that all three relays would now be
redundant.
Summary and Recommendations
Figure 6.17 summarizes the effects of the three recom-
mended modifications on the unavailability of the initi-
ation function when the Effective Downtime per test is 2.0
hours. With the modifications there is a clear advantage to
testing the logic relays only once every cycle. The una-
vailability for the 60, 90, and 180 day test intervals are
almost entirely due to the unavailability to override the
test. A once per operating cycle test policy eliminates
Failure Event 5, which accounts for unavailability during
online testing, from the initation function fault tree. The
unavailability for a 365 day test interval is due entirely
to failures, since the test is done during scheduled down-
time. Note that it is unavailability is over an order of
magnitude smaller than the contribution of the tests.
The current test procedures should be consolidated
into one comprehensive procedure that verifies that all
active components receive the initiation signal. In addi-
tion, minor design changes to the initiation logic relays
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Figure 6. 17. Effects of Design Modifications on Initia-
tion Function Unavailability Verses Periodic Test Inter-
val. Effective Downtime per Test = Two Hours.
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will eliminate two single cut sets (Failure events 5 and 12)
from the injection function fault tree. This reduces the
requirement for logic tests from the current six per year to
one per refueling cycle while producing a factor of 80
decrease in the unavailability of the initiation function.
To check the sensitivity of these recommendations to
the failure rate of the relays, a calculation was made with
the relay standby failure rate increased by a factor of ten
to 3.OE-6. Figure 6.18 shows the results of this calcu-
lation. Comparison of this figure with Figure 6.13 at 60,
90, or 180 day intervals shows that the contribution of the
test downtime to the initiation function unavailability is
significant compared to the contribution of standby fail-
ures even for this elevated failure rate. The
unavailability for the once per cycle test jumps much higher
as the failure rate increases. However, with the recom-
mended modifications a once per cycle testing policy still
produces the least average unavailability if the effective
downtime for an online test exceeds two hours.
6.6 AUTOISOLATION FUNCTION TESTS
Currently two procedures are used to verify the steam
line break sensor functions. A third procedure verifies the
low pressure sensor functions. All three of these proce-
dures test the entire train of the autoisolation logic and
cause both Steam Line Isolation Valves, MO 2301-4 and 5, to
250
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Figure 6.18. Sensitivity of Modified Initiation Logic Circuit
Unavailability to an Order of Magnitude Increase in Component
Failure Rates. With the recommended modifications, a once
per operating cycle test interval still produces the least
function unavailability.
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close. A fourth procedure (8.M.2-2.10.5) tests the
autoisolation logic semi-annually. This procedure is
redundant with the three sensor tests and can be dropped
without affecting the safety of the plant.
Before the tests are quantitatively analyzed, they
will be described and some suggestions will be made for
improving their ability to check the functioning of all iso-
lation circuits.
Procedure 8.M.2-2.5.1. HPCI Steam Line High Flow
Isolation - The purpose of this test is to verify that the
differential pressure switches in the steam supply send
close signals to the steam supply line isolation valves upon
sensing a high differential pressure. A sensor is discon-
nected from its tap line and a test differential pressure is
applied using compressed air. (The ability of the tap line
to transmit the pressure from the tap point on the steam sup-
ply line is not verified.) The first sensor check must
produce closure of the Steam Line Isolation Valves, which
are then kept closed for the remainder of the test. The sen-
sor is then returned to service and the second is checked in
a similar fashion. However, since the seal-in circuit is
activated by the first test, only the closure of pressure
switch contacts is verified by the remainder of of the test
procedure. The seal-in circuit keeps the logic relays
closed, so the ability of the pressure switch to activate
the autoisolation circuit can not be checked. (Note - This
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problem is common to the next autoisolation functional test
as well.)
Provided that it does not interfere with other operator
duties, it is recommended that the operator stationed at the
HPCI control panel during this test reset the autoisolation
circuit before each instrument check so that the ability of
each differential pressure switch to generate a close signal
in the autoisolation relays can be checked. The isolation
valves do not have to be reopened for this verification.
Procedure 8.M.2-2.5.3. HPCI Steam Line High
Temperature - Two combinations of two-out-of-two temper-
ature switch closures are checked in each of three different
locations: 1) Torus Room, 2) Valve Station above 23 feet,
and 3) Turbine/Pump Room. The test verifies a total of 6
circuits and 12 switches. Each circuit is checked by jump-
ering one switch and applying a high temperature to the
series sensor. The jumper is then reversed, and the second
sensor is tested. This procedure verifies both that the
sensor has not inadvertently shorted (revealed by a prema-
ture closure of the local relay when the jumper is applied)
and the proper functioning of the switch given a high tem-
perature. The first test must produce closure of the steam
supply line isolation valves, but the remainder verify clo-
sure of only the local relay. As above, it is recommended
that the operator stationed at HPCI panel in the control
room reset the autoisolation seal-in between each temper-
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ature sensor functional test so that the entire
autoisolation circuit can be verified operational.
Procedure 8.M.2-2.5.4. HPCI Steam Line Low Pressure -
This procedure tests the HPCI steam line low pressure
switches and the 1-out-of-2 taken twice logic which produces
an autoisolation signal from them. Switches are discon-
nected from the steam supply line (which results in the con-
tacts closing due to low pressure) in patterns which test
the circuit logic. The first test produces closure of the
steam supply line isolation valves. Since low steam line
pressure does not cause a seal-in of the autoisolation cir-
cuit, all relays deenergize when the pressure switches are
reconnected to the steam line. Therefore, the current test
verifies the functioning of all the isolation logic relays
for all combinations of logic without requiring the operator
to reset the autoislation circuit and no change is
necessary.
While this procedure does not affect the HPCI
autoisolation fault tree, it does contribute test caused
downtime of the initiation function. In addition, a false
signal from the low pressure sensors can result in disabling
the initiation function. Finally, if the initiation logic
tests are to be accomplished while the reactor is shutdown
for refueling, the signal produced by the low pressure sen-
sors must be disabled, since it overrides a HPCI initiation
signal. (This is also an good option for the operator to
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have in the event there is a false low pressure signal that
disables the HPCI injection function.)
6.6.1 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The quantitative analysis of the autoisolation func-
tion periodic tests is very strongly influenced by three
important facts revealed by the fault tree analysis, which
are discussed in the following sections.
1) The autoisolation function has a relatively large
potential for common cause failures.
2) Aside from combinations of common cause failures,
only two cut sets contribute significantly to the unavail-
ability of the autoisolation function.
3) Autoisolation tests affect the unavailability of
the injection function as well as the autoisolation
function.
Common Cause Effects
Because of the high degree of redundancy in this func-
tion nine potential common cause failures are mode; led in
the fault tree. Three of them account for the necessity of
locating the temperature sensors in three separate rooms to
detect steam line breaks. There is a probability that a sen-
sor at one loction can not detect a break at one of the other
locations in time to initiate the safety function. In this
analysis we assume a probability of 0.01 that the temper-
ature sensors can not detect a steam line break because of
their location. One accounts for a break which is not large
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enough to trip the dP sensors. The others account for poten-
tial calibration errors or calibration drift.
A design which provides the necessary redundance and
diversity of sensors to overcome a 1% chance of failure due
to location reduces the importance of individual sensor
failures. If one designs against a 1% chance that a break
will occur where the sensor can not detect a steam leak
because of its location, he is assuming a minimum unavail-
ability for that sensor. That probability tends to dominate
the probability that sensor has failed during standby.
Important Cut Sets
The fault tree analysis revealed no single component
and only 12 two component cut sets in the autoisolation
fault tree. Of these, seven involve loss of power, which is
monitored and consequently the unavailability is assumed
quite low. An eighth pertains to the suppression pool,
which is normally isolated during standby. The ninth and
tenth contain a combination of common cause failures of all
the temperature sensors plus and common cause failures of
the dP sensors, which are judged to by primarily demand or
human error in this function. The final two are the major
contributors to the unavailability of the autoisolation
function which are sensitive to test interval variations:
29, 31 - Coincident failure of the two steam line iso-
lation valves, and
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19, 21 - Coincident failure of the two autoisolation
relays.
The testing intervals of the components in these cut sets
will dominate the quantitative analysis of the periodic test
policy for the autoisolation function.
The three autoisolation functional tests are currently
accomplished monthly over a two day period. Because the
initial test signal produces closure of the two isolation
valves, every sensor test checks the functioning of all four
components in the two important cut sets. However, because
of their quick succession, the second two tests are per-
formed before standby failures have had an opportunity to
occur. Therefore, although the valves and relays are cycled
a total of three times during the month, their periodic test
interval is still 30 days.
The lower curves on Figure 6. 19 compares the current
sequential testing policy with one in which the sensor tests
are staggered. These curves give the unavailability of the
autoisolation function verses the periodic test interval of
the sensor tests. When the sensor tests are accomplished
sequentially, the relays and valves are tested at the sensor
testing interval. In the staggered tests the isolation
relays and valves are tested at one third the interval
shown. The staggered testing policy is superior to the
sequential policy, because the relays and valves get tested
at the staggering interval, while the less important cut
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Figure 6.19. Autoisolation Function Unavailability as a
Function of Autoisolation Sensor Test Intervals.
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sets get tested less often. The decreased test interval for
these dominant components reduces the function's unavail-
ability.
The curves plotted with square data points are the
result of assuming up to 10% dependent failures among sen-
sors at any one location. The curves plotted with the trian-
gular data points also assume that all the temperature
sensors can fail with a XCCF = 0 '1 ind. Because this assump-
tion can defeat the designed redundancy of the temperature
sensors, there is a larger percentage rise in the staggered
testing unavailability then the sequential testing. Howev-
er, the clear advantage of sequential testing is still
evident.
It can be seen in the figure that, if we assume no com-
mon cause failures can fail all temperature sensors (the
only plausible mechanism being calibration drift of all the
sensors in one direction), the sensor tests can be accom-
plished once every nine weeks instead of at the current 30
day interval, with a reduction of 60% in the function's una-
vailability, because the 9 week sensor test interval
translates into a 3 week test interval for the isolation
relays and valves. Because an all temperature sensor XCCF
increases the relative importance of them with respect to
the valves and realys, the unavailability of staggered test-
ing at 9 weeks is about the same as the current policy for
that assumption.
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Interaction With Injection Function
In this section it is assumed that staggered testing of
the sensors is implemented. The autoisolation function
tests interact with the injection function in two ways:
1) They close the Steam Line Isolation Valves and thus
cause unavailability of the injection function.
2) They verify that the autoisolation sensors are not
about to generate false autoislation signals that
would override the injection function.
When the two Steam Line Isolation Valves close during
an autoisolation test, the HPCI System isolates from the
reactor. While the valves are closed and the autoisolation
signal is sealed-in the HPCI System can not respond to a true
demand for the injection function unless an operator clears
the test signal and resets the seal-in relay. The parameter
g accounts for the probability that these actions will not
be accomplished. Because the conditions of a true demand
would create a high stress situation with many coincident
alarms, a Human Error Probability (HEP) of 0.25 is applied
to each required action. [Sw80.]
The estimation of g for the isolation valves is com-
plicated by the fact that three different procedures are
involved on a staggered basis. Since the HEP data and the
times during individaul tests when autoisolation signals
are present are only rough estimates, it is reasonable to
establish an average test time, T, and unavailability to
(Of-
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override the tests, q0 , for the three tests. For brievity,
only the estimation of the temperature sensor parameters is
discussed.
According to plant personnel, the temperature test
lasts approximately 3 hours. Much of that time is spent mov-
ing test equipment from sensor to sensor, so a test signal is
applied to a temperature signal about 10% of the time. Given
that our recommendation to clear to autoisolation signal
after every test is implemented, the autoisolation signal is
sealed in for another 10% of the time. During this time two
operator actions are required: remove the signal and clear
the seal-in. One is accomplished by the technician doing
the test, and the second is accomplished by the control room
operator stationed at the HPCI panel in accordance with the
test procedures. During this time the control room operator
must clear the seal-in signal before the HPCI can be initi-
ated. During the remainder of the test the HPCI System could
initiate its injection function should a true demand occur.
Based on these estimates q0 for the temperature sensor test
is calculated to be:
q0  = 0.1[1-(.75)(.75)] + 0.1(.25) = 0.07 (6.4)
The first term reflects the fact that during 10% of the test
two operators must perform actions successfully. The second
term accounts for the time that only one operator must take
action.
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The other two sensor tests are shorter, but produce
about the same q0 during the test as the temperature sensor
test. When the contributions of all three procedures are
averaged together, we obtain an average q0 of 0.08 over an
average time of 1.5 hours per test.
The second cause of injection function unavailability
due to autoisolation tests is failure of the isolation
valves which requires that the HPCI System be declared inop-
erable for repair. The P will be equal to the probability
that a valve fails to make a transition in either direction.
This probability depends on the test interval and demand
failures during both the opening and closing of the valves,
yielding the relation:
Pf = XT2 + 2q (6.5)
where 2qd accounts for only transition failures which can
cause occur under test conditions. The 2 accounts for the
fact that if the valve fails to either close or open during
the test, the HPCI System would be declared inoperable until
repairs are completed. (In other words command failure
mechanisms and accident condition failure mechanisms would
not be included in this parameter.) Assuming that transi-
tion failure account for 10% of observed failures at the
periodic test, the values of P shown in Table 6.5 for 10,
14, 21 and 30 day valve test intervals.
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In order to determine the effect of the autoisolation
tests on the injection function, the applicable cut sets
relating to false signals from the autoisolation sensors and
the closure of the Steam Line Isolation Valves are extracted
from the injection function fault tree and subjected to
testing in accordance with the staggered autoisolation test
policy. Shorts in series sensors and excessive drift which
could lead to false signals from those sensors are modeled
by the sensor standby failure rate. Valve unavailability is
created by the tests, as discussed above.
Figure 6.20 shows the unavailability contribution to
the injection function due to autoisolation valve tests. It
is interesting to note that, except for extremely high
assumed common cause failure rates for generating false
signals (ie. in excess of an individual component failure
rate) the unavailability created in the injection function
Sensor Test Valve Test Pf
Interval (days) Interval (days)
30 10 .001
42 14 .0013
63 21 .0018
90 30 .0023
Table 6.5. Probability of Test Caused Failure to Injection
Function Failure Events 31 and 32 (Isolation Valves, NOFC)
as a Result of Autoisolation Function Tests.
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Figure 6.20. Injection Function Unavailability Due to
Autoisolation Sensor Tests Which Cycle Autoisolation
Valves MO 2301-4 and MO 2301-5.
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> 6
4
2-
10
(
by cycling the isolation valves is greater than the unavail-
ability reduction obtained in the autoisolation function by
verifying the lack of potential for false signals from the
autisolation circuit.
Recommendations
Figures 6.19 and 6.20 show that a staggered sensor
testing policy can provide lower unavailability with longer
individual sensor test intervals than the current policy,
which schedules all sensor tests during a two day period of
the month. Because the the two autoisolation valves, MO
2301-4 and 5, are cycled as a result of every sensor test,
under a staggered testing policy they will be effectively
tested more often. Since coincident valve and associated
relay failures are the dominant two cut sets in the
autoisolation function, it is possible to extend the indi-
vidual sensor test intervals to either six or nine weeks and
still reduce the autoisolation function's unavailability.
Because the closure of the autoisolation valves during the
sensor tests has the potential to defeat the injection func-
tion, the nine week test interval produces the least
unavailability in the injection function and should be
favored. At the nine week test interval the autoisolation
3 If the requirement to cycle MO 2301-4 and 5 is dropped
from 8. 5.4.4 (see Section 6.4. 1) the requirements to
cycle these valves will be reduced by a factor of 2.8
without a reduction in their unavailability.
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valves will be cycled once every three weeks instead of the
current three times per month. I *
The preceding calculations were made assuming a con-
stant standby failure rate. To preclude the possibility
that an increasing hazard rate might produce a sharper rise
in the unavailability than calculated here, and consequent-
ly more out-of-range sensor failures, the test intervals for
the three sensor tests could be first extended to 6 weeks
with a staggering of two weeks between tests. If the amount
of drift or number of failures observed in the sensors has
not increased significantly, based on the observations of an
operating cycle, then the sensor test interval may be
increased to 9 weeks.
6.7 SUMMARY OF HPCI RECOMMENDATIONS
Table 6.6 summarizes the results of the quantitative
assessment of the HPCI periodic testing policy.
As the injection function fault tree so clearly indi-
cated, system unavailability is dominated by the failure of
single component cut sets. Depending on assumptions regard-
ing the failure rates of these components, the average una-
vailability of the system ranges from 0.01 to 0.03. One
test, 8.5.4.1, the Turbine/pump and Valve Operability Test,
4 At the 6 and 9 week interval it may be desirable to cali-
brate the sensors every second test instead of every
third.
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Procedure
I. Injection Function
Operability
A. Online Tests
8.5.4.1 (Pump Flow Rate
at 1000 psig)
8.5.4.4 (Valve Oper-
ability)
8.I.6 (Pump and Valve
Operability)
8.A.15 (System Integ-
rity Surveil-
ance)
B. Refueling Cycle Tests
8.5.4.3 (Flow Rate at
150 psig)
8.5.4.6 (Op. From Alt.
Shutdown Stat.)
8.E.23 (Flow Controller
Calib.)
Current
Interval
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Quarterly
Once/
Cycle
Once/
Cycle
Once/
Cycle
Recommendations
No Change
1) Delete Isolation Valves
From Test
2) Consolidate Injection
Valve Cycling Into 8.5.4.1
Consolidate into
Consolidate
8.5.4.1
into 8.5.4.1
No Change
No Change
No Change
Table 6.6. Summary of Periodic Test Recommendations
6.4.3
6.4.1
6.4.1
6.4.1
6.4.1
6.4.2
6.4.2
6.4.2
0~~
Ref. Section
Procedure
II. Initiation Function
8.M.2-2.l.1 (Reactor
Water Level)
8.M.2-2.l.4 (Dry Well
Pressure)
8.M.2-2.10.4.2 (Initia-
tion Logic)
8.M.2-2.10.4.3 (Steam
Supply Isol.
Valve)
8.M.2-2.10.4.4 (Injec-
tion Valve
Logic)
8.M.2-2.10.12 (Reactor
High Water Trip
Logic)
Current
Interval
Recommendations
xI - I~-4.
Func.: Monthly
Calib. Quarterly
Func.: Monthly
Calib. Quarterly
Semi-annually
(April + Oct.)
Semi-annually
(April + Oct.)
Semi-annually
(April + Oct.)
Semi-annually
(Feb. + Aug.)
No Change
No Change
1) Consolidate into
one procedure
2) Test activation
of all components
3) Test once per re-
fueling cycle
No Change
Table 6.6. Summary of Periodic Test Recommendations (continued)
(C
[Ili
a)i
Go Ref. Section
6.5.1
6.5.1
6.5.2
6.5.2
6.5.3
Procedure Current
Interval
Recommentation
I I.
III. Autoisolation Logic
and Function
8.M.2-2.5.1 (Steam
Line High Flow)
8.M.2-2.5.3 (Steam
Space High
Temperature)
8.M.2-2.5.4 (Steam
Line Low Pres.)
8.M.2-2.10.5 (Auto-
isolation Logic)
8.M.2-2.5.3 (Sup.
Pool Isola-
tion Valve)
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Semi-
annually
l/Refueling
Cycle
Once every nine weeks*
Once every
Once every
nine weeks*
nine weeks*
* Stagger at three week
intervals.
Delete
No change
Table 6.6. Summary of Periodic Test Recommendations (continued)
NJ~
6.6.1
6.6.1
6.6.1
6.6
Ref. Section
Interval I
IV. Miscellaneous Tests
8.5.4.5 (HPCI System
Inoperable)
8.C.13 (LOLC
Valve Surv.)
8.M.2-2.5.6 (Cond.
Stor. Tank
Level)
8.M.2-2.5.7 (Sup.
Chamber Level)
Not addressed
No change
Not addressed
Not addressed
Specifies tests
of other systems
whenever HPCI
down
Once every two
weeks
Func: Monthly
Calib: Quarterly
Func: Monthly
Calib: Quarterly
Table 6.6. Summary of Periodic Test Recommendations (continued)
C
t.j Ref. SectionRecommendationsProcedure Current
verifies that the most important single component cut sets
are functioning. It is recommended that the test interval
of this test be maintained at 30 days. This interval results
in an unavilability that is very close to the minimum, and
the potential for test caused failures and wear-out argue
against shortening it to match the calculated optimum.
The test intervals for many other tests should be
lengthened as indicated in Table 6.6. Compared to the pump
and valve operability tests, these tests address minor con-
tributors to system unavailability. In two cases the
lengthening of the test interval will actually improve the
availability of the HPCI system.
1) Currently, it is necessary to deenergize the major
components of the HPCI System to accomplish the initiation
logic tests. The fault tree analysis has shown where three
minor modifications to the logic circuits eliminate a single
component cut set and make the function reliable enough to
test on a once per cycle basis. The deletion of the necessi-
ty to disable the system to accomplish an online test
removes a second single cut set, with the result that the
overall unavailability of the initiation function is
reduced by a factor of 80.
2) Staggering the autoisolation sensor tests permits
verification of the operability of the isolation valves more
often with fewer tests of the sensors, which have been
designed with sufficient redundacy to make individual sen-
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sor failures relatively unimportant. Because the isolation
relays and valves dominate the autoisolation function's
unavailability, the sensor testing interval can be doubled
while still reducing the unavailability in the
autoisolation function by 40%. Because autoisolation func-
tion testing interferes with the injection function, a stag-
gered and lengthened testing policy for the sensors also
produces a 10 to 20% smaller contribution of autoisolation
function failures to the injection function unavailability.
(It should be pointed out, however, that the autoisolation
function contributes only about 1% of the injection func-
tion's unavailability.)
In addition to the recommendations for changes in test
interval, a number of recomendations have been made to con-
solidate similar procedures into a single comprehensive
procedure. Also, some needlessly repetitious procedures
should be eliminated.
The implementation of these recommendations will bring
the periodic testing policy for the HPCI System into a bet-
ter balance with the actual contributors to the the system's
unavailability with 47 fewer tests per year.
More general conclusions regarding the practical
application of time dependent unavailability analysis to
operatioal standby safety systems are presented in Chapter
7.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A large amount of effort is expended annually to test
standby safety systems at nuclear power installations.
Since the purpose of these tests is to verify that the sys-
tems can perform their safety function when required, it is
prudent to ask how well they do their job and if the interval
at which.they are accomplished is consistent with their
potential for improving availability.
7.1 SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate that
time dependent unavailability analysis is a practical tool
for assessing the periodic testing program of standby safety
systems. To accomplish this objective the following tasks
have been accomplished:
1) The input parameters to the FRANTIC II computer
code have been interpreted from an engineering point of view
and related to failure causes which can be identified in
failure and maintenance reports. This will assist systems
engineers using the code.
2) Based on the engineering interpretation, FRANTIC II
has been modified to model time dependent failure rates and
test caused wear-out or burn-in with more flexibility. The
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offset time added to the failure parameters now allows the
user to model a component failure rate that can vary from any
one value to any other value following any one of an infinite
family of time dependent curves. The offset time also
allows the user to investigate the effects of long term
wear-out due to both testing and accumulated standby time
without running a calculation over the entire life of the
system.
3) A capability to calculate the optimum test interval
of a constant failure rate component subject to imperfect
testing has been added. The various contributors to
imperfect testing are interpreted in terms of an effective
downtime per test.
4) Subroutines obtained from UNRAC [Ka80] have been
modified to produce and permanently store cut sets based on
a fault tree of the safety function. The subroutines also
evaluate these cut sets to produce instantaneous system una-
vailability in terms of the instantaneous component
unavailabilites calculated by FRANTIC II. The resulting
package is named FRANTIC II-MIT. It can be easily applied to
any simple or complex system without the use of lengthy ana-
lytical formulas. The input necessary to generate the cut
sets is sufficiently flexible to easily permit changes in
fault tree logic resulting from system modifications. This
makes the code an effective tool to use during both the
design and operational phases of a system anaylsis.
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5) FRANTIC II-MIT has been applied to simple systems
to provide an understanding of the effects of various
assumptions about failure mechanisms and component config-
urations. It was then used to assess the periodic testing
program of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System of a
Boiling Water Reactor. The resulting analysis led to recom-
mendations for reducing system unavailability while also
reducing the periodic test load from approximately 170 to
123 per year.
7.2 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has provided the necessary background and
examples to show that FRANTIC II-MIT can be used for practi-
cal applications in operational systems. It has demon-
strated that time dependent unavailability analysis using
FRANTIC II-MIT in the context of a comprehensive systems
analysis can provide a quantitative basis for the establish-
ment of periodic testing programs in standby safety systems.
Based on our experience of interpreting, modifying, and
applying the code, we make the following specific conclu-
sions:
1) FRANTIC II-MIT can model essentially all signif-
icant component failure modes and mechanisms on a time
dependent basis. It can be set up to answer a variety of
system specific questions limited only by their capability
to be represented by fault tree techniques and the data
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available for code's wide variety of component failure
parameters.
2) The application to the High Pressure Coolant
Injection System has demonstrated FRANTIC II-MIT' s poten-
tial for improving periodic test programs. The current pol-
icy requires over 20 different tests. FRANTIC II-MIT was
able to model most situations and provided useful informa-
tion upon which practical recommendations for test policy
changes could be made.
3) Although precise input data is desirable, valuable
insights about system behavior under testing can be gained
through the use of FRANTIC II-MIT even with data having
large uncertainties. By focusing on the potential for fail-
ure and its causes, a probabilistic approach such as used in
this work can point out where those uncertainties make a
difference. Often the relative change in a system's una-
vailability can provide the information needed to make test
policy decisions. With sensitivity studies one can obtain
this type of information with reasonable confidence despite
uncertainties in the failure data.
4) FRANTIC II-MIT uses the computer efficiently. A
typical problem with a number of calculations on a system of
10-20 components requires less than a minute of CPU time.
5) The effort required to properly analyze a periodic
testing program in an operational system is extensive. A
major part of it is associated with developing fault trees
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and understanding operating procedures. FRANTIC I I-MIT
provides a valuable framework for gathering and using system
information. It fits into the engineering process by allow-
ing the designer to consider in detail the probability that
a standby safety system will fail to accomplish its safety
function. During this study many recommendations for
improving test procedures came as a direct result of an
attempt to obtain data to input to the code.
It should be mentioned that it is not necessary to use
all the input parameters of FRANTIC II-MIT to analyze a
fault tree. If only demand data are available the average
probability of failure upon demand can be input as qd and a
quick estimate of system unavailability can be obtained from
using just the one parameter. 1
6) The time dependent hazard rate models introduced in
FRANTIC II-MIT had little impact on the results of the prac-
tical application of the code to the HPCI System, because of
a lack of sufficient information to identify potential time
dependencies in important components. Data supported the
use of only the constant hazard rate model.
7) The ratio of demand related failures to standby
failures is a very important factor to consider in develop-
The original estimate of failure upon demand must
account for the test interval. For example, WASH 1400
generally assumed a 30 day test interval in generating
its failure upon demand data.
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ing a periodic testing program. The application of FRANTIC
II-MIT has shown that the system' s unavailability becomes
quite insensitive to test interval when demand failures
become more probable than standby failures. Currently,
failure rate data is not organized to allow the ready deter-
mination of the ratio of the two contributors.
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1) FRANTIC II-MIT' s failure mechanism modeling capa-
bilities currently exceed the sophistication of the avail-
able failure data by a wide margin. It is recommended that a
determination of the parameters useful in identifying fail-
ure mechanisms be made and a system for easily reporting
this data in an operating environment be defined.
2) The generalized Weibull hazard rate introduced in
FRANTIC II-MIT has the potential for application to a proba-
bility based maintenance policy where maintenance is accom-
plished to reduce a component's hazard rate. This requires
work in two areas. First, research is necessary to deter-
mine how specific types of maintenance affect component
hazard rates. Second, the component renewal type models in
FRANTIC II-MIT need to be made more general to allow the haz-
ard rate to be changed by a maintenance action. The choice
of options for this second task will depend on the results of
the first.
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3) Frequently the unavailability of a safety function
depends on more than just one standby safety system. Peri-
odic test programs must be planned to insure that the sys-
tems are not all highly unavailable at the same time. The
analysis of diverse independent systems with a single fault
tree can be quite expensive. Consequently it would be
desirable to store statistically independent system level
instantantaneous unavailabilities for use in a higher level
fault tree containing the systems and their common dependen-
cies. The evaluation of such a fault tree requires
modification of the TIMES subroutine of FRANTIC II-MIT to
calculate system unavailability at specific user input time
points as well as those generated by the periodic testing
information. This will permit the evaluation of large fault
trees in piecemeal fashion with considerable savings in com-
puter time.
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TABLE -I FAULT TREE LOGIC
GATE GATE INPUT COMP. OR GATES
NO. TYPE
99 0 37 100 1 0 0 0 0
100 0 101 102 105 106 107 0 0
101 0 2 3 4 0 0 0 0
102 0 103 104 0 0 0 0 0
103 0 121 12 0 0 0 0 0
104 0 108 109 50 0 0 0 0
105 1 140 141 0 0 0 0 0
106 0 149 33 0 0 0 0 0
107 0 154 41 42 43 44 46 47
108 0 114 115 52 111 0 0 0
109 0 112 113 53 54 55 70 0
110 0 114 115 0 0 0 0 0
111 0 139 156 51 0 0 0 0
112 0 56 57 0 0 0 0 0
113 0 77 70 0 0 0 0 0
114 0 116 117 0 0 0 0 0
115 0 62 63 0 0 0 0 0
116 0 118 75 153 0 0 0 0
117 0 119 120 158 159 76 0 0
118 1 60 61 0 0 0 0 0
119 1 64 65 0 0 0 0 0
120 1 66 67 0 0 0 0 0
121 0 122 5 0 0 0 0 0
122 1 123 124 0 0 0 0 0
123 0 t25 126 127 6 0 0 0
124 0 128 129 130 7 0 0 0
125 1 131 132 0 0 0 0 0
126 1 133 134 0 0 0 0 0
127 0 8 9 12 0 0 0 0
128 1 135 136 0 0 0 0 0
129 1 137 138 0 0 0 0 0
130 0 10 11 12 0 0 0 0
131 0 78 79 0 0 0 0 0
132 0 80 81 0 0 0 0 0
133 0 82 83 0 0 0 0 0
134 0 84 85 0 0 0 0 0
135 0 86 87 0 0 0 0 0
136 0 88 89 0 0 0 0 0
137 0 90 91 0 0 0 0 0
138 0 92 93 0 0 0 0 0
139 1 73 74 0 0 0 0 0
140 0 142 13 14 27 0 0 0
141 0 144 145 15 16 17 18 19
142 0 143 25 26 0 0 0 0
143 0 22 23 0 0 0 0 0
144 0 152 24 0 0 0 0 0
145 1 146 147 0 0 0 0 0
146 0 20 21 38 0 0 0 0
147 1 148 -25 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE - I CONTINUED :
INPUT COMP. OR GATES
-22 -23 0
150 151 30
34 35 36
39 40 0
28 29 0
58 59 0
155 45 0
48 49 0
157 72 0
140 71 0
68 69 0
94 95 0
0 0
31 32
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
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GATE
TYPE
0
0
0
0
0
10
GATE
NO.
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
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TABLE - 2
NO. NO. OFCUT SET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
COMP.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
12
12
12
12
12
Appendix B. Injection Function Cut Sets (continued)
IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
37
2
-4
34
3
4
12
5
33
39
30
31
32
35
36
41
42
43
44
46
47
45
56
50
62
52
75
40
77
53
54
55
70
57
63
51
76
72
73 74
64 65
15 22
58 59
8 10
7 8
6 10
6 7
13 15
13 16
13 17
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TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
CUT SET NO. NO. OF COMP.
50 2
51 2
52 2
53 2
54 2
55 2
56 2
57 2
58 2
59 2
60 2
61 2
62 2
63 2
64 2
65 2
66 2
67 2
68 2
69 2
70 2
71 2
72 2
73 2
74 2
75 2
76 2
77 2
78 2
79 2
80 2
81 2
82 2
83 2
84 2
85 2
86 2
87 2
88 2
89 2
90 2
91 2
92 2
93 2
94 2
95 2
96 2
97 2
98 2
99 2
Appendix B.
IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
13 18
13 19
13 24
14 15
14 16
14 17
14 18
14 19
14 24
15 27
16 27
17 27
18 27
19 27
24 27
15 25
15 26
15 23
16 25
16 26
16 23
17 25
17 26
17 23
18 25
18 26
18 23
19 25
19 26
19 23
24 25
24 26
23 24
16 22
17 22
18 22
19 22
22 24
22 71
66 67
68 69
94 95
60 61
9 10
9 11
8 11
7 9
6 11
48 49
13 71
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TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
NO. NO. OF COMP.
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
IN C. S.CUT SET
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
Appendix B. Injection Function Cut Sets (continued)
COMPONENTS NOS.
14 71
27 71
25 71
26 71
23 71
6 86 88
10 82 84
7 82 84
8 90 92
10 78 80
9 86 88
9 86 89
8 87 88
8 86 89
6 90 92
7 78 80
6 87 88
6 86 89
11 78 80
11 78 81
10 79 80
10 78 81
7 79 80
7 78 81
25 28 29
26 28 29
23 28 29
11 82 84
11 82 85
10 83 84
10 82 85
7 83 84
7 82 85
9 90 92
9 90 93
8 91 92
8 90 93
8 91 93
9 91 92
9 87 88
8 87 89
6 91 92
6 90 93
13 28 29
6 91 93
6 87 89
11 79 80
10 79 81
7 79 81
14 28 29
309
Sheet 6 of 7
TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
NO. NO. OFCUT SET
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
IN C. S.COMP.
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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COMPONENTS NOS.
27 28 29
22 28 29
8 86 88
11 83 84
10 83 85
7 83 85
9 91 93
9 87 89
11 79 81
11 83 85
78 81 90 92
83 85 86 88
83 84 87 88
83 84 86 89
82 85 87 88
82 85 86 89
82 84 87 89
78 80 91 92
78 80 90 93
22-23-25 38
82 84 90 92
13 20-22-25
78 81 86 88
78 80 87 88
78 80 90 92
78 80 86 89
20-22-25 27
83 84 86 88
82 85 86 88
82 84 87 88
82 84 86 89
20-23-25 27
79 81 86 88
79 80 87 88
79 81 90 92
79 80 91 92
79 80 90 93
78 81 91 92
78 81 90 93
78 80 91 93
78 80 86 88
79 80 86 89
78 81 87 88
79 81 87 88
79 81 86 89
79 80 87 89
78 81 87 89
13 21-22-25
13-22-25 38
13 20-23-25
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TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
NO. NO. OFCUT SET
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
COMP.
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
82 85 91
79 80 90
83 85 87
79 81 91
83 85 91
93
92
89
93
93
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IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
14 21-22-25
14-22-25 38
14 20-23-25
21-22-25 27
-22-25 27 38
21-22-25 26
-22-25 26 38
78 81 86 89
78 80 87 89
14 20-22-25
20 22-23-25
83 84 90 92
82 84 86 88
82 85 90 92
83 85 90 92
83 84 91 92
83 84 90 93
82 85 91 92
82 85 90 93
82 84 91 93
82 84 91 92
82 84 90 93
20-22-25 26
83 85 87 88
83 85 86 89
83 84 87 89
82 85 87 89
79 80 86 88
20-23-25 26
79 81 91 92
79 81 90 93
79 80 91 93
78 81 91 93
21 22-23-25
79 81 87 89
13 21-23-25
13-23-25 38
14 21-23-25
14-23-25 38
21-23-25 27
-23-25 27 38
21-23-25 26
-23-25 26 38
83 85 91 92
83 85 90 93
83 84 91 93
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I INONSAFTY 1.E-20 30.
1 2 MAINT
2 1125VDCD5 .000037
2 2
3 1125VDCD8 .000037
3 2
4 1250VDCD9 .000037
4 2
5 1INIT TST
5 2SYS DOWN
6 ILVL CCF .43 .001 90.
6 2REACTOR
7 1HW HI PR .15 .001 90.
7 2CCF
8 IKI NOFO 0.4 365.
8 2LL RE WA
9 1K2 NOFO 0.4 365.
9 2LL RE WT
10 1 K3 NOFO 0.4 365.
10 2 HI DW P
.... 5...110...5...210...5.. .310...5.
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 Ti
.... 5...1|O...5...210...5.. .3:0...5.
11 1 K4 NOFO 0.4 365.
11 2 HI OW P
12 1K23 NOFO 0.4 365.
12 2 SEAL IN
13 IV-20F SC .15 30.0
13 2CST SUPL
14 ICST ISO .04 14.0
14 2 LOFC
15 IV-56 ISO .04 14.0
15 2SUP LOFC
16 1V-35 SUP 1.5 30.0
16 2 NCFC
17 IV-36 SUP 1.5 30.0
17 2 NCFC
18 iV-39 SUP .15 365.
18 2 CF-FC
19 IP RP/BLK .000001
19 2SUPP SUC
20 1-35 LIM 1.3 30.0
20 2 NOFO
....5... 1|0...5....2|0...5...3:0...5.
LEGEND: LAMBDA QRESID T2 T1
.. ... 1:0. ..5...2:0.. .5.. .3:0...5.
21 1-36 LIM 1.3 30.0
21 2 NOFO
22 1-35 LIM .02 30.0
22 2 NOFC
23 1-36 LIM .02 30.0
23 2 NOFC
24 IK15 NCFC 0.4 30.0
24 2 F ENER
25 IV-6 CST 1.6 30.0
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20. .10
0.5
0.5
..4:0.. .5... 50...5..
TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.. 4|0...5...510...5..
20.
20.
20.
20.
20.
19.
20.
..4:0...5...s10...5..
TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.4:0...5...510...5..
20.
4.0
4.0
8.0
20.
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25 2 NOFC
26 ISUP WATR .66 20.
26 2FSIG HI
27 1K25 NOFC .02 8.0
27 2SP HI WT
28 1PS2390A .33 .001 30.0 1.0 .01
28 2NCFC CST
29 1PS2390B .33 .001 30.0 1.0 .01'
29 2NCFC CST
30 IV-3 NCFC 17. 30.0 24.
30 2
.... 5 .. 10.. .5.. .210.. .5.. .310...5.. .4:0...5. .. 5|o...5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA QRESID T2 T1 TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.5... 110.. .5.. .2|0.. .5.. .3:0.. .5...4:0.. .5.. .5|0...5..
31 IV-4 NOFC 1.E-20.000007 21.0 1.5 24. 0.08 .0013
31 2
32 IV-5 NOFC 1.E-20.000007 21.0 1.5 24. .0013
32 2
33 IPUMPS F 3.9 30.0 20.
33 2
34 ITURBINE 11.5 30.0 20. .01
34 2 PARTS F
35 ILUB PUMP 7.9 30.0 20.
35 2
36 ICOOLER F 3.0 20.
36 2 AND REQ
37 IHPCILOCA .0001
37 2
38 IV-6 NOFO 1.6 30.0 20.
38 2 SUP NEED
39 ICV-45 SC .15 30.0 20.
39 2 STM EXH
40 IV-74LOFC .04 14.0 20.
40 2 STM EXH
....5... 1|10...5...2:0.. .5.. .3 0.. .5.. .4:0...5...51O... 5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 T1 TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.. ... 10... .5.. .2:0.. .s.. .3|0.. .s.. .4:0...5.. .510... 5..
41 IDIS PIPE .03 30.0 48.
41 2 RUPTURE
42 IAO-7 SC .22 365.
42 2
43 IV-8 NCFC 1.5 30.0 20.
43 2 DIS ISO
44 IV-9 NOFC .15 30. 20.
44 2 DIS INJ
44 IV-14 FC 1.5 30.0 20.
45 2MIN RECI
46 IFW ISO V 0.0
46 2 NOFC
47 1FWCV-58B 0.0
47 2 NOFC
48 1V-IONCFO .15 30. 20.
48 2 TEST V
49 IV-15NCFO .15 30.0 20.
49 2 TEST V
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50 IRESET .0001
50 2 HEP
.... 5... 1 O.. .5.. .2:0.. .5.. .310.. .5...4|0...5...510...5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
... 5.. 1 0...5 ... 210.. .5.. .3 0... 5...4:0.. .5.. .5 0...5..
51 1LWPR CCF .0001 63. 21.
51 2 F SIG
52 ITS CCF .0001 63.
52 2
53.ITRIP CCF 0.0
53 2
54 1K28 NOFC .02 8.0
54 2 ISO REL
55 ITUR OVSP 1.0 30.0 24.0
55 2 F SIG
56 IPSL 2360 .02 365. 4.0
56 2 SHORTS
57 1K17 NOFC .02 8.0
57 2 SUC LPR
58 ITS 2371A .33 63.
58 2A T/P RM
59 ITS 2373A .33 63.
59 2A T/P RM
60 ITS 2371B .33 63.
60 2B T/P RM
....5... 1 0... .... .210...5 ... 310.. .5 .. 410.. .5.. .510.. .5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP OOVR PTCF
....5... 110.. .5.. .210.. .5.. .30.. .5.. .410.. .s... .510...5..
61 iTS 23738 .33 63.
61 2B T/P RM
62 1DP2352/3 .33 63. 21.
62 2ANY OF 4
63 1K9/K36 .04 8.0
63 2NOFC DP
64 ITS 2370D .33 63.
64 28 VLV ST
65 ITS 2372D .33 63.
65 2B VLV ST
66 ITS. 2371D .33 63.
66 28 TORUS
67 iTS 2373D .33 63.
67 2F CLOSED
68 1TS.2370C .33 63.
68 2A VLV ST
69 ITS 2372C .33 63.
69 2F CLOSED
70 1PS2368AB .03 .000006 365. 1.0
70 2T X FSIG
.... 5...110.. . .. .210...5 ... 310.. .s .. 4 s0.. 5 . . 510...5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.. 5.. .1 0.. . .. .210...5 ... 310...5 ... 410...5 ... 510... s..
71 1K13 NOFC .02 8.0
71 2
72 1K12 NOFC .02 8.0
72 2
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73 1PS2389AB .66 63. 42.
73 2STM LPFS
74 1PS2389CD .66 63. 42.
74 2STM LPFS
75 1K6/K34 .04 8.0
75 2NOFC
76 IK8/K35 .04 8.0
76 2NOFC
77 1K20 NOFC .02 8.0
77 2HI T EXP
78 ILIS-72A 4.3 30.0 9.0 .25 .25 1.0
78 2RLV NOFO
79 1-72A CAL
79 2
80 1LIS-728 .4.3 30.0 9.2 .25 .25 1.0
80 2RLV NOFO
.... 5... 110.. .5.. .210.. .5...310.. .5.. .410.. .5.. .510.. .5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.... 5... 110...s ... 210...5...310...5.. .410.. .5.. 510. ..S..
81 1-72B CAL
81 2
82 1LIS-72C 4.3 30.0 9.4 .25 .25 1.0
82 2RLV NOFO
83 1-72C CAL
83 2
84 ILIS-72D 4.3 30.0 9.6 .25 .25 1.0
84 2RLV NOFO
85 1-72A CAL
85 2
86 IPS-90A 1.5 30.0 24. .25 .25 1.0
86 2NOFO
87 1-90A CAL
87 2
88 IPS-908 1.5 30.0 24.2 .25 .25 1.0
88 2NOFO
89 1-908 CAL
89 2
90 iPS-90C 1.5 30.0 24.4 .25 .25 1.0
90 2NOFO
....5... 110...5 ... 210...5 ... 310.. .5... 410.. .5.. .5'0...5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.. 5.. .1 0...5...210.. .5...310.. .5.. .410...5 ... 510...5..
91 1-90C CAL
91 2
92 IPS-90D 1.5 30.0 24.6 .25 .25 1.0
92 2NOFO
93 1-90D CAL
93 2
94 ITS 2371C .33 63.
94 2A TORUS
95 ITS 2373C .33 63.
95 2F CLOSED
96 IK24REDUN 0.30 3.6E-06 365. 8.0
96, 2 SEAL IN
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On line testing
no longer required.
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TABLE -1 FAULT TREE LOGIC
GATE GATE
NO. TYPE
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
INPUT COMP. OR GATES
122
123
125
128
131
133
8
137
137
10
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
5
124
126
129
134
134
9
138
138
11
79
81
83
85
87
89
91
93
0
0
127
130
0
0
12
0
0
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Note: Gate numbers for the partial fault
trees do not agree entirely with those
shown in the injection function fault tree.
Since gate numbers are not part of the final
cut sets, they can be renumbered to suit the
convenience of the analyst so long as they
still convey the correct logic.
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NO. IN C. S.CUT SET
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
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NO. OF COMP.
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
33
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
33
4
4
TABLE - 2'
COMPONENTS NOS.
5
12
8 10
7 8
9 10
6 10
6 7
9 11
8 11
7 9
6 11
10 82 84
7 82 84
8 91 92
8 90 92
9 90 92
6 90 92
8 91 93
8 90 93
6 91 92
10 78 84
9 91 92
6 90 93
11 78 84
10 79 84
10 78 85
7 79 84
7 78 85
11 82 84
10 83 84
10 82 85
7 83 84
7 82 85
9 91 93
7 83 85
7 78 84
10 83 85
11 82 85
11 83 84
11 83 85
9 90 93
6 91 93
7 79 85
11 79 84
11 78 85
11 79 85
10 79 85
82 84 90 92
83 84 90 93
/ I
/k1
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TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
CUT SET NO. NO. OF
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
COMP.
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
82 84 91 92
83 84 90 92
79 84 91 92
78 85 91 92
83 85 90 92
83 85 90 93
83 85 91 93
78 84 91 93
82 85 90 92
83 85 91 92
82 85 90 93
82 84 90 93
78 84 90 92
79 84 90 92
78 84 90 93
78 85 90 92
82 85 91 93
78 84 91 92
79 85 90 92
83 84 91 93
79 85 90 93
78 85 90 93
79 84 90 93
79 84 91 93
78 85 91 93
79 85 91 92
83 84 91 92
82 85 91 92
79 85 91 93
82 84 91 93
Appendix E. Initiation Function Cut Sets Before Modifications
(continued)
321
Sheet 4 of 5
TABLE -1 FAULT TREE LOGIC
GATE GATE INPUT COMP. OR GATES
NO. TYPE
121 0 122 5 0 0 0
122 1 123 124 0 0 0
123 0 125 126 127 6 0
124 0 128 129 130 7 0
125 1 131 134 0 0 0
126 1 133 134 0 0 0
127 0 140 141 139 0 0
128 1 137 138 0 0 0
129 1 137 138 0 0 0
130 0 140 141 139 0 0
131 0 78 79 0 0 0
132 0 80 81 0 0 0
133 0 82 83 0 0 0
134 0 84 85 0 0 0
135 0 86 87 0 0 0
136 0 88 89 0 0 0
137 0 90 91 0 0 0
138 0 92 93 0 0 0
139 1 12 96 0 0 0
140 1 8 10 0 0 0
141 1 9 11 0 0 0
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TABLE - 2
NO. NO. OFCUT SET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
.47
48
49
COMP.
1 -
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
5
9 11
12 96
8 10
6 7
7 78 84
7 82 84
6 91 92
6 91 93
6 90 92
6 90 93
7 79 84
7 78 85
7 79 85
7 82 85
7 83 84
7 83 85
82 84 90 92
82 85 91 92
82 85 91 93
82 84 90 93
83 84 90 93
83 84 91 92
83 84 91 93
83 85 90 92
83 85 90 93
78 84 91 92
79 84 90 92
78 85 90 92
83 85 91 92
78 85 90 93
79 84 91 92
78 85 91 92
78 84 91 93
78 85 91 93
79 84 91 93
79 85 90 92
79 85 90 93
78 84 90 93
82 84 91 92
79 85 91 92
79 85 91 93
79 84 90 93
82 85 90 92
83 85 91 93
82 85 90 93
82 84 91 93
83 84 90 92
78 84 90 92
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Fault Tree Logic
GATE
TYPE
0
1
0
I
0
0
0
1
0
I
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
I
01
O
INPUT COMP. OR GATES
101 120 0 0
102 106 0 0
103 1 2 0
104 105 0 0
3 4 5 19
6 7 8 21
107 9 0 0
108 112 116 0
10 109 11 0
110 111 0 0
12 3 13 19
14 6 15 21
16 113 17 0
114 115 0 0
3 18 19 13
6 20 21 15
22 117 23 0
118 119 0 0
3 24 25 19
6 26 27 21
121 124 0 0
122 123 0 0
30 31 0 0
28 29 0 0
125 32 0 0
34 33 126 0
35 36 0 0
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GATE
NO.
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1Io
I1
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
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Autoisolation Function Cut Sets
* TOTAL NUMBER OF CUT SET GENERATED = 109 *
CUT SET NO. NO. OF COMP. IN C. S.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
COMPONENTS NOS.
36
9
9
19
9
9
21
19
9
9
21
9
9
15 22
21 23
16 22
15 23
17 22
17 23
16 23
21 23
21 22
19 22
16 22
15 22
17 22
13 23
13 24
16 23
17 23
15 23
13 23
15 26
19 26
15 27
19 23
21 22
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Scieet 3 of 3
NO. NO. OFCUT SET
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
COMP. IN C. S.
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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Autoisol-ation Function Cut -Sets
(continued)
COMPONENTS NOS.
4 6 13 25
2 6 13 24
1 6 13 22
i 13 15 22
1 11 17 22
1 13 21 25
5 6 13 22
3 7 15 22
5 6 13 25
1 10 16 22
2 3 15 22
2 11 17 23
1 15 19 26
1 11 16 22
5 13 21 24
2 6 13 22
2 6 13 23
2 13 15 23
1 10 17 22
5 13 21 25
8 15 19 27
2 6 13 25
4 6 13 24
1 15 19 22
1 6 13 24
2 13 21 22
1 6 13 25
8 15 19 23
2 13 21 25
2 13 21 24
1 15 19 27
5 6 13 23
2 13 21 23
4 6 13 22
1 10 17 23
8 15 19 22
1 15 19 23
1 13 21 24
2 3 15 27
2 3 15 23
2 15 19 22
1 3 15 22
1 3 15 23
1 3 15 27
1 3 15 26
2 15 19 23
4 13 21 22
2 11 16 23
3 8 15 27
3 8 15 23
3 8 15 26
1 10 16 23
4 13 21 23
7 15 19 27
7 15 19 26
4 13 21 25
4 13 21 24
2 3 15 26
2 15 19 27
2 15 19 26
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Autoisolation Function Components
COMP
NEW
.... N 5 .. .. .5.. .2:0.. .5.. .3:0.. .5.. .4 0.. .5.. .5:0.. .5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.... 5... 1O.| . 5.. .2:0.. .5.. .3 0...5 ... 4:0...5.. .5:0...5..
1 iDP CANT .01
1 2DETECT
2 iCCF DP .00010 4.0
2
1125VDCD4
2BUS A
1DPIS2352 4.3
2NOFO
1K36 NOFO 0.3
2
1125VDCD5
2BUS B
1DPIS2353 4.3
2
1K9 NOFO 0.3
2
iCCF TEMP
9 2 ALL
10 iVLV CANT
10 2DETECT
.... 5... 110... 5..
LEGEND: LAMB
......1|0.. .s..
11 ICCF VLV
11 2TEMP SEN
12 ITS7OC72C 6.6
12 2
.000001
.0001 42. 14.
.00004 42. 14.
.000001
.0001 42. 14.
.00004 42. 14.
.50
4.0
.50
4.0
.0001 42.0
.01
.2:0.. .5...3 0.. .5.
DA ORESID T2 Ti
.2:0...5.. .3:0...5.
.00010 42.0
.0002 42.0
13 1K35 NOFO 0.3 .00004 42.0
13 2VLV TEMP
14 iTS70D72D 6.6 .0002 42.0
14 2VLV TEMP
15 1KB NOFO 0.3 .00004 42.0
15 2VLV TEMP
16 ITOR CANT .01
16 2DETECT
17 1CCF TOR .00010 42.0
17 2TEMP SEN
18 ITS7iC73C 6.6 .0002 42.0
18 2TOR TEMP
19 1K37 NOFO 0.3 .00004 42.0
19 2SEALIN A
20 1TS71D73D 6.6 .0002 42.0
20 2TOR TEMP
.. ... 110...5...210.. .5.. .310.. .5.
LEGEND: LAMBDA QRESID T2 TI
.... 5...1|0O... 5... 2|0...s5...3|O... 5.
21 1K27 NOFO 0.3 .00004 42.0
21 2SEALIN 8
22 IPT CANT .01
22 2
..4:0...5.
TAU TREP
..4:0... 5.
8.0
.. 5 0.. .5..
OOVR PTCF
..5|.. .5..
1.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
8.0
1.0
4.0
1.0
..4:0... .5.. .5:0.. .5..
TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
..4:0.. .s.. .510...5..
4.0
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5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
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23 iCCF P/T .00010 42.0 8.0
23 2TEMP SEN
24 ITS71A73A 6.6 .0002 42.0 1.0
24 2P/T RM
25 1K34 NOFO 0.3 .00004 42.0 4.0
25 2T/P A
26 iTS7iB738 6.6 .0001 42.0 1.0
26 2P/T RM
27 1K6 NOFO 0.3 .00004 42.0 4.0
27 2P/T B
28 148OVAC .00004
28 2
29 IV-4 NOFO 3.00 .0005 14.0 24.
29 2
30 125OVDCD9 .000001
30 2
.... 5... 110...5...2 0.. .5... 310...5...410.. .5.. .510...5..
LEGEND: LAMBDA ORESID T2 TI TAU TREP QOVR PTCF
.... 5... 110.. .5.. .210.. .5.. .310.. .5.. .410.. .5.. .510...5..
31 1V-5 NOFO 3.00 .0005 14.0 24.
31 2
32 IV-34,35 .00001
32 2BOTH OP
33 1125VDCD8 .000001
33 2
34 1K28 NOFO 0.3 .00004 4.0
34 2
35 1V-35NOFO 3.00 .0005 30.00 24.
35 2
36 IV-36NOFO 3.00 .0005 30.00 24.
36 2
-1
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Appendix I
FRANTIC-II INPUT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix gives the input format of the FRANTIC
II-MIT Code. Much of it is a verbatum copy or paraphrase
of the FRANTIC manuals IVe77,Ve8l] so that the entire input
structure can be available in this document.
The FRANTIC II-MIT Code calculates unavailability from
a system unavailability equation provided by the CUTSETS
subroutines, which are described in Appendix J. Before he
can accomplish quantitative calculations the user must first
generate cut sets for his system using CUTSETS and store the
resultant output with his permanent files. The cut sets and
the evaluation routines contained in CUTSETS substitute for
the user provided SYSCOM subroutine required for the original
FRANTIC II Code. The file containing the cut sets must be
identified when calling the executive program to run the code.
See Appendix K for examples of how this is done on the IBM
VM/SP CMS computer system at MIT.
In addition to generating cut sets, the user must supply
failure rate and test data for each component of the system.
This data is broken into cases. A case contains all the in-
put information necessary to accomplish a calculation of sys-
tem unavailability over a specific interval of time. As a
minimum, it contains:
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* Reference to the cut sets to be used to describe the sys-
tem. (Only one set of minimal cut sets may be used for
any one computer run. It is identified when the code is
run.)
" A set of components which make up the system whose un-
availability is to be studied.
* Titles, time, and print options (all optional).
* Either a RUN or an OPTEST data group to specify the type
of calculation desired.
Data input for one case remains unchanged for all subsequent
cases in a given computer run until specifically changed by
the user. When multiple cases are run, only that data which
differs from the previous case need be entered. Program ex-
ecution terminates when no additional data groups are en-
countered. (Figure 3.1 gives a description of the computa-
tional flow.)
1.2 DATA GROUPS
Cases may be described by up to eight sets of data groups.
Each data group consists of a keyword line and one or more
additional lines of formatted input. A complete program run
can be accomplished with two data groups. The others are op-
tional. The eight data groups are described below.
1.2.1 TITLE DATA GROUP
This data group specifies the title for the case to be
run. It consists of a keyword card containing the characters
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"TITL" in the first 4 columns (only the first four characters
need be entered for this and all other keyword cards) followed
by a card containing 80 characters of text to be printed as a
header on the output report for the case.
Input Format:
LINE COLUMNS NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
Type A 1-4 ANAME A4 Keyword "TITL"
Type B 1-80 TITLEl 20A4 Title for output
Sample Input:
TITLE
TEST OF OFFSET CALCULATIONS FOR TEST CAUSED WEAROUT, MARCH 12
1.2.2 POPT DATA GROUP (OPTIONAL)
This data group is used to suppress the formatted
version of FRANTIC II-MIT output contained in the original
FRANTIC II code when use is being made of the FILES subrou-
tine to write selected input and output data to a file. By
selectively suppressing formatted output, the user can reduce
computing time and avoid the requirement to search through
a large volume of data to find one or two numbers when
accomplishing sensitivity studies.
If the POPT data group is not used, all formatted out-
put will be generated. Once suppressed, the formatted output
will not be generated until another POPT data group which
changes the input options is input.
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Input
C
Format:
OLUMNS NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
1-4 ANAME A4 Keyword "POPT"
On this line a zero or blank suppresses the
formatted printing of the data. A 1 generates
the formatted output.
1 COMP Il Component Data
2 PEAK Il Peak Unavaila-
3
4
QSAV
TIME
Il
Il
bilities
Average System
Unavailability
Data
Time Point Data
Sample input which suppresses time point data and peak
unavailabilities.
P9PT
1 1
1.2.3 COMPONENTS DATA GROUP
This data group describes the failure characteristics
of the components which make up the system to be evaluated.
It is identified by a keyword card beginning with the char-
acters "COMP." The keyword line must be followed by a line
beginning with the characters "NEW" or "UPDATE". "NEW" in-
dicates that the components being input in the data group
which follows will become the component set for the next cal-
culation. All previously input components (if any) are de-
leted. "UPDATE" is used to change selected parameters in
existing components or to add components to an existing group.
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C
LINE
A
B
Only the non-blank component parameters (with the exception
of offset time which must be input every time) are used in
updating the failure characteristics of previously input
components. After the "NEW" or "UPDATE" line, two lines
must be entered for each component.
The COMPONENT data group used in FRANTIC II-MIT is en-
tirely different from the original FRANTIC II Code, as it
incorporates additional failure and test parameters and
provides more space for those contained in the original code.
As a result, two lines of input are now necessary to describe
a component's failure characteristics. Line C contains all
those parameters necessary to describe failures represented
by a constant hazard rate. Line D contains those which model
the generalized Weibull hazard rate and test caused wearout.
Unless otherwise noted the default value is zero.
Input Format:
LINE COLUMN NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
A 1-4 ANAME A4 Keyword "COMP"
B 1-4 TYPE A4 Option NEW or
6-13
14-20
21-27
INDX
LINE
NAME
LAMDA
QRESID
13
12
A8
F7.0
F7.0
UPDATE
Component Number
Input line num-
ber = 1
Component Name
Detectable Standby
Failure Rate x
E+6/hr, Xo
Demand Failure
Rate, qd
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C 1-3
4-5
LINE COLUMN NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
28-32 TEST2 F5.0 Test Interval (days),
T2
33-37 TESTl F5.0 First Test Interval
(days), Tl, default=
T2
38-42 TAU F5.0 Average Test Time
(hours), T
43-47 REPAIR F5.0 Average Repair Time
(hours), TR
48-52 QOVRD F5.0 Unavailability to
Override Test, qo
53-57 PTCF F5.0 Probability of Test
Caused Failures, Pf
58-62 CAROVR F5.0 Test Carryover Factor,
Cf
63-67 INEFF F5.0 Detection Inefficiency,
p
68-74 ULAMDA F7.0 Undetectable Standby
Failure Rate (xE+6/hr),
D 1-3 INDX 13 Component Number
4-5 LINE 12 Input Line Number=2
6-13 DUMMY Not used for input.
Space may be used to
further describe comp
and appears in input
file only.
14-20 BETA F7.0 Shape Factor, 8,
default = 1.0
21-27 OFFSET F7.0 Offset time (years),
t0
28-32 FNLAM F5.0 Lambda test factor,
f., default = 1.0
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LINE COLUMN NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
33-37 FNQR F5.0 Demand Test Factor,
fd, default = 1.0
38-42 FNQT F5.0 Fraction of demand
affected by test, ft'
default = 1.0
43-47 TYPE F5.0 Component Renewal
Type: 1 = NN, 2 = 00,
3 = ON, default = 1
If p is input as a non-zero value, the program will re-
compute X0 as follows:
If p is input and A is left blank, the program will compute
A as follows:
X X=
The 17 parameters described allow the user to specify
most types of components under a variety of testing schemes:
Periodically Tested Components -- user must provide X , T2'
and optionally, Ti, T, TR' o' Pf p' A p qd' ' A' fd' ft
to and TYPE. The following values of TYPE indicate the case:
TYPE = 1.0 GOOD AS NEW test and repair (Case NN)
= 2.0 GOOD AS OLD test and repair (Case 00)
= 3.0 GOOD AS OLD test and GOOD AS NEW repair
(Case ON)
If more than one component in series in a system is tested
as the result of a single test, then set q = 0 in all but one
of the components which is affected. That one component should
be given the actual value of go. If qo = 1, this procedure is
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not necessary. if, however, q, 0 1, then not setting to zero
all but one of the components results in a test contribution
which is over estimated, that is, q0 is counted more than once.
Monitored Components -- X and TR must be input. The following
values of ITYPE indicate the case:
TYPE = 1. 0 GOOD AS NEW repair
= 2.0 GOOD AS OLD repair
T2 must be zero or left blank; Tl, q0, f and Pf are ignored; and
$, p, X, qd and ITYPE are optional. If T is input, it is
added to TR'
Nonrepairable Components -- X, qd, T2, Tl, T and TR must be
zero or left blank; Pf, p, f and ITYPE are ignored; A must
be input and 6 is optional. Alternatively, A may be input in-
stead of A. In this case, T2 should be set to a value greater
than the total time period of interest, and all paramters, ex-
cept 6, must be zero.
Constant Unavailability -- all parameters except qd must be
zero or left blank and a value for qd must be input.
The last line of the components data group contains "-l"
in the component number field. This indicates the end of the
data for the group. The maximum number of components is 100.
Sample Input:
A - COMP c
C - I 1sUM 20 30.0 20. .05
- 1 2 (
1.2.4 TIME DATA GROUP (OPTIONAL)
This data group specifies the time period over which
component and system unavailabilities are to be computed. It
consists of a keyword card beginning with the characters "TIME"
followed by a single card containing the total time (in days)
over which the time dependent, instantaneous unavailability
is to be computed, and the maximum allowable interval (in days)
between any two times, TDEL. If the data group (including the
keyword card) is omitted, or if a zero is entered for the time
period, the default value, 365 days, takes effect. If the
maximum time interval, TDEL, is omitted, or if a zero is entered,
no maximum will be required.
The number of time points generated by the code within
the time period is a function of the test intervals, testing
times, repair times of the components, as well as the value of
the maximum interval. A pair of points is generated wherever
a discontinuity in any component unavailability function
occurs. For example, suppose a particular component has the
following time dependent unavailability function:
t0 tI t2 t3 t4 t t6
345TIME
The program will generate time points at to+E, t
t 1 +E, t2-E,t 2 +E; t ... , T-E, where E is a small number
(E=10 4 hrs) and T is the total time specified in the TIME
data group (or the 365 day default value). Time points for
all the other components are generated in a similar manner.
All the points are then merged and duplicate points discarded.
A test is then made to insure that the difference between
any two times is less than or equal to TDEL, and, if required,
extra time points are inserted. If the system contains no
periodically tested components, then time points are generated
at intervals of TDEL starting at t=O.
The time points generated in FRANTIC II are based on all
the components input in the COMPONENTS data group, regardless
of whether they are actually used in the system unavailability
function.
The spacing of the time points affects the accuracy of
the computed average (or mean) system unavailability and the
appearance of the instantaneous unavailability plots. The
more non-linear the system unavailability, the more time
points are required for extremely precise evaluations. A
lack of sufficient points can cause some distortions in the
plots and yield somewhat inaccurate estimates of the average
system unavailability.
The inaccuracy occurs because the program computes the
average system unavailability by numerical integration using
the trapezoid rule (i.e., successive points are connected by
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straight lines and the area under the resulting function is
computed). The method yields the correct area for the contri-
butions to unavailability due to testing and repairs, but
may overestimate or underestimate contributions due to fail-
ures (the between tests contribution).
Input Format:
LINE COLUMN NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
A 1-4 ANAME A4 Keyword "TIME"
B 1-10 TEND F10.0 Total Time Period In
11-20 TDEL
Days, T (default, T=365)
F10.0 Maximum Time Interval
In Days (default, no
maximum)
Sample Input:
TIME
1825. 5.0
1.2.5 PRINT DATA GROUP (OPTIONAL)
This data group is used to request a table printout of
the system unavailabilities computed by the program over one
or more time intervals (within the input time period) and to
specify the number of instantaneous unavailabilities to be
ranked by magnitude. The data group is identified by a key-
word card beginning with the characters "PRIN." The keyword
card must be followed by one card containing the number of
time intervals desired and the number of maximum unavailabil-
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ities desired. The value input for the number of intervals
may be -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4.
If the value input is negative, all system unavailabil-
ities computed are printed and no additional lines are neces-
sary. If the value is zero, any print options previously
specified are nullified and the default option (no print) is
instituted. No additional lines are necessary. If the value
is greater than zero, another line containing the end points
of the intervals is read. In this case the program will
print the system unavailability at all the computed time
points that fall within the specified interval(s) including
the end points. A maximum of four intervals may be specified,
and they may overlap.
The maximum unavailability output lists, in decreasing
order, the n greatest instantaneous system unavailabilities
computed by the program. The number of unavailabilities
printed (n) has a default value of 12 and may not exceed 100.
If the PRINT data group (including the keyword card) is
omitted, 12 peaks are printed, and no other system unavail-
ability printout is produced. The PRINT data group is depicted
as follows:
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Input Format:
LINE
A
B
C
(use only
when num-
ber of in-
tervals is
>0)
COLUMN
1-4
1-5
6-10
1-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
NAME
ANAME
NPRT
NPK
STPRT (1)
FINPRT(l)
STPRT (2)
FINPRT(2)
STPRT (3)
FINPRT(3)
STPRT (4)
FINPRT(4)
FORMAT DESCRIPTION
A4 Keyword = "PRIN"
15 Number of time inter-
vals for printing sys-
tem unavailabilities
(-l,0, or 1-4)
15 Number of peaks to be
printed
F10.0 Start of first time
interval in days
F10.0
F10. 0
F10.0
F10.0
F10.0
F10.0
F10. 0
End of first time in-
terval in days
Start of 2nd time in-
terval in days
End of 2nd time inter-
val in days
Start of 3rd time in-
terval in days
End of 3rd time inter-
val in days
Start of 4th time in-
terval in days
End of 4th time inter-
val in days
Sample Input:
365.
4.
~PRINT
3- 2
-0__.0
i-? ( _
1460. 1825.
A
Vt ~
'I
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1.2.6 PLOT DATA GROUP (NOT ACTIVE IN FRANTIC II-MIT)
This data group specifies how instantaneous system
unavailability is to be plotted. To use the plot option it
would be necessary to make the plot generating subroutines
in FRANTIC II-MIT conform with local plotting hardware.
Since average unavailability of the system rather than its
instantaneous unavailability was the primary information de-
rived from running FRANTIC II-MIT in this study, the plot
routines were not modified to function on the MIT plotter.
1.2.7 RUN DATA GROUP
This data group initiates the system unavailability
computations. The COMPONENTS and optionally the TITLE, TIME,
PRINT and PLOT parameters must be set up before the RUN data
group. The RUN data group is identified by a keyword card
beginning with the characters "RUN."
The RUN keyword card must be followed by one or more
run data cards, where each card has the following parameters:
1) system number - number code identifying the number
of terms in the inclusion-exclusion expansion used
for calculations. This may be 1, 3 or 5. The use
of 1 corresponds to use of the rare event approxi-
mation and is the fastest running of the 3 options.
2) unavailability option - four letter code selecting
the type of unavailability to be computed where
"FAIL" means compute the instantaneous
unavailability based on contributions
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from component failures only (the be-
tween tests contribution).
"TOTL" means compute the instantaneous
unavailability based on contributions
from failures, testing and repairs.
When the unavailability option is left
blank, the default value is "TOTL."
3) x-scale - four letter code specifying the scaling
of the points along the x or time axis for plotting.
"NONE" means no plots are produced and
should always be used in FRANTIC II-MIT.
If x-scale is left blank, the default value is "LIN"
when the unavailability option is "FAIL", "BOTH"
when the unavailability option is "TOTL."
4) y-scale - four letter code specifying the scaling of
the points along the y or system unavailability axis
where
"NONE" means no plots are produced (may
be omitted if x-scale = "NONE")
5) plot cutoff option - power of 10 to be used as a lower
bound on system unavailability for plotting (e.g.,
-7 = 10~7). The default is no cutoff. This is not
used in FRANTIC II-MIT.
6) plot title - 56 character text to appear as a plot
subheading in addition to the title for the case.
A negative system number indicates the end of the RUN data
group.
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Input Format:
COLUMN
1-4
1-3
5-8
10-13
15-18
20-23
25-80
1-3
NAME
ANAME
NSYS
QOPT
XOPT
YOPT
ICUTOP
TITLE2
NSYS
FORMAT
A4
13
A4
A4
A4
14
14A4
13
Sample Input:
3
RUN
- TOTL NONE NONE
LINE
A
B
1.2.8 TEST DATA GROUP
This data group describes the input necessary to use
Subroutine OPTEST. Subroutine OPTEST calculates the optimum
test interval of a single component subject to test caused
down time. Test caused down time is the result of either
test caused failures, unavailability to override the test,
or repair of demand caused failures. The subroutine uses
data input using the "COMP" data group for its calculations.
Two options can be used to obtain output:
DESCRIPTION
Keyword "RUN"
1, 3 or 5 number terms
in incl.-excl. expansion
Unavailability option
Input NONE
Input NONE or leave
blank
Leave blank
RUN title
End of run cards
indicator (-1)
kwo.l
(
C
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1) Calculate the optimum test interval, the (minimum)
unavailability when tested at this interval, and the two
test intervals which will result in an increase in the aver-
age unavailability by a factor of f over the minimum. (One
will be shorter than the optimum, corresponding to an in-
crease in test caused unavailability, and one will be longer,
corresponding to an increase in undetected standby failures.)
2) Calculate the optimum test interval, the (minimum)
unavailability resulting from testing at the optimum inter-
val, the unavailability resulting from testing at the inter-
val input in the "COMP" data group for that component, and
the factor f increase of that unavailability over the minimum.
Input Format:
LINE COLUMN
1 4 1-4
2 61 1
2-5
6-15
NAME
ANAME
OPTION
INDEX
F
FORMAT
A4
Il
14
F10.3
DESCRIPTION
Keyword "TEST"
0 = Terminate OPTEST
calculations
1 = Calculate T2OP,
QMIN (at T2OP), T2LOW
and T2HI giving Q =
F*QMIN.
2 = Calculate T2OP,
QMIN, Q for T2 input
with component data,
and F = Q/QMIN.
Component index number.
Input for option 1 only.
Factor increase of Q
over QMIN used for cal-
culating T2LOW and T2HI.
Default is 1.1.
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Sample Input:
A - TEST
B -1 1
I 1 1.2
1 1 1.3
1 1 1.4
1 1 1.5
0
0
354
Appendix J
THE CUTSETS PACKAGE
J.l INTRODUCTION
Cut sets are generated by the CUTSETS package of sub-
routines taken directly from Karimi [Ka80]. This appendix
describes the input necessary to use CUTSETS and gives some
suggestions for improving the flexibility of its use.
Procedure for using the CUTSETS subroutines:
e First derive the fault tree by an analysis of the system.
* Assign a number to each basic failure event starting
from 1. For complement events, use the negative of the
number of the event, (i.e., if there exist both A and A
in a fault tree and the number N has already been assigned
to A, then -N should be assigned to A).
* Assign a number to the Top Event.
e Number all the intermediate gates in order until all the
gates have been numbered.
When assigning a number to the Top Gate it is possible to
leave room for additional basic failure events. This will
allow for future expansion of the fault tree without the re-
quirement to renumber all the gates. See the useage notes.
J.2 INPUT FORMAT
LINE COLUMN NAME FORMAT DESCRIPTION
A 1-4 IMAX 14 Largest number reserved
for basic failure events
in the fault tree logic.
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LINE
The Type B input line continues until every gate has been
described. The gates must be input in sequence starting
from the top gate to the last gate with none left out.
When the input file is completed the first number in each
line should increment consecutively from the number of com-
ponents to the number of the last gate.
Sample Input:
FILE: 2OUTOF3 LOGIC A
S14 3 0 3
10 0. 11 12 14
11 t 1 2
12 1 3 4
1314 11 5 6
COLUMN
5-8
9-12
13-16
17-20
NAME
IMAXT
LMAX
NSORT
NMAX
Ll (I , 1)
Ll(I, 2)
Ll(I,J=
3,20)
FORMAT DESCRIPTION
14 Number of the last gate in
the fault trep.-rr/g y
14 Maximum number of inputs to
a single gate. Presently,
IMAX limit is 18.
I41/ A control word for minimal
cut set print out. If NSORT=
1, no sorting of cut sets.
If NSORT=0, the minimum cut
sets are ordered according
to size.
14 L Maximum allowable components
per cut set. (Reduced to 10
in CUTSETS)
14 Gate number I
14 Logic of Gate I: 1 = AND,
0 = OR.
18(14) Numbers of gates or compo-
nents input to Gate I.
Right justify within field
of four spaces. Complement
events are entered as nega-
tive numbers.
B 1-4
5-8
9-80
*AV
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J.3 USEAGE NOTES
1. Within a fault tree it is not important how the
gates- are numbered so long as an input line appears for
every gate number between the Top Event and the last gate.
Lower numbered gates may be input into higher numbered gates
without affecting the logic of the tree.
2. If a gate is removed from the system fault tree the
following procedure can be used to avoid renumbering the
gates following it.
a. Insure that the gate is removed as an input to any other
gate.
b. Leave an input line in the LOGIC file which contains only
the number of the removed gate. This will satisfy the
input format of the code, but the line containing the
number of the removed gate will have no affect on the
fault tree logic.
In the sample input file given above, the line numbered 13
represents a gate that has been removed from the fault tree
logic. It can be seen in the sample output that a gate 13
is listed as part of the input, but the cutsets are generated
without its affecting the results.
3. The CUTSETS routines are run on an IBM VM/SP CMS
system at MIT using a file called CUTSETS EXEC:
GLOBAL TXTLIB PLOTLIB CMSLIB FORTLIB
FILEDEF 5 DISK &l/LOGIC
FILEDEF 6 DISK &l CUTOUT(LRECL 132
FILEDEF 8 DISK I&liCUTSETS(LRECL 132
LOAD CUTSETS (START
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In this file, &l is a variable which will assume the name
of whatever file name the user desires. The first line calls
the libraries necessary to interprete the FORTRAN commands.
For example, the fault tree logic of the 2OUTOF3 LOGIC file
can be processed by typing:
CUTSETS 2OUTOF3
The EXEC will execute in the following manner:
cutsets 2outof 3 Vfo'ry(g
GLOBAL TXTLIB #PMN09. PLOTLIB CMSLIB FORTLIB
FILEDEF 5 DISK 2OUTOF3 LOGIC
FILEDEF 6 DISK 2OUTOF3 CUTOUT ( LRECL 132
FILEDEF 8 DISK 2OUTOF3 CUTSETS ( LRECL 132
LOAD CUTSETS ( START
EXECUTION BEGINS...
R; T=0.24/O.50 13:25:44
Two files are produced as a result of the program execution.
a. Formatted output for qualitative analysis is con-
tained in 2OUTOF3 CUTOUT. This file is not used for quanti-
tative evaluations and may be erased after printing.
FILE: 2OUTOF3 CUTOUT A
I
0
TABLE -1
GATE
NO.
10
11
12
13
14
0 MIND IND LMIN II I
0 0 3 4 3
1 * TOTAL NUMBER
0 TABLE - 2 ;-
CUT SET NO. NO.
1
2
3
FAULT TREE
GATE
TYPE
0
1
1
0
1
LOGIC
INPUT COMP. OR GATES
11 12 14
1 2 0
3 4 0
0 0 0
5 6 0
OF CUT SET GENERATED = 3 *
OF COMP. IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
2 1 2
2 3 4
2 5 6
At
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b. Output for quantitative analysis with FRANTIC II-MIT
is contained in 2OUTOF3 CUTSETS. It is formatted so that it
will automatically read into the FRANTIC II-MIT common block
storage when its file name is given in the EXEC which runs
FRANTIC II-MIT. It is given here for illustrative purposes:
FILE: 2OUTOF3 CUTSETS Al
3 0 1 0
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 0 0 0 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 2 4 8 16' 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048
4096 8192 16384 32768 65536 131072 262144 524288 1048576 2097152
4194304 8388608 16777216 33554432 67108864
134217728 268435456 536870912 1073741824 0
3 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0
48 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
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Appendix K
RUNNING FRANTIC II-MIT ON CMS
This appendix contains suggestions for running FRANTIC
II-MIT on the IBM 370 VM/SP CMS system.
K.]l USING XEDIT COMMANDS AND MACROS
The formatted input required by FRANTIC II-MIT can be
easily and accurately established using Xedit subcommands.
The most useful commands are CLocate and COVerlay using
the column pointer provided by the editor. If two or more
commands are executed in sequence repetitively, a separate
file with file type XEDIT can be established to execute all
the commands at once. For example, the following file will
automatically insert a value for qd in the current line,
provided the user is on the correct line.
FILE: O XEDIT A
CL:21
cov &I
This command can be executed by typing qd .0001 and return.
The symbols _ put a blank into the file. Note that the
format for inputting qd is F7.0, so seven characters are in
the field containing .0001. This ensures that any previous
value in the space provided for qd is completely overwritten
by the current value. On a line editing CRT, the result will
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lopk like:
/ 8 1
8 iKi NOFO 0.30 3.6E-06 60. 19.
qd _. 0001
8 IKI NOFO 0.30 3.6E-06 60. 19.
8 IKI NOFO 0.30 .0001 60. 19.
The following is an example of a file which might be
used to change the periodic test interval of selected com-
ponents in a system. When the command,
macro m2254 
_30.
is used, this file will be used to change the periodic test
interval of the specified components in the previous COMP
data group. The word "macro" is required because the file
name contains numbers. FILE: M2254 XEDIT A
SET V OFF
L -/COMP
CL:28
L / 51 1/
COV &1
L / 73 1/
COV &1
L / 74 1/
COV &1
SET V ON
CF
The above file can be used to create input for sensitiv-
ity calculations of the effect of test interval on unavail-
ability. When multiple calculations are to be made in one
computer run, use can also be made of the PUT and GET sub-
commands for setting up the calculation. (It is not neces-
sary to input the subcommands in capital letters. The capitals
are used here to emphasize that they are subcommands of the
Xedit editor.) A possible procedure is:
1) Set up the first calculation with the COMP and RUN
data groups together at the end of the input.
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2) Give the subcommand -/COMP to move the current
line to the beginning of the COMP data group.
3) Give the subcommand PUT* to copy both the COMP
and RUN data groups into a temporary holding file while
also keeping it in the current data file.
4) Give the subcommand BOT to ensure the current
line is at the end of the data file.
5) Give the subcommand GET to copy an additional COMP
and RUN data group into the file. There will now be two
COMP and RUN data groups in the original data file.
6) Give the subcommand MACRO M2254 _35._ to change
the test interval to 35 days. The macro will go back to the
beginning of the previous COMP data group, search for the
designated component identifications and overlay _35._ in
the field starting at column 28.
With the subcommands and macros available in Xedit the
flexibility for setting up input data files is immense. For
further information consult the IBM reference manuals.
K.2 RUN EXEC
The following is the EXEC file used to run FRANTIC II-
MIT.
FILE: RUN EXEC A
\1 FO (' t 
-'GLOBAL TXTLIB E.SA3MBG2 P LLIB CMSLIB FO TLIB
FILEDEF 5 DISK &3 DAT /\ / \
FILEDEF 6 DISK &3 OUT(LRECL 132
FILEDEF 8 DISK &2 CUTSETS(LRECL 132
FILEDEF 10 DISK &3 FILE
FILEDEF 11 DISK &3 OPTEST
LOAD &1 (START
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In order to run FRANTIC II-MIT the following files
must have been established.
1) CUTSETS must have already been run to produce a
file having filetype CUTSETS.
2) Input data is stored in a file with filetype DAT.
When the code runs it produces:
1) Standard formatted output in a file having the file-
name of the input data files name and filetype OUT.
2) Output in accordance with that specified in the
FILES subroutine is stored in a file with a filename of the
input data but having a filetype FILE.
The following is an example of how a run looks on a
terminal. This run produced the data for Figure 5.4.
run frantic parallel simpsys
GLOBAL TXTLIB FORTMOD2 PLOTLIB CMSLIB FORTLIB
FILEDEF 5 DISK SIMPSYS DAT
FILEDEF 6 DISK SIMPSYS OUT ( LRECL 132
FILEDEF 8 DISK PARALLEL CUTSETS ( LRECL 132
FILEDEF 10 DISK SIMPSYS FILE
FILEDEF 11 DISK SIMPSYS OPTEST
LOAD FRANTIC ( START
EXECUTION BEGINS...
R; T=1.26/1.67 00:26:47
K.3 SUBROUTINE FILES
The following is an example of Subroutine FILES. It is
self explanatory.
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FILE: FILES
SUBROUTINE FILES
C
C SUBROUTINE FILES OUTPUTS COMMON BLOCK DATA TO A USER SPECIFIED
C FILEDEF 10. CURRENTLY THE USER MUST PROGRAM FILES FOR THE
C PARAMETERS HE DESIRES TO BE SAVED IN A FILE.
C THIS SUBROUTINE WILL BE MOST USEFUL FOR DOING SENSITIVITY STUDIES
C THE USER CAN SUPPRESS NORMAL FORMATTED OUTPUT USING THE
-C POPT DATA GROUP. THE SPECIFIC VARIABLE BEING CHANGED AND THE
C RESULTING QSAVG CAN THEN BE OUTPUT TO FILEDEF 10 FOR USE IN
C PLOT ROUTINES OR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.
C
C
C THIS SECTION EXTABLISHES THE COMMON BLOCKS ACCESSED
COMMON /NRUN/ NRUN
COMMON /HEADER/ TITLE1(22),TITLE2(16)
COMMON /TIMDAT/ TI(1500),IAREA(1500),TEND,NTIME,NEWTIM,TDEL
DOUBLE PRECISION TI
COMMON /SYSAVG/ OSAVG,QFAVG,QTAVG,QRAVGITOPT
COMMON /QPARAM/ NAME( 100),LAMDA(100),OLDLAM( 100),TEST2( 100),
I TESTi(100),TAU(100),REPAIR(100),QOVRD(100),
2 PTCF(100),INEFF(100),ULAMDA(100),QRESID(100),
3 BETA(100),CAROVR(100),OFFSET(100),FNLAMD(100),
4 FNQRSD(100),FTORSD(100),ITYPE(100),NCOMP,DIFF
REAL LAMDA,INEFF
DOUBLE PRECISION NAME
COMMON /QCON/ NTEST(100),PTCFI(100),QRESI(100),QN(100),
1 QUN(100).PK(100,100)
C
C THIS SECTION IS CHANGED BY THE USER TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS
TST=TEST2(1)/24.
OFSET=OFFSET(1)/(24.*365.)
IF(NRUN.GT.1) GO TO 9
WRITE(10,11)
11 FORMAT(' LAMBDA(1) OFFSET(1) BETA(1) ORESID(1) TEST2(1) QSAVG')
9 WRITE(10,2) LAMDA(1),OFSET,BETA(i),QRESID(1),TST,QSAVG
2 FORMAT(6(iPEIO.2))
RETURN
END
It is frequently convenient to keep more than one FILES
subroutine. This can be done by creating them under unique
filenames.. When any specific subroutine is required, a
series of commands will change the active FILES subroutine
to the one desired. For example, the commands:
x initfile fortran
file files
R; T=0.07/0.18 00:43:19
fortgi files
G1 COMPILER ENTERED
SOURCE ANALYZED
PROGRAM NAME = FILES
* NO DIAGNOSTICS GENERATED
R; T=O.27/0.48 00:43:30
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FORTRAN A
call the filename INITFILE FORTRAN and files a copy as FILES
FORTRAN. After it is compliled the formatted output in the
FILE will follow these Fortran statements:
TST5=TEST2(5)/24.
TST86-TEST2(86)/24.
IF(NRUN.GT.i) GO TO 9
WRITE(10,11)
11 FORMAT(' LAMBDA(6) LAMBDA(12)TAU(5) TEST2(5) TEST2(86) QSAVG')
9 RT=OFFSET(1)/(24.*365.)
WRITE(0,2) LAMDA(6),LAMDA(12),TAU(5),TST5,TST86,QSAVG
2 FORMAT(6(iPEIO.2))
RETURN
END
A
365
\NG
O)
